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Abstract

Conflict of laws rules in Canada bias toward taking jurisdiction over matters involving human
rights or environmental abuse inflicted abroad, particularly when inflicted by Canadian
corporations. Contrary to enumerated tests for jurisdiction, many Canadian courts have instead
preferred a regressive state-centric/hyper-comity anchor in applying such tests to putative foreign
plaintiffs. This Thesis argues this preference can be effectively understood using the lens and
language of Pierre Bourdieu’s field theory as representing a habitus of the Canadian judiciary. In
light of the habitus of the Canadian judicial field, and in order to encourage an interpretation of
conflict of laws rules in Canada that prefers an uptake of such claims, practitioners ought to
introduce issues of jurisdiction to Canadian courts framed with respect to fairness, notably whether
it is fair to provide Canadian corporations significant benefit when operating abroad and, through
failure to take jurisdiction, allow such corporations to avoid civil prosecution.
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Introduction
The world’s climate is changing, likely in large part because of human/corporate
behaviour.1 The impacts of such change, though largely still to come, are most endured by the
world’s poorest citizens.2 In a growing trend, affected groups are turning to international and
domestic law to assign blame to major players and to seek compensation in order to assist with
the mitigation of the effects of climate change. As of March 2017, the United Nations (UN)
Environment Programme had counted nearly 1000 civil cases related to climate change filed
worldwide against governments, 654 of those cases being filed in the United States (US) alone.3
Such cases seek to hold governments accountable for legislative and policy commitments, link
government actions to greenhouse gas emissions, or establish liability for failures to adapt to
climate change. In Canada, while there have been some domestic attempts at tying responsibility
for climate change to the Canadian federal and provincial governments — through constitutional
challenges and judicial reviews4 — there has yet to be a successful claim against any level of
government, nor any of Canada’s multinational corporations, for their role in climate change.5
Such challenges —whether against governments or corporations — bring with them a
scale and complexity that dwarfs the average civil case given the myriad logistical, causational,
and procedural difficulties.6 However, before having any case heard, putative plaintiffs will need
to convince a Canadian court that it has jurisdiction over the matter. Where affected plaintiffs are
foreign citizens, such jurisdiction to hear the case, let alone determine it on its merits, is far from
1

IPCC, “2018: Summary for Policymakers. In: Global Warming of 1.5°C. An IPCC Special Report on the impacts
of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways, in the
context of strengthening the global response to the threat of climate change, sustainable development, and efforts to
eradicate poverty” World Meteorological Organization, Geneva, Switzerland.
2
O Hoegh-Guldberg et al, “2018: Impacts of 1.5oC Global Warming on Natural and Human Systems. In: Global
Warming of 1.5°C. An IPCC Special Report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels
and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways, in the context of strengthening the global response to the
threat of climate change, sustainable development, and efforts to eradicate poverty” (2018) IPCC.
3
UNEP, “The Status of Climate Change Litigation: A Global Review” (May 2017) at 10-11.
4
See for example, the now abandoned judicial review by Ecojustice against the Province of Ontario with respect to
a decision to approve additional air pollutant releases in Sarnia as impeding the applicants’ right to life, liberty, and
security of the person per s 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms: Ronald Plain v Director, Ministry of
the Environment, Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario, as represented by the Minister of the Environment, the
Attorney General of Ontario and Suncor Energy Products Inc, Court File No. 528/10 (ON SCJ).
5
Meinhard Doelle, Dennis Mahony & Alex Smith, “Canada” in Richard Lord et al, eds, Climate Change Liability:
Transnational Law and Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012) at 525.
6
Daniel Augenstein, “Torture as Tort? Transnational Tort Litigation for Corporate-Related Human Rights Violations
and the Human Right to a Remedy” (2018) H R L Rev 593 [Augenstein 2018] at 595.
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assured. Foreign plaintiffs in Canada are subject to Canadian conflict of laws/private
international law rules and the application of such rules has failed to keep pace with the
internationalization of the global marketplace and the reality of earth sciences.
Though climate change litigation has been slow to develop in Canada (especially
compared to the United States), we may look to project-specific transnational tort litigation
outside the field of climate change dimensions – some for environment-related harms and some
for harms associated with more classical human rights violations – to predict the role jurisdiction
will play in such climate change cases and thus to minimize the risk of failure and subsequent
determinations of res judicata. Such tort cases, already ongoing, are likely the best avenue with
which to create precedent and pave the way for the larger climate change actions. There are
several reasons for this. The defendants, though whose involvement is frequently complicated by
veiled corporate relationships, are generally few and easy to identify; similarly, though plaintiffs
may be numerous, they are often aligned in a representative or class action; last, the tortious
conduct is generally tied to a single or ongoing identifiable event at a single location or project.
In such cases, the parties and damages are much easier to identify, thus preventing any clouding
of judicial judgment by novelty and scale and providing an observer with a cleaner test of
jurisdiction.
Unfortunately, Canadian extraction abroad provides a rich source for such cases.
Between 2000 and 2015, at least 44 people died, and 403 people were injured as a result of
violence surrounding Canadian-owned mines in Latin America alone.7 Those most heavily
affected were those opposed to mining projects and their family members as well as women,
children, and union and indigenous leaders. Such numbers were described by the Justice and
Corporate Accountability Project (JCAP) as “the tip of the iceberg.”8 Indeed, the figures are
limited to the Latin American region and reflect only data that was available. While many of the
incidents JCAP outlined went unpunished, some plaintiffs have come forward to seek redress. In
a (perhaps ironic) reflection of the tendency of the transnational corporation to seek financial
gain through doing business in a developing country — and thus passing off environmental
7

Duncan Hood, “Mining Disaster,” Globe and Mail Report on Business 35:6 (March 2019) citing Shin Imai, Leah
Gardner & Sarah Weinberger, “The ‘Canada Brand:’ Violence and Canadian Mining Companies in Latin America,”
Report (2016) Justice and Corporate Accountability Project online (pdf): <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2886584> [JCAP Report].
8
JCAP Report, supra note 7 at 5.
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burdens to those who cannot or will not resist by exporting waste and polluting enterprises9 —
plaintiffs then, fairly, seek beneficial recourse in choosing the multinational corporation’s home
country as a preferred forum for action.10
But in analyzing judicial treatment of such cases we are presented with a complicated
story. While the tests for asserting and keeping jurisdiction in Canadian fora vary, they favour
the assertion of jurisdiction, particularly in cases involving human rights abuses. However, using
the simultaneously ephemeral and historic notion of comity, Canadian courts have diverged in
the application of the black letter law. Such divergence leads to unpredictability in access to
justice (not to say, unfairness) for foreign plaintiffs and the source of such divergence will
require attendance before any larger climate change-related litigation can expect success in
Canada.
Rather than taking a doctrinal view of Canadian transnational tort cases to try to make
sense of and identify differences between such cases on technical rules, by pursuing an analysis
of such decisions from a sociological or behavioural perspective — one that shifts focus from the
decision itself to the decision-maker — we are able to make more sense of the judicial tendency
to resort to traditional state-based analyses. This thesis argues, thus, that it is not the black letter
law that is creating difficulty for foreign-based plaintiffs in transnational human rights and
environmental tort litigation in Canada, but the tendencies of the Canadian judiciary to lean into
traditional understandings of the international space as well as to draw on cautious dispositions
related to the political economy of corporate accountability.
These tendencies, comforting though they may be to some, lead to the inevitability that
plaintiffs, particularly those from the developing world, may never see justice done. It is often
difficult if not impossible for plaintiffs to seek redress from their home government institutions
when the entity responsible for their misfortune provides significant economic incentive to a
plaintiff’s national leaders and power elites. Beyond national governance, and as noted by Beth
Stephens, corporations are multinational while the rules to govern them remain national, creating
a disconnect between such international corporate structures and the law;11 this lack of
9

Janet Dine, The Governance of Corporate Groups (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) at 161.
Sarah Joseph, Corporations and Transnational Human Rights Litigation (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2004) [Joseph
2004] at 150.
11
Beth Stephens, “The Amorality of Profit: Transnational Corporations and Human Rights” (2002) 20 Berkeley J
10
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supranational authority — grounded in international law — creates further regulatory gaps in
which problems arise that are under-regulated.12 In many of these cases, a corporate entity’s
home country becomes the sole option for seeking redress.
In recognizing territorialist judicial tendencies and the reality of corporate/plaintiff power
dynamics, the question remains: how then can plaintiffs advance modern approaches to private
international law in project-specific transnational tort cases, which may pave the way for access
to Canadian courts for future and larger more complicated – i.e. notably, climate change – files?
One solution may be to encourage those in the Canadian judiciary, who already tend
heavily towards traditional legal interpretations (notably, as will be detailed, classical
territorialist understandings of both the world and law), to embrace other traditional concepts
(namely, fairness and equality of treatment) rather than seeking to persuade judges to approach
private international law from more modern frames of reference (such as ideas of membership in
a global community or ideas of transnational law). In a more traditional judicial mindset, it may
be possible to appeal to a sense of fairness that is willing to attach national responsibility to legal
entities where such entities are provided extensive national benefit. The modern reality is that
Canadian corporations are provided extensive benefit by virtue of being based in Canada; that
benefit leads to a parallel responsibility in this country. Such an argument may find favour with
even traditionally-minded judges.
It is important to explain, before embarking on the above-noted argument in the main
body of this thesis, that the question of transnational and global justice is a broad and widely
studied topic. In order to narrow and focus the research contained herein, and to provide what is
hoped to be a new frame of understanding, I have chosen and made a number of assumptions.
Most notably, I assume, using a legalist frame,13 that civil litigation is a desirable and effective
tool for individuals and communities impacted by harmful corporate conduct. Second, I have
addressed only the application of current Canadian state law, rather than the existence and

Int’l L 45 at 54.
12
Craig Scott & Robert Wai, “Transnational Governance of Corporate Conduct through the Migration of Human
Rights Norms: The Potential Contribution of Transnational ‘Private’ Litigation” in Christian Joerges et al, eds,
Transnational Governance and Constitutionalism (Portland: Hart Publishing, 2004) 287 [Scott & Wai 2004] at 288.
13
Robert Wai, “The Commercial Activity Exception to Sovereign Immunity and the Boundaries of Contemporary
International Legalism” in Craig Scott, ed, Torture as Tort: Comparative Perspectives on the Development of
Transnational Human Rights Litigation (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2001) 213 [Wai 2001a] at 240.
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possible application of Indigenous law to such questions.14 Third, unless otherwise specified, I
have limited my analysis to the Canadian domestic (rather than international) legal context. This
third assumption was made given the current Canadian judicial hesitance in engaging with
customary or treaty-based international law. While many scholars have argued both for a liberal
domestic application of customary international law and for a re-imagining of transnational law15
— as a concept distinct from, while mutually imbricated with, international or domestic law —
for the sake of and hope for immediate application I preferred in this thesis to present an analysis
and future direction based in practices that are already palatable to the Canadian judiciary.
Finally, few Canadian project-specific transnational cases involve environmental torts
and most involve, instead, human rights abuses. However, for our purposes I will use both kinds
of cases as examples of “bad behaviour.” I assume that both kinds of cases may serve equally
well as test cases for the assumption of Canadian jurisdiction over foreign actions; whether
human rights cases serve perfectly to predict the way in which a Canadian court may treat a
climate change case where the damage is inherently more challenging to identify than physical
damage is to a person, may be available for further inquiry.16
The paper unfolds over three main chapters, apart from the present introduction and the
conclusion. In the first chapter, I introduce private international law in Canada, and specifically
the way in which courts assert and retain jurisdiction. Given the diversity in approaches taken by
Canadian provincial fora, this analysis is done using representative provinces: British Columbia
(BC), Ontario, and Québec. This section explains the tests for jurisdiction simpliciter, forum non
conveniens, and forum of necessity before introducing and explaining the way in which the
concept of comity of nations is applied by Canadian courts in the context of private international

14

See for instance the discussion in Franzki, Hannah & Johan Horst, “On the Critical Potential of Law — and its
limits” in Kerstin Blome et al, eds, Contested Regime Collisions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016)
347 [Franzki & Horst 2016] at 360.
15
See for instance Craig Scott, “Translating Torture into Transnational Tort: Conceptual Divides in the Debate on
Corporate Accountability for Human Rights Harms,” in Craig Scott, ed, Torture as Tort: Comparative Perspectives
on the Development of Transnational Human Rights Litigation (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2001) [Scott 2001a] at 45;
Augenstein 2018, supra note 6.
16
It may, in some cases, be easier for a Canadian court to ground their jurisdiction over climate change impacts
caused by a Canadian corporation as the damage caused by climate change — its impact on the global commons —
could be easily said to occur in Canada, the victims of such damage being Canadian citizens (along with others).
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law. In this chapter I use several Canadian transnational tort cases as examples of how Canadian
private international law has been successfully applied in a principled and modern manner.
In the second chapter I analyze why, in the context of the black letter law, some courts
have found it difficult to apply a modern lens to private international law, one that is based in the
reality of globalism. To assist in this analysis, I use the conceptual framework introduced by
French political philosopher Pierre Bourdieu. I use Bourdieu’s field theory to demonstrate how
varied structural and historical norms have created a tendency within the judicial field towards a
(highly) territorialist understanding of the state and the actions of its citizens. Equipped with
Bourdieu’s field theory — as it relates to the Canadian judicial field — I then demonstrate how
we may observe these tendencies at play through select Canadian legal actions. Such examples
make clear that despite the forward-looking approach taken in some cases — reviewed in the
second chapter — the tendencies of the courts, including the Supreme Court of Canada, toward
territorialism remain strong.
The third chapter seeks a way forward for private international law practitioners in
Canada. Given the tendencies of the Canadian judiciary, I suggest using a conservative
(conservative, synonymous to traditional or old-fashioned, rather than in its political meaning)
and historical grounding in the concept of fairness to offset the conservative tendency of
territorialism. For the purposes of establishing jurisdiction, by focusing instead on the concept of
equal treatment (borrowing in part from political philosopher John Rawls) in both benefit and
responsibility as it relates to the corporation itself, we are able to sidestep moral (and hotly
debated) arguments of what duty may or may not be owed by the Canadian judiciary to the
global public or the corporation to vastly unequal plaintiffs. Instead, the judiciary may focus
instead only on the rights and responsibilities of the corporation within and to the Canadian
system. And as it turns out, Canadian corporations operating abroad — notably those that
actively avoid facing their accusers in Canadian courts — are provided significant financial,
expert, regulatory, and reputational benefits by virtue of being Canadian. I argue that such
entities cannot at once benefit from our legal system and also avoid being subject to it.
The conclusion draws out certain implications of the analysis and argues that in
highlighting a CanCorp’s exploitation of the Canadian system, litigators may be able to steer an

7
otherwise traditionalist-minded judiciary towards the ultimate goal of a liberal and globalized
interpretation of the tests for jurisdiction.

8

Chapter I: Canadian courts are legally entitled to take jurisdiction over
transnational environmental and human rights tort litigation.
In state-positivist thinking about public and private international law, the competence of a
state to assert jurisdiction — to make, apply, and enforce laws — was based solely on the
territorial jurisdiction of the state. Indeed, in the Island of Palmas Case (Netherlands v United
States of America), the arbiter Max Huber famously noted the “principle of the exclusive
components of the state in regard to its own territory” is the “point of departure in settling most
questions that concern international relations.”17 As states were forced to deal with increasing
cross-border trade, relationships (business and familial), and criminal behaviour, the conception
of the “state’s” legitimate reach has expanded somewhat such that various bodies of the state
may take jurisdiction to make, apply, and enforce rules “extra-territorially.” For instance, a
state’s legislative jurisdiction — to make laws that will bind those otherwise beyond the state’s
territorial border — now reasonably extends beyond territoriality and may be anchored in: an
accused’s or defendant’s nationality (nationality principle); in certain acts committed abroad that
are prejudicial to a state’s security (protective principle); in certain criminal acts that are deemed
so offensive to the international community at large that a state requires no connection to
prosecute (universal principle); and perhaps, in some contexts, to acts that injure a state’s
nationals regardless of where the harm occurred (passive personality principle).18
The above noted principles related to legislative jurisdiction have been considered, at the
international level, as instantiations of a more general “bona fide connection” test between the
subject matter and the source of jurisdiction.19 That international test is, today, reflected in
Canada’s approaches — in both codified and common law — to private international law
(alternatively referred to as conflicts/conflict of laws) in both contract and tort matters. As will
be demonstrated, where a defendant is a Canadian national in circumstances involving human
rights abuses, the conflicts structure in Canada militates towards a Canadian court finding and

17

Island of Palmas Case, United States v Netherlands, (1928) II RIAA 829 at 838.
Steve Coughlan et al, Law Beyond Borders: Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in an Age of Globalization (Toronto:
Irwin Law Inc, 2014) [Coughlan 2014] at 37.
19
Ibid at 39.
18
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retaining jurisdiction to hear the case on both the inherent bases of the nationality and
territoriality principles.
In this section, I will first review the conflicts context in Canada, outlining how a
transnational environmental/human rights tort claim is assessed at the jurisdiction stage and the
various thresholds such a case encounters upon first being introduced to a Canadian court. Next,
I will demonstrate that the traditional concept of “comity,” often raised by Canadian courts in
such contexts, proves to be inapplicable or limited in such cases. Last, I will demonstrate how, in
applying a thoughtful analysis of the jurisdictional legal framework, a modern interpretation of
comity, and a “reality frame” with respect to context, some Canadian courts have managed to
accept and retain jurisdiction over such claims.

A: The conflicts context in Canada
When plaintiffs try to bring transnational tort claims in Canada, they generally face
immediate motions by the defending party/parties to dismiss the action on the basis of lack of
jurisdiction, or motions to strike on the basis of no reasonable cause of action.20 It is this first
barrier, the motion to stay, that must be overcome before a plaintiff may move to have his or her
case heard on its merits. While the applicable law of tort claims may be (1) legislated rules, (2)
the common law, (3) creative arguments involving the domestic application of customary
international law, or a combination of all three, it is jurisdiction that acts as a threshold
determinative issue, without which no claim proceeds. As a determinative factor, the way in
which Canadian courts approach this test of private international law is key.
Assuming a court has subject-matter jurisdiction, a question of transnational tort litigation
necessarily begins with whether a chosen state will assert jurisdiction. In Canada, determining
whether a superior court will assert jurisdiction is actually three questions: whether a forum can
assert jurisdiction (jurisdiction simpliciter), whether it will keep jurisdiction in the event it is
found, and where no jurisdiction is initially found, whether the court will take jurisdiction out of
20

Defendants frequently argue a claim has no reasonable cause of action where the tort complained of was
committed by a subsidiary or contracted corporation of the defending corporation to which the defending
corporation alleges it is not the respondeat superior. Additionally, such defences are argued where the cause of
action involves standards set by international law: See Araya v Nevsun Resources Ltd, 2017 BCCA 401 leave to
appeal to SCC granted, 2018 CarswellBC 1552 [Nevsun].
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necessity.21 The particular approaches vary as between Québec and its Civil Code, jurisdictions
that have implemented statutory schemes such as BC, and those that rely entirely on the common
law, such as Ontario. As such, a review of the approaches taken by representative fora BC,
Québec, and Ontario in this regard is useful.22 What follows does not purport to be a
comprehensive review of the current state of conflict of laws in Canada, but merely a sufficiently
thorough review to demonstrate that, rather than an impassible barrier, the legal constructs that
inform the assertion of jurisdiction at the onset of litigation lean heavily, in cases of human rights
abuses, towards Canadian courts doing so.

Jurisdiction simpliciter
At common law, jurisdiction simpliciter is traditionally established in personam23
through presence or consent. The fundamental basis of jurisdiction through presence is territorial
power. While it is easier to establish jurisdiction simpliciter through a defendant’s residence or
domicile in the forum, it is not necessary. Historically, a defendant’s temporary presence was
sufficient to establish jurisdiction.24 While scholars have generally considered the establishing of
jurisdiction solely through presence to be fading in application — because it may be temporary
— the recent SCC decision in Chevron Corp v Yaiguaje, confirmed its continued existence as a
primary basis upon which to found jurisdiction.25
In terms of presence, while corporations may be subjected to jurisdiction by virtue of
having incorporated in a particular forum (reflective of “residency”), a corporation may also be
subjected to that jurisdiction by “doing business” in a particular forum.26 A determination of
whether a corporation is carrying on business requires “some form of actual, not only virtual,
presence in the jurisdiction, such as maintaining an office there or regularly visiting the territory
of the particular jurisdiction.”27 In provinces where it is required, the requirement of a foreign

21

Jordan v Schatz (2000), 77 BCLR (3d) 134 at para 21; Club Resorts Ltd v Van Breda, 2012 SCC 17 [Van Breda] at
para 101; Tolofson v Jensen, [1994] 3 SCR 1022 [Tolofson] at 1049.
22
Ontario, BC, and Québec are also Canada’s three largest jurisdictions, which also makes them useful
representative fora.
23
As opposed to in rem as is often seen in admiralty law.
24
See Maharanee of Baroda v Wildenstein, [1972] 2 All ER 689 (HL).
25
Chevron Corp v Yaiguaje, 2015 SCC 42 [Chevron] at paras 89-91.
26
Ibid at para 85.
27
Van Breda, supra note 21 at para 87.
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corporation having to obtain a licence to do business will provide evidence to support a
corporation’s presence.28
In Québec, the Civil Code provides the court with jurisdiction where the defendant is
“domiciled” in Québec.29 In Canada, while the term “domicile” is traditionally imbued with a
19th century English interpretation allowing for inclusion of “domicile of origin” — in other
words, the jurisdiction from which the defendant originally came — the Civil Code provides an
interpretation of “domicile” more akin to “residence.”30
A defendant may also consent to a court’s jurisdiction, either through attornment
(participating in the legal process, other than to take steps to challenge jurisdiction),31 or by
agreement (through contract). The various rules of civil procedure generally allow for a
defendant to seek a stay of proceedings and/or an order setting aside service and not be deemed
to have attorned to that jurisdiction.32
Where a defendant is not present or has not consented to the jurisdiction, the court may
nonetheless establish jurisdiction where there is a real and substantial connection between the
forum and the dispute. This “real and substantial connection” test was adopted by the SCC in
Morguard Investments Ltd v De Savoye33 with reference to an approach taken in England in
Indyka v Indyka.34 Writing for the Court, La Forest J explained the real and substantial
connection approach was born of the dual principles of order and fairness to support a modern
system of private international law.35 Though La Forest J was interested in the broader
constitutional issues associated with trans-provincial enforcement of judgments raised by
scholars at the time, he was limited in his analysis by the facts and argument before him.
However, three years later, the Morguard principle was transformed in Hunt v T & N Plc36 from

28

For instance, corporations incorporated internationally must obtain a licence to operate in Ontario pursuant to the
Extra-Provincial Corporations Act, RSO 1990, c E 27. Section 1(2) defines, for the purpose of the statute, what
constitutes carrying on business in the province.
29
CCQ at Art 3134.
30
CCQ at Arts 75, 76, 307.
31
Fraser v 4358376 Canada Inc (cob Itravel 2000 and Travelzest PLC), 2014 ONCA 553.
32
Supreme Court Civil Rules, BC Reg 168/2009 [Supreme Court Civil Rules], R 21-8; Rules of Civil Procedure,
RRO 1990, Reg 194 [Rules of Civil Procedure], R 17.06.
33
Morguard Investments Ltd v De Savoye, [1990] 3 SCR 1077 [Morguard].
34
Indyka v Indyka, [1969] 1 AC 33.
35
Morguard, supra note 33 at 1097.
36
Hunt v T & N Plc, [1993] 4 SCR 289 [Hunt].
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a common law test to a constitutional principle meant to inform and protect against provincial
overreach in the assertion of jurisdiction.37 Though responsible for penning the overarching test,
and continuing to promote its relevance in the more recent case of Club Resorts Ltd v Van
Breda,38 the SCC at the time did not outline any specific factors it deemed necessary to consult
in applying it. That job was initially taken up by the Ontario Court of Appeal in Muscutt v
Courcelles.39
In Muscutt, the Court outlined eight factors to consider in the application of the real and
substantial connection test. The factors, as explained by Sharpe JA, were to be considered
together, no one factor to be determinative. This holistic approach allowed for jurisdiction to be
made out on the basis of several more tenuous connections whose additive effect could result in a
stronger link. It is important to note that, while some courts took up the eight Muscutt factors,
other courts — including those of British Columbia — continued to apply the real and
substantial connection test in a more general way.40
In 2012, the SCC reconsidered the real and substantial connection test in the seminal case
of Club Resorts Ltd v Van Breda. The Court noted that, while the Morguard test was a
constitutional principle that operated to impose limits on provincial powers, the test of whether
or not a forum may “assume jurisdiction” ought to involve a system of “connecting factors”
informed by “principles for applying them.”41 This approach, wrote the Court, provided more
certainty to parties in being able to predict whether a court would assume jurisdiction.42 Thus,
the Van Breda test reformulated the Muscutt factors; where any one of the presumptive
connecting factors applies, a court will assume jurisdiction unless the defendants can rebut by
demonstrating the absence of a real and substantial connection.43 The defendant may rebut the
presumption of jurisdiction by establishing facts that demonstrate the connecting factor does not
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actually point to “any real relationship between the subject matter of the litigation and the forum
or points only to a weak relationship between them.”44
The short list of presumptive connecting factors provided by the Court — the defendant
being domiciled in the forum, the defendant carrying on business in the forum, the tort being
committed in the forum, and a contract connected with the dispute being made in the forum45 —
applied only to tort cases. The Court expected lower courts to define new factors over time, with
the guidance that those new factors should be similar to the enumerated factors and should be
considered in light of that factor’s treatment in the case law, treatment by statute, and treatment
in the private international law of other legal systems.46 In a major shift from the Muscutt
approach, where no connecting factors (new or previously enumerated) were found that could
stand alone, a court should not assume jurisdiction – i.e. the holistic approach was terminated. 47
Most recently, in Chevron, the SCC reaffirmed the Morguard principle and underlined
the structural rationales regarding how and, notably, why courts in Canada take jurisdiction. In
that case, the court differentiated the recognition and enforcement of judgments from asserting
jurisdiction in the first place. Both mechanisms look to the real and substantial connection test in
reference to courts of the first instance, whether it be ensuring a foreign court had jurisdiction
when it decided on an outcome now sought to be enforced in Canada, or whether it be a
Canadian court taking jurisdiction over a claim not yet adjudicated. However, the Court noted,
the locus of the real and substantial connection results in a much lower standard for a Canadian
court to take jurisdiction over enforcement in that a real and substantial connection is not
required between the defendant and a Canadian jurisdiction.
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There was some debate as to whether the real and substantial connection test overrides
the traditional presence and consent-based jurisdiction. However, in Chevron, the SCC suggested
that where jurisdiction is established based on presence — in that case, having a place of
business in the jurisdiction — there is no need to also apply the real and substantial connection
test.48 The same has been found in respect of consent in Ontario.49
In rejecting Chevron’s claim, the Court explained the differences in policy and
international relations rationales for its approach to different jurisdiction-finding mechanisms. A
Canadian court enforcing an order is acting as a “facilitator”50 limited by its territorial
jurisdiction; in other words, in enforcement actions, a court only has power where the
defendant’s assets are in Canada. A court’s enforcement power has “no coercive force outside its
jurisdiction.”51 This, explained the Court, supports Canada’s commitment to international comity
in assisting other states in upholding their laws.52 Throughout the judgment the Court
consistently referred to the “modern” approach to conflict of laws based on the principle of
comity, which “calls for the promotion of order and fairness, an attitude of respect and deference
to other states, and a degree of stability and predictability in order to facilitate reciprocity.”53
This, remarked Gascon J, is true “of all areas of private international law.”54 Inherent in this
analysis are perhaps competing themes: on one hand, traditional themes of deference and
stability of international order, but, on another, the Court’s emphasis on fairness (although it is
not clear to whom fairness is due) and modernization. The Morguard/Van Breda test remains the
leading common law.
Today, following the 1994 recommendation of the Uniform Law Conference of
Canada,55 three provinces have diverged slightly from the common law and enacted legislation
designed to set standards related to determining jurisdiction.56 Such standards, for the most part
48
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but not entirely, are consistent with the principles underlying the common law rules regarding
presence, consent, and the Morguard-Van Breda real and substantial connection test. For
instance, provisions of the British Columbia Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act
(CJPTA), incorporate presence and consent-based jurisdiction in sections 3, 7, 8, and 9. Notably,
presence is determined by “ordinary residence,” thereby rejecting any common law “transitory”
presence exception, most recently upheld in the common law context in Chevron. Additionally,
whether a corporation is carrying on business in a province is incorporated in the CJPTA at
section 7, which defines presence only in enumerated scenarios, thereby ousting the flexibility of
the common law.
The real and substantial connection test is adopted in the CJPTA at section 10. The test
outlines a number of “connecting factors” similar to those enumerated by the SCC in Van Breda.
However, contrary to Van Breda, the CJPTA does allow a court to take jurisdiction under the
real and substantial connection test even where no single section 10 connecting factor is made
out, which thus allows the kind of cumulative holistic approach to the connecting factors last
seen in Muscutt.
While there is movement towards codifying the CJPTA in other provinces, for the time
being, in common law provinces that have not yet adopted similar legislation – such as Ontario –
the traditional common law test remains active.
While litigation regarding the real and substantial connection test is ongoing, for the
purposes of this analysis, we are concerned with corporations incorporated and/or headquartered
in Canada, particularly in Québec, BC, and Ontario. Pursuant to Québec’s Civil Code, BC’s
CJPTA, and the common law in Ontario, a corporation headquartered or constituted in Canada
(CanCorp) would be hard pressed to argue the superior courts of their incorporating jurisdictions
do not have jurisdiction simpliciter. How jurisdiction simpliciter is applied to internationallyincorporated companies is beyond the focus of this thesis, but its continued research is an
important related analysis to be undertaken in the future. As provincial or national incorporation
paired with local offices provides prima facie jurisdiction simpliciter, I will proceed on the
assumption that jurisdiction simpliciter is made out. I, therefore, turn to the test employed to
determine whether a court should retain jurisdiction of a matter: forum non conveniens.
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Forum non conveniens
As to whether a court will decide not to retain jurisdiction, notwithstanding its right to do
so, the Canadian approaches evolved from the Scottish and, then later, English approaches to
jurisdiction.57 The principle was referred to as forum non conveniens, literally “not the
convenient forum,”58 but understood to mean “not the appropriate forum.” The adoption of
forum non conveniens was confirmed by the SCC in Amchem Products Inc v British Columbia
(Workers’ Compensation Board).59 Unlike the British test that divided the analysis into two
“limbs,”60 the SCC rejected this analytical approach and held the test was simply a single
question: whether another identified forum is clearly the more appropriate forum for resolution
of the dispute. In doing so, the Canadian approach identified an onerous standard (“clearly” more
appropriate) and shifted the burden of proof entirely to the defendant. In Amchem, the Court held
that, where there is no one forum that is clearly the most appropriate, the domestic forum
prevails by default and the Canadian court will not grant a stay.61
The CJPTA adopted, in part, the test in Amchem, but notably dropped the requirement
that another forum is “clearly” the more appropriate one, simply asking whether the court of
another state “is a more appropriate forum.”62 In contrast, in Van Breda, released after the
CJPTA received royal assent, the SCC retained the qualifier “clearly” from Amchem, thus further
reaffirming this difference between provincial statutory and common law. That said, the qualifier
“clearly” was relied on extensively by the BC Court of Appeal in determining the forum
57
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conveniens under the CJPTA in the recent case of Garcia v Tahoe Resources Inc,63 discussed
below. Thus, although the qualifier is not explicitly present in the statute,64 the BC Court of
Appeal appears to be reading it into the test. Similarly, the CJPTA is unhelpfully silent with
respect to which party bears the burden to prove another forum is clearly more appropriate.65
However, as with the qualifier “clearly” the Court of Appeal in Tahoe, with reference to Van
Breda, upheld the trial judge’s finding that the onus fell to Tahoe (the defendant) on the forum
non conveniens motion.66 This suggests, despite the wording of the statute, that the common law
and CJPTA approaches have re-converged with respect to both the standard and burden of proof.
While, unlike the British two-pronged test, common law courts, in applying the Van
Breda test, take into consideration a range of factors, sometimes with reference to the legislated
CJPTA framework or the model as it was first presented by the Uniform Law Conference of
Canada. In both the common law test and the CJPTA, the list of enumerated factors is openended; a court may consider factors not yet listed that suit the particular facts before it. The SCCenumerated common law factors include: physical connection to the forum, the applicable law,67
a forum’s specialized expertise,68 jurisdiction clauses,69 conflicts with proceedings elsewhere,70
and juridical advantage.71
While the CJPTA was designed as a comprehensive regime,72 section 11 of the statute
lists criteria courts must consider but includes no language suggesting the list is exhaustive.73
Such framing left open the possibility of courts adding further similar factors. Indeed, the BC
Court of Appeal has since expanded the list of criteria under the CJPTA available for analysis. In

63

Garcia v Tahoe Resources Inc, 2017 BCCA 39 [Tahoe].
The qualifier doesn’t appear in the BC CPJTA, nor that enacted by Saskatchewan or Nova Scotia.
65
Stephen GA Pitel, “The Canadian Codification of Forum Non Conveniens” (2015) 7:2 J P Int’l L 251 at 255.
66
Tahoe, supra note 63 at para 54.
67
Molson Coors Brewing Co v Miller Brewing Co (2006), 83 OR (3d) 331.
68
See for example, Spiliada, supra note 58.
69
ZI Pompey Industrie v ECU-Line NV, 2003 SCC 27 [ZI Pompey].
70
Westec Aerospace Inc v Raytheon Aircraft Co (1999), 67 BCLR (3d) 278 (CA) [Westec Aerospace]; Teck Cominco
Metals Ltd v Lloyd’s Underwriters, 2009 SCC 11 [Teck].
71
Connelly v RTZ Corp Plc (No 2), [1997] ILPr 643 (HL) [Connelly CA].
72
Teck, supra note 70 at para 21.
73
Per section 11 of the CJPTA, supra note 56, the court must consider: (a) the comparative convenience and
expense for the parties to the proceeding and for their witnesses, in litigating in the court or in any alternative forum,
(b) the law to be applied to issues in the proceeding, (c) the desirability of avoiding multiplicity of legal proceedings,
(d) the desirability of avoiding conflicting decisions in different courts, (e) the enforcement of an eventual judgment,
and (f) the fair and efficient working of the Canadian legal system as a whole.
64

18
2015, the Court of Appeal confirmed courts in BC may now consider (in addition to the
mandatory section 11 factors):
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)
f)
g)
h)
i)
j)
k)

where each party resides;
where each party carries on business;
where the cause of action arose;
where the loss or damage occurred;
any juridical advantage to the plaintiff in this jurisdiction;
any juridical disadvantage to the defendant in this jurisdiction;
the convenience or inconvenience to potential witnesses;
the cost of conducting the proceeding in this jurisdiction;
the applicable substantive law;
the difficulty and cost of providing foreign law, if necessary; and
whether there are parallel proceedings in any other jurisdiction.74

Québec is the only civil jurisdiction that has codified the forum non conveniens test;75 to
my knowledge, all other civil jurisdictions other than civil/common hybrids like Scotland and
Louisiana, once assuming jurisdiction simpliciter, have no option but to keep it. While the Civil
Code notes that jurisdiction should be declined only in “exceptional circumstances,” Justice
LeBel in Van Breda equated this use of “exceptional” with the common law requirement that
another jurisdiction must “clearly” be the more appropriate. In doing so, it appears he was
bringing the Canadian common and civil law systems in line,76 likely in an attempt to force
consistency among the provinces.
Arguably, the availability of forum non conveniens provides courts with a number of
advantages. Its availability discourages plaintiff “forum shopping” to choose courts likely more
favourable to them; it encourages international (or inter-provincial) comity by respecting another
forum’s territorial jurisdiction;77 it holds parties to contractual agreements by, among other
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things, making damages for breach of contract predictable;78 and it prevents the “rush to
judgment” that may come where parallel proceedings have commenced in multiple
jurisdictions.79 Such factors also informed the policy considerations regarding the inclusion of
forum non conveniens in the CJPTA.
When the CJPTA was introduced by the BC legislature in 2003, then Attorney General,
the Honourable Geoff Plant, made clear the new Act was born of both the Uniform Law
Conference CJPTA and the decisions of the SCC in Morguard and Amchem.80 In doing so,
however, he emphasized only one kind of litigation. The Attorney General noted the purpose of
the new Act was to increase harmonization of commercial law across Canada and with Canada’s
international partners, and provide consistency such that disputes (referred to as “commercial
disputes”) could be dealt with efficiently, fairly, and effectively.81 Following BC’s adoption of
the CJPTA, there is general movement to codify the test;82 it appears here to stay.
However, despite its lofty goals of modernizing commercial litigation and improving
comity across fora, the forum non conveniens test remains somewhat vague and open ended, still
not having been endowed with clear judicial guidance either by or for the judiciary. Further
challenges come with the timing of its application. Applications to stay proceedings on the basis
of forum non conveniens are generally made at the onset of litigation which can make responding
to arguments regarding forum appropriateness, challenging for the plaintiffs where the necessary
evidence tying a defendant or its actions to a desired forum has not yet come to light. Thus, in
cases of human rights and environmental torts, a conservative application of the test for forum
non conveniens can end in unjust results. For instance, despite being the only civil law system to
adopt the provision (all the while using the language “exceptionally” to describe the situation in
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which it may apply), the Québec courts have not been shy in exercising forum non conveniens
and extricating themselves from especially challenging transnational human rights tort claims in
a way that has not been faithful to the idea of an “exceptional” declining of jurisdiction.83
The test for forum non conveniens ought to attract a purposive reading given both the
exceptional nature of the test (a challenging onus to be met by the defendant)84 and the factspecific and discretionary approach mandated by the common law and CJPTA. Indeed, recall the
CJPTA in British Columbia was affirmed on the basis of that government’s pursuit of
standardizing commercial law. In introducing then-Bill 31, Attorney General Plant also noted the
new Act would contribute to the modernization of British Columbia law in a way “consistent
with access to justice and building a strong economy.”85 While the CJPTA is applied to all
manner of actions, I suggest the initial purpose of the CJPTA, being aimed at the commercial
context, may leave open a modified reading in the human rights or environmental contexts —
both necessarily extra-commercial in nature (even as commercial imperatives may be causally
connected to why violations occur) — particularly where the Act comes into conflict with access
to justice issues. Certainly, access to justice formed the heart of the recent decision in Chevron in
which the SCC found that the international context of digitalized currency meant access to a
defendant’s assets may be very difficult for a successful plaintiff. There, it is notable how the
Court fused a traditional conflicts analysis with a justice/equity analysis in the context of
collection of damages. The Court ruled for the first time that it would take jurisdiction even if a
defendant’s assets were not already in the jurisdiction; to not do so, they said, “would be to turn a
blind eye to the current economic reality.”86
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Such attention to economic reality is echoed in the exceptional allowance of jurisdiction
granted in the notion of a forum of necessity, the third question a court may ask in assessing
whether to take jurisdiction of a matter. While I do not purport to analyze in great detail this
fledgling concept, the coming into being of forum of necessity in Canada offers both support for
the purposive interpretation of forum non conveniens and a useful contrast in defining the latter’s
threshold.

Forum of necessity
Acting as an exception to jurisdiction simpliciter is the forum of necessity doctrine. This
doctrine was derived from Art 3 of the Swiss Federal Code on Private international Law87 and
first incorporated in Art 3136 of the Civil Code of Québec (coming into force in 1994). The
Québec provision states:
3136. Even though a Québec authority has no jurisdiction to hear a dispute, it may
nevertheless hear it provided the dispute has a sufficient connection with Québec, if
proceedings abroad prove impossible or the institution of proceedings abroad cannot
reasonably be required.

The necessity doctrine was later incorporated into section 6 of the CJPTA upon its
enactment. Section 6 provides that a court that lacks territorial competence may take jurisdiction
where:
a) there is no court outside British Columbia in which the plaintiff can commence the
proceeding; or
b) the commencement of the proceeding in a court outside British Columbia cannot
reasonably be required.
Unlike Art 3136 of the Civil Code, section 6 of the CJPTA does not require the dispute
have a “sufficient connection” to the jurisdiction before the doctrine can be invoked.88
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With respect to common law jurisdictions, for the first time, in Van Breda, the Ontario
Court of Appeal suggested in obiter that the elements of forum of necessity should be read into
the common law in order to meet access to justice needs.89 In that case, in response to arguments
related to whether “fairness to the plaintiff ” ought to be an independent factor capable of
determining the real and substantial connection test, the Court referred to the emergence of the
forum of necessity doctrine which it said “recognizes that there will be exceptional cases where,
despite the absence of a real and substantial connection, the need to ensure access to justice will
justify the assumption of jurisdiction.” Justice Sharpe for the Court of Appeal clarified that
forum of necessity did not modify the real and substantial test but operated as an exception to it;
a court reserves residual discretion to assume jurisdiction. While the forum of necessity doctrine
was not applied in Van Breda, the court noted the preferred path was one in which an
overarching fairness veto is not read into real and substantial connection, but that where fairness
is of such serious concern that the court takes jurisdiction under that doctrine instead.90 On
appeal, the SCC chose not to opine, although it left the door open to its possibility.91
While the overarching goal of the forum of necessity mechanism appears to be to provide
a reasonable remedy for those otherwise excluded from a Canadian forum, in practice it does so
only rarely. The lower courts that have addressed the forum of necessity provisions have made
clear the test is high. As the Ontario Court of Appeal noted in West Van Inc v Daisley, all
jurisdictions that have adopted the test have imposed a threshold of reasonableness.92 Courts in
Ontario have held that factors such as the expiry of a limitation period and the difficulty in
obtaining counsel in a foreign jurisdiction would be unlikely to meet the test.93 Today, only in
one case in Ontario and one in British Columbia has the court accepted they were the forum of
necessity and taken jurisdiction. They did so on the basis, respectively, that (1) the claimants
could not reasonably be expected to bring an action in the forum in which they had been tortured
(Iran),94 and (2) in a complicated case where the claimant and the defendant both agreed on
British Columbia as the appropriate forum because their home state (Idaho) had mostly abolished
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all provisions for joint and several liability and non-patient suits.95 Many other cases brought in
Ontario and British Columbia have been denied, thus reinforcing the high bar posed by the test.96
A number of those courts do so citing the first example, Bouzari v Bahremani, as the exemplar in
considering whether cases before them meet the exceptional test for the necessity doctrine.97
In Bouzari, Mr. Bouzari and his wife and children brought an action against Hashemi
Bahremani alleging Mr. Bahremani compelled the abduction, imprisonment, and torture of Mr.
Bouzari in Iran between June 1993 and January 1994. Shortly after he was released by the
government of Iran, Mr. Bouzari and his family fled to Canada. In 2005 Low J of the Ontario
Superior Court took jurisdiction as a forum of necessity because there was no reasonable basis
upon which Mr. Bouzari could be required to commence the action in Iran, the state where the
torture took place.98 Not surprisingly, few cases have reached the threshold of serious danger that
Mr. Bouzari likely faced were he to have returned to Iran.
Similarly, under the Civil Code, the forum of necessity doctrine is only applied in
“exceptional circumstances,”99 the same verbal formula used in Québec in consideration of
forum non conveniens. Decided under Art 3136 of the Civil Code, the decision in Lamborghini
(Canada) Inc v Automobili Lamborghini SPA,100 has set the standard for that Court’s approach to
forum of necessity. In Lamborghini, LeBel JA, as he then was, noted the exception is narrow, to
be used in exceptional circumstances “when the foreign forum that would normally have
jurisdiction is unavailable for exceptional reasons such as a nearly absolute legal or practical
impossibility.”101 Justice LeBel provided, for further clarity, some examples: the breakdown of
diplomatic or commercial relations with a foreign State, the need to protect a political refugee
(like Mr. Bouzari), or the existence of a serious physical threat if the case were to be undertaken
by a foreign court. Later, in Anvil Mining, a transnational tort case, the Québec Court of Appeal
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reiterated the “practical impossibility” threshold. There, the proposed representative plaintiff in a
class action relied on the necessity doctrine in arguing it was not able to find counsel in Australia
to represent the class. The Québec Court of Appeal held the plaintiff had not shown it was
“impossible to gain access to a foreign court and [had not] established that the dispute has a
sufficient connection with Québec.”102
The forum of necessity test is considered where there is no case to be made for
jurisdiction simpliciter; it is used by a court to assert territorial competence where it otherwise
has none. The creation of such a mechanism supports, along with a purposive reading of forum
non conveniens, a general movement towards equity in the realm of jurisdiction, a desire on the
part of the legislature and the courts to allow for a more global perspective on fairness.
Additionally, the rarity of necessity acts as a foil, highlighting and contrasting the exceptional
nature expected of courts giving up jurisdiction under forum non conveniens. In other words,
where necessity is only to be used in “exceptional circumstances” — and a review of the case
law makes clear it is rarely used — then the “exceptional circumstances” (even if understood as
synonymous with “clear”) standard associated with forum non conveniens should theoretically
similarly limit its usage.
The recent birth of forum of necessity and the high bar of forum non conveniens reflect
the changing reality of transnational relationships, movement of peoples, and commerce. Their
application to transnational human rights and environmental tort litigation should support
Canadian courts taking jurisdiction where it is sought. However, seemingly balanced against this
movement towards internationalism is the concept of comity that was once associated only with
public international law. Comity is now often cited in Canadian private international law as
shorthand for “respect for traditional norms of territoriality and sovereign exclusivity.” It is the
concept courts frequently lean on when shying away from taking jurisdiction and legitimizing a
restrictive approach to the application of the jurisdiction tests reviewed above. Why courts may
102

Anvil supra note 83 at para 103. The “practical impossibility” of obtaining counsel may be increasingly more
common as multinational corporations have been known to employ a tactic of engaging all, or most, key litigators in
a jurisdiction on retainer to thwart a plaintiff’s attempt at representation before the court. For an example, see
Enron’s approach in India following the public interest petition launched by the Center for Indian Trade Unions
related to Enron’s dealing with the Government of Maharashtra for Enron’s Dabhol Power Project. Enron allegedly
placed all lawyers in Delhi and Bombay on retainer so the petitioners could not find representation: Human Rights
Watch, The Enron Corporation: Corporate Complicity in Human Rights (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999) at
32.

25
do this is the subject of the next section, but first it is necessary to review what this traditional
concept actually is and the bounds of its current form. In so doing, it will become clear, through
decisions of Canada’s highest courts, that rather than comity being available as the trump card
played to evade responsibility, comity’s proper application to transnational human rights tort
litigation is more restrained.

B: The public international law concept of comity infuses conflicts
In the realm of everyday language, comity, from the Latin comitas meaning “courteous,”
refers to the courtesy and friendship of nations in mutual recognition of the laws and customs of
others.103 In international law, it is variously described as “informal acts performed out of
politeness, convenience and goodwill,”104 the way in which a sovereign state “respects the
independence and dignity of other sovereign states,”105 and a form of “mutual deference and
respect.”106 It is a concept that is intimately tied to the traditional pillars of public international
law: the sovereignty and the equality of states. In order to position comity within private
international law, it is important to briefly review the emergence of comity within, or at least in
proximity to,107 public international law.

Comity in public international law
The emergence of modern notions of state sovereignty birthed the concept of comity;
where states recognize each other as possessing exclusive control over their own territories, some
understanding between states with respect to cross-border activity was required. However, the
modern concept of state sovereignty is relatively new. Before the 16th century, the theocratic
foundation of medieval Europe required less focus on state territoriality as the centre of political
power lay with the Catholic Church in Rome. With the rise of the secular state, political power
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gained traction and the modern territorialized concept of sovereignty emerged, and along with it,
the concept of comity.
One of the first wholly conceptualized frameworks of state sovereignty was explored by
Jean Bodin in his Six Livres de la Republique.108 Bodin conceptualized sovereignty as amounting
to the absolute and perpetual power of the republic, over which no other body had supervisory
power. Over 70 years later, the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 formally established the principles
of territorial delineation of state authority/self-determination and its twinned principle of nonintervention.109 Over the next few centuries, first Thomas Hobbes (1651) and then John Locke
(1700s) reimagined state sovereignty as no longer unconditionally held by the sovereign but as
increasingly framed as a contract between the people and the sovereign.110
In parallel with the developing philosophy of the sovereign as inward-looking — i.e. the
sovereign’s authority as either experienced by or viewed by its ruled people — the 16th and 17th
centuries also found increasingly powerful states looking for a way to strike a balance between
their own domestic interests and their interests in being part of a community of other such
states;111 the strict boundaries of state sovereignty had not accommodated the reality of
transnational trade and movement of peoples. The foundation of such a balance was equity but it
remained unclear what equity required in the context of state relations.112 It was then that comity
began to take shape in Dutch scholarship. Hugo Grotius, a pioneer of modern public international
law, delineated law in a proper and strict sense from expectations in social behaviour, which he
discussed as comity.113 In public international law, comity allowed flexibility in the hardened
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concepts of territoriality and sovereignty. However, rather than being considered a legal solution,
the concept of comity was political, to be exercised by rulers and politicians, rather than
judges.114 As a political concept, comity was normative but not also legally binding.115 While the
concepts related to territorialized state sovereignty and are now enshrined as the first principles
of Article 2 of the UN Charter,116 even today a breach of comity at the state level does not allow,
under public international law, any legal recourse by one state against another. Instead, it may
lead to a similar retort through unfriendly or unneighbourly action, referred to as “retorsion.”117

Comity’s bleed into private international law
Despite the idea of comity having its beginning in public international law — as a norm
of politeness between states — early in Britain’s judicial history of handling cases involving
conflicts of law, we see the British judiciary referencing concepts of “statehood” and comity as
normative concepts to assist decision making, first in criminal law and then in the private
international law context. While comity served as a discretionary doctrine that empowered courts
to decide when to defer to foreign law out of respect for the sovereignty of another state,118 later
it branched out, coming to inform a wider range of cases providing justification for judicial
decision making in all sorts of conflicts scenarios.119
In the 1981 case of R v Zingre,120 we begin to see the concepts of public international law
– relationships between states – begin to seep into Canadian domestic law. In that case, a Swiss
national was involved in crimes related to business dealings in Manitoba. The accused was living
in Switzerland, a state that did not allow extradition to Canada. Manitoba — through the
Canadian federal government — asked the Swiss government for its assistance to prosecute the
accused in Switzerland pursuant to Canada and Switzerland’s mutual legal assistance treaty. The
issue in the case was whether the subsequently appointed Swiss investigators could be permitted
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to interview witnesses in Canada despite the accused’s reliance on certain sections of the Canada
Evidence Act.121 While the case rests entirely on the interpretation of the treaty provisions, the
SCC — to which the case was appealed — held that one jurisdiction should give effect to the
laws of another jurisdiction “not out of mutual obligation but of deference and respect” unless it
is contrary to the public policy of the jurisdiction to which it is requested.122 In that case,
involving multiple state actors in the mutual legal assistance realm, the Court suggested comity
is a fundamental concept in not only state relations but in the realm of domestic criminal law.123
Shortly after the criminal-procedure context of Zingre, comity came to the fore in the
criminal-jurisdiction context in Libman v The Queen.124 In that case, Justice La Forest for the
SCC engaged in a thoughtful review of the 19th century history of comity as it applied to
transnational criminal cases. In Libman, the accused was committed to trial for fraud resulting
from telephone sales solicitation made from Canada in which he misrepresented business
opportunities to potential American investors. Mr. Libman sought to have his committal for trial
quashed on the basis the crimes did not occur in Canada and that the Criminal Code125 is limited
to territorial crimes unless a provision expressly provides otherwise. Justice La Forest began his
account by emphasizing the primary basis of criminal jurisdiction is territorial and that states in
public international law are hesitant to incur the “displeasure” of other states by indiscriminate
attempts to control the activities that take place wholly within the territorial bounds of another
state.126 Justice La Forest then engaged in a review of the the English cases to trace issues of
territoriality through the jurisprudence. He explained that in the 19th century, most common law
crimes were territorially confined (such as theft), and given the insular nature of Britain’s
geography, its understanding of transnational law remained similarly insular. Comity, it seemed,
was originally interpreted to support the isolation of crimes into defined territorial enclaves. It
was the advent of marketing fraud, first through mail and then through telephone, that the
question of where a crime took place when it was transnational in nature, became of chief
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concern.127 Throughout the 20th century, courts applied varying theories of the locus of crime:
some involving a “continuum,” others involving focus on where the crime began or ended.
In a series of cases in the 1970s,128 the English courts held that comity did not prevent
parliament from prohibiting conduct in England that had consequences abroad. In Treacy v
Director of Public Prosecutions, Lord Diplock concluded that where “prohibited acts are of a
kind calculated to cause harm to private individuals it would savour of chauvinism rather than
comity to treat them as excusable merely on the ground the victim was not in the United
Kingdom (UK) but in some other state.”129 He went on,
Comity gives no right to a state to insist that any person may with impunity do
physical acts in its own territory which have harmful consequences to persons within the
territory of another state. It may be under no obligation in comity to punish those acts itself,
but it has no ground for complaint in international law if the state in which the harmful
consequences had their effects punishes, when they do enter its territories, persons who did
such acts.130

In Director of Public Prosecutions v Doot, a case involving conspiracy to import drugs
into England, the technique of the continuing offence was again employed when the court stated
it did not accord with international comity that the courts of the UK should treat defendants with
any leniency just because the consequences of their actions harm those outside of the territorial
confines of the home nation.131 In applying comity to conflict of laws (in the widest sense, and
not limited to ‘private’ law matters), the court went on to explain that the concept of international
comity is not static and that modern nations are not “nearly as sensitive about exclusive
jurisdiction” as they once were.132 The fact patterns presented by transnational criminal cases
provided the UK courts with opportunities to appreciate the often unreasonable outcomes created
by a strict territorialist approach to state sovereignty and to employ more thoughtful analyses that
were reflective of the sometimes transnational nature of crime. This less-siloed approach was
subsequently employed in transnational civil actions.
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The Canadian approach differed slightly from that taken in the UK. In the early years
after confederation, the approach to territoriality taken by Canadian courts was narrow, likely
reflective of Canada’s dependent status.133 However, just as in the UK, as time went on, this
narrow construction began to give way to a more liberal interpretation with respect to the
criminal realm. The Canadian courts had begun to realize that such a strict approach involved a
“large measure of unreality.”134 For instance, the modern approach taken in Canada to criminal
offences landed on a test to determine whether there is a “real and substantial link” between
Canada and the offence. This approach, held Justice La Forest in Libman (with reference to
Treacy and Doot), accorded with the modern and evolving notion of comity, which in his words
“means no more nor less than kindly and considerate behaviour towards others.”135 Justice La
Forest ended his discussion in Libman promoting a balanced interpretation of international
comity in which, as global citizens, we look not only to the traditional notions of sovereignty and
exclusivity, but at the protection of the public in other states. In a “shrinking world”, he says,
“we are all our brother’s keepers.”136
Five years later, and in relation to an inter-provincial civil case, Justice La Forest had a
second opportunity to take on the changing face of comity, this time in a a civil conflicts case. In
the seminal case of Morguard (whose impact on jurisdiction simpliciter is explained above), a
case about enforcement and recognition of an Alberta judgment in BC, he again explained the
historic basis for the territorial anchor in private international law and the enforcement of
judgments. However, he quickly goes on to find that modern states cannot live in “splendid
isolation” and do have to frequently give effect to judgments given in other countries in defined
circumstances.137 Comity, which he importantly says for the first time is the informing principle
of private international law, is the deference and respect due other states to the actions of a state
legitimately taken within its territory. Justice La Forest accepts and applies the formulation of
comity from the Supreme Court of the United States in Hilton v Guyot, 159 US 113 (1895) at
163 and more recently cited by Estey J in Spencer v R, [1985] 2 SCR 278 at 283:
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‘Comity’ in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one
hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other. But it is the recognition which
one national allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of
another nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the
rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws.138

In other words, comity requires a balancing of state interests in private international law,
both in the maintenance of good relations with the global community as defined by statehood
and within a state’s own boundaries and interests. As well, it is addressed in the “legal sense”
and embraced as a legal principle to inform private international law rules compared to the
earlier public international law origins of comity as an extra-legal (or at least extra-judicial)
normative concept.
This balancing re-appeared in Muscutt where the Ontario Court of Appeal, in interpreting
Morguard, first laid out the test for determining whether there was a real and substantial
connection. The last factor in that Court’s test was comity. While the Muscutt factors were
eventually discarded in support of the Van Breda “connecting factors” approach — of which
comity was not one — the importance of comity as buttressing private international law was
most recently reiterated in Chevron. In that case, Justice Gascon for the SCC reiterated the point
made by Justice LeBel in Van Breda, that “the goal of modern conflicts systems rests on the
principle of comity, which, although a flexible concept, calls for the promotion of order and
fairness, an attitude of respect and deference to other states, and a degree of stability and
predictability in order to facilitate reciprocity.”139 Though comity has come to be used as
shorthand for the twin principles of private international law, “order and fairness”, the SCC has
been clear such principles are not of equal weight. As Justice La Forest said in Tolofson v Jensen
(to which I will return), that as order is a precondition to justice — as though fairness is not —
“order comes first.”140
Notably comity's bleed into private international law has occurred more in common law
states compared with civil law states whose civil codes exhaustively define circumstances in
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which courts take or refuse jurisdiction.141 It is only in common law countries, particularly those
that grapple with judicially-created tests of forum non conveniens, recognition and enforcement
of judgments, and forum of necessity, that judges have reached for such normative directives.142
Indeed, in the development of private international law in Canada, comity swiftly coloured the
discussion and has left an indelible imprint. Courts now reference comity as if by necessity or
reflex.143

Limits on comity
While comity now appears to be a permanent fixture in the premises of private
international law in Canada, both a technical and purposive reading of Canadian jurisprudence
demonstrates that comity, despite its presence, is limited in its reach and application. In the
following section, I make four arguments to demonstrate this limitation. First, while comity is a
legal principle, it is not a concrete substantive rule and is further limited in its application by the
judiciary by its parallel political nature. Second, Canadian courts have recognized comity should
be and is limited to the extent that it interferes with certain basic standards of international and
national human rights requirements. Canadian courts have found they should not blindly bend to
neighbourliness when it would fly in the face of fundamental human rights norms. Third,
Canadian judicial application seems to have effectively tailored the application of comity to
situations in which the juridical acts of a foreign state are squarely at issue, rather than the
application of comity to situations involving no direct state interference. Lastly, comity is widely
regarded as an inherently flexible concept, due to keep up with, notably, changing international
business practices; judicial fairness dictates this not be done to benefit the strong while resiling
the weak to traditional and rigid concepts of territoriality.
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Comity is not a legal rule
Comity serves as a structural principle of interpretation for the entire field of private
international law; it is a high-level framing principle rather than a concrete rule of law. Indeed,
Canadian courts, while quick to cite comity, are also quick to note that comity does not
specifically bind them in their decision making. In other words, comity is not a legal rule to
which courts must adhere and oblige. As may be clear from the definitions included above, this
international concept of “neighbourliness” does not provide much in the way of clarity. The SCC
has acknowledged this challenge in interpretation in noting comity is a “very flexible concept”
and that it “cannot be understood as a set of well-defined rules, but rather as an attitude of
respect for and deference to other states.”144 Comity’s structure as an interpretive tool comes not
from its objective definition —we know that it is a relatively loose concept — but from the order
imbued within it through its use in defining Canadian private international law standards (for
example, the real and substantial connection test). On comity itself, Upendra Baxi declares the
concept a “highly pliant, problematic, and fuzzy trope;”145 Harold Maier similarly described
comity as “an amorphous never-never land whose borders are marked by fuzzy lines of politics,
courtesy, and good faith.”146 It is perhaps due to this inherent “fuzziness” that comity is
interpreted differently in different jurisdictions or by different judges in the same jurisdiction;147
the Court noted in Amchem, for example, that the interpretation of private international law
recognizes the fact that comity is “not universally respected.”148
Further, it is suggested that not only is comity too general to provide for specific
outcomes, it may, when used by courts to consider international and political issues, not even be
an appropriate consideration for courts; comity, as a principle to be used in expectations related
to state-state interaction, is inherently a political, not a legal concept.149 Addressing comity and
its use in the American context, David Gerber notes, “comity balancing” does not provide an
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effective solution to issues of extraterritorial jurisdiction. Given the separation of powers
between the executive and the judiciary in Canada, Gerber’s argument is instructive.
Fundamentally, the traditional public international law concept of comity is political in context
(and arguably in status) and is now generally considered little more than an undefined
“neighbourliness.” It is important, then, to distinguish that, when brought into domestic law as a
high-level principle by Canadian courts, its operation in the extraterritorial jurisdiction-finding
framework is simply to add a very general reason for courts to favourably consider interests of
foreign states. However, a determination of whether to make a decision solely in light of the
“interest of a foreign state” and an associated imperative not to injure foreign relations is unusual
given that the notion a judge should be making such a political decision is generally considered
inappropriate.150
The SCC has held that an “appropriate and just remedy is also one that must employ
means that are legitimate within the framework of our constitutional democracy.”151 Specifically,
the executive branch of government, by reason of its prerogative power, is responsible for
international relations, to be conducted within a range of constitutional options.152 Courts rarely
have access to the breadth of institutional and situational knowledge held by the national
government related to state relations. The government must have flexibility to determine how to
exercise its duties at the international level, taking into account “complex and ever-changing
circumstances...[and] Canada’s broader national interest.”153 This constitutional separation of
powers leads to the inevitable conclusion that, in approaching state comity, courts ought to, at the
very least, tread very carefully.
This is not to suggest courts must not look to inter-state comity, but perhaps that their
consideration of comity ought to be limited to the evidence before them, such as often presented
in international and domestic reports written by trustworthy bodies. In contrast, any liberal taking
of real or effective judicial notice of the state of affairs as between Canada and another state is to
be avoided.
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Comity constrained by justice
Not only is a territorialist view of comity weakened by comity’s fuzzy and flexible
nature, Canadian courts have gone further to limit its consideration in circumstances in which
Canadian and international core human rights values are at risk.
While this thesis is focused substantially on the jurisdictional test for asserting or giving
up jurisdiction, the seminal choice of law decision in Tolofson offers a useful first example of the
way in which a Canadian court’s reliance on comity may be limited where the human rights
values are at stake. In Tolofson, the parties were involved in a motor vehicle accident in
Saskatchewan. The plaintiff lived in BC and brought an action in the BC Supreme Court for
damages. The defendant brought a motion to stay the proceedings on the basis of forum non
conveniens and, alternatively, a motion to choose the law of Saskatchewan as the applicable law
were the action to go ahead in BC courts. The case was eventually appealed to the SCC. Justice
La Forest traced the history of choice of law through British cases and its application in
Canadian jurisdictions. Lamenting the varied and unprincipled approaches of the past, Justice La
Forest wrote:
What strikes me about the Anglo-Canadian choice of law rules...is that they appear
to have been applied with insufficient reference to the underlying reality in which they
operate and to general principles that should apply in responding to that reality. Often the
rules are mechanistically applied. At other times, they seem to be based on the expectations
of the parties, a somewhat fictional concept, or a sense of “fairness” about the specific case,
a reaction that is not subjected to analysis, but which seems to be born of a disapproval of
the rule adopted by a particular jurisdiction.154

Thus, in order to structure a new Canadian approach to choice of law, Justice La Forest
turned to concepts in the international legal order.155 He found that a court would follow its own
rules of procedure, but that, when it came to substantive law, the principles of international
comity — that states should respect the exercise of jurisdiction of another state within that other
state’s own territory — support an approach that the law of the place where the tort took place
should apply: lex loci delicti (the law of the place of the delict).156 Justice La Forest explained
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that this approach allows for some predictability and ease of application, that it was “fair” in that
ordinarily people expect their activities to be covered by the law of the place where they happen
to be, that it discouraged plaintiffs from shopping for fora that have more generous substantive
law, and that it was an approach supported by other countries.157
However, although he created a starting presumption that the law of the place of the tort
would apply to transnational and trans-provincial cases, Justice La Forest left the door open to
judicial discretion for courts to apply the law of the forum (lex fori) in circumstances where
applying the law of the place would lead to injustice: “because a rigid rule on the international
level could give rise to injustice, in certain circumstances, I am not averse to retaining a
discretion in the court to apply our own law to deal with such circumstances.”158 He recognized
that such injustices were unlikely to appear in trans-provincial cases but that the exception may
be of assistance in the international realm. While there is some debate regarding the extent to
which the “exception” is applied trans-provincially,159 the exception remains available in
transnational cases. Indeed, the justice exception aligns the Canadian approach closer to that of
Australia and the UK where the lex fori is applied under the “public policy doctrine” where
fundamental or universal notions of justice and morality are at risk.160 The exception, limited as
it appears to be to transnational cases, indicates an awareness on the part of the court that
Canada’s neighborliness has bounds.
In the context of issues of enforcement of a foreign state’s non-monetary order in Pro
Swing Inc v Elta Gold Inc,161 Justice Deschamps for the majority of the SCC wrote that in
considering whether to assist the US in enforcing its court order, a Canadian court will look to a
number of factors, including comity. However, stipulating that comity is not some unbounded
concept, she noted that comity is concerned not just with the nature of a foreign state’s acts, but
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also the protection of a domestic nation’s citizens and domestic values.162 Indeed, despite noting
that the defendant had not raised a public policy defence to the enforcement of the order, she
went on to write that Canadian courts are the “guardians of Canadian constitutional values,”163
such that there are sometimes issues that the court must raise of its own volition, such as those
related to public policy. As an example, she cites the SCC’s decision in United States of America
v Burns,164 in which the Court looked both to Canada’s international commitments and to its
constitutional values in crafting its direction to the Minister that the surrender of an accused
person to American custody for criminal trial would not be imposed without assurance the death
penalty would not be imposed on him. Courts, she held, should be mindful of the values that
merit constitutional or quasi-constitutional protection.165 In this discussion, Justice Deschamps
outlined where principles of comity may be limited and where Canada must turn inward to
consider its own values aside from those contained within theories of reciprocity.
Despite being continuously touted by international law traditionalists and Canadian
courts as a seminal and leading case supporting strict territoriality in public international law,166
Justice Lebel in R v Hape can actually also be seen to take small steps towards limiting the
impact of comity. In that case, the RCMP conducted investigations in Turks and Caicos related
to a money laundering scheme run by a Canadian national. The investigation was conducted
under supervision of the local authorities. Through the investigation, the RCMP collected
damning evidence of the scheme from the office of the accused; they did so without a warrant.
Upon coming to trial in Canada, the accused sought exclusion of the evidence collected sans
warrant claiming his rights pursuant to section 8 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms167
(Charter) were breached. In finding the Charter did not apply to the investigation in Turks and
Caicos, Justice LeBel left the door open for two circumstances in which the Charter may apply
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to Canadian investigators outside of Canada. The first is where the host country consents to the
application of Canadian law in its jurisdiction.
The second touches on issues of comity. Justice LeBel noted Canadian authorities can
participate in investigations abroad but must do so under the laws of the foreign state. This
permissive rule, he stated, is derived from principles of comity. Citing earlier decisions of Justice
La Forest in United States of America v Cotroni,168 Justice LeBel noted the importance of state
cooperation in investigating and prosecuting transnational crime as otherwise cases would fall
through the cracks. However, comity may be limited, he said, “where the participation of
Canadian officers in investigative activities sanctioned by foreign law would place Canada in
violation of its international obligations in respect of human rights.”169 The Court went on to note
that individuals can reasonably expect that “certain basic standards will be adhered to in all free
and democratic societies,” and that to rely on evidence gathered in a way that would undermine
such standards would be “unfair.”170 In coming to this conclusion, it is clear that while Justice
LeBel remained grounded in a traditional notion of territoriality as the basis of jurisdiction in that
case, he saw the need for adaptation of the law to the changing world.
That comity may be limited was further explored by the SCC in the cases related to Omar
Khadr. In 2008, the SCC determined that Mr. Khadr’s section 7 Charter rights had been
breached and that he was entitled to (somewhat) limited Stinchcombe disclosure171 related to
interviews conducted by the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service (CSIS). Mr. Khadr had
been held since 2002 by US authorities at Guantanamo Bay for allegedly killing an American
soldier in Afghanistan when he was 15. The interviews were conducted by CSIS agents in
Guantanamo Bay and the results of the interviews were shared with US authorities to assist with
building their criminal case against Mr. Khadr in the US. While the Court held that generally the
Charter does not apply abroad, it noted that Justice Lebel in Hape had stated an important
exception to comity: that comity cannot be used to justify Canadian participation in activities of
a foreign state or its agents that are contrary to Canada’s international obligations. Canada’s

168

United States of America v Cotroni, [1989] 1 SCR 1469.
Hape, supra note 105 at para 101.
170
Ibid at para 111.
171
R v Stinchcombe, [1995] 1 SCR 754.
169

39
deference to foreign states, they repeated, ends where clear violations of international law and
fundamental human rights begin.172
In that case, the US Supreme Court had already found the process and actions taken at
Guantanamo Bay, in the time Mr. Khadr was an inmate, were unjust and violated American law
through, among other things, breaches of the Geneva Conventions.173 Given Canada is and was a
party to the Geneva Conventions, it was unnecessary for the SCC to determine whether the CSIS
agents were participating in activities that are contrary to Canada’s obligations. Thus, the SCC
was able to avoid overruling comity in contradiction to a foreign state’s law, and instead relied
on that foreign state’s own judicial pronouncements. It is important to note that the Court did not
hold that such a fortuitous situation was a requirement in future cases; in other words, the Court
has not held that Canadian courts may not independently find international human rights or
humanitarian law values are offended by something that a foreign state may treat as fully legal.
Two years later, Mr. Khadr returned to the SCC to challenge the then Canadian
government’s decision not to ask the US for his repatriation, which he had continually requested.
In that decision, the SCC again noted that, in general, international customary law and the comity
of nations prevent the Charter from applying to the actions of Canadian officials operating
outside Canada. However, an exception exists where there is Canadian participation in activities
of a foreign state or its agents that are contrary to Canada’s international obligations and
fundamental human rights norms.174 In that case, Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs agents
had questioned Mr. Khadr at Guantanamo Bay knowing he had been subjected to a three-week
sleep deprivation program called the “frequent flyer program,” a program clearly contrary to
Canada’s fundamental human rights obligations not to engage in or be complicit in torture.
While the SCC did not have to decide whether the mistreatment of inmates at
Guantanamo Bay, and specifically the treatment of Mr. Khadr, clearly met the threshold for a
breach of “fundamental human rights norms,” (as that work had already been done by the United
States Supreme Court and relied on by the SCC in Khadr 2008) it is likely they would have
independently found — like the US Supreme Court did — that the breach of the Geneva
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Conventions (relied on in Khadr 2008) would have sufficed to demonstrate a breach of
international law.175
The idea of relying on fundamental human rights norms was not new for the Supreme
Court in these cases. In Baker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), the SCC was
charged with determining the reasonableness of a decision maker’s consideration of the rights of
the child pursuant to the then Immigration Act.176 Justice L’Hereux-Dubé for the majority, noted
that an indicator of the importance of consideration of the rights of the child was Canada’s
ratification of the Convention of the Rights of the Child (CRC) and Canada’s recognition of the
rights of the child through the ratification of other similar international instruments —
notwithstanding Canada had not incorporated such treaties through domestic statute.177 Citing
Ruth Sullivan’s, Driedger on the Construction of Statutes (3rd ed 1994), L’Hereux-Dubé J
explained that the legislature is presumed to respect the values and principles enshrined in
international law; even though some international obligations may not have direct application in
Canadian law, the values reflected in international human rights law can nonetheless be used to
inform the contextual approach to statutory interpretation and judicial review.178 Canada’s
commitments in the international realm make up part of the context in which legislation is
enacted in Canada. Thus, interpretations of such legislation that further or reflect such
commitments should be preferred over those that do not.
In interpreting whether the decision at issue was a reasonable exercise of the Minister’s
power to grant an exemption to deportation for humanitarian and compassionate grounds (s
114(2) of the Immigration Act), L’Hereux-Dubé J did not limit herself with an analysis of the
CRC but also specifically looked to the preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights179 (UDHR) which, she noted, reflects values that are central in determining the issue.180
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This section of the judgment is of particular import given the dissent, given by Iacobucci and
Cory JJ, was made solely on the basis of disagreement with the majority’s holdings that
unincorporated international treaty law could generate values relevant to the interpretation of the
humanitarian and compassionate grounds provision of the Immigration Act. The dissenting
judges left open the possibility that the matter would have been different if the international
human rights values were customary obligations;181 Iacobucci J, for the dissent, failed to
acknowledge that while the UDHR is not a treaty and that, as a UN General Assembly
resolution, not binding per se, it has long been argued to have helped in the crystallization of
fundamental general (non-treaty) international law.182
In 2005, the SCC reiterated the importance of Canadian courts interpreting domestic law
in a manner that accords with the Canada’s treaty obligations and with the principles of
customary international law.183 Beyond these cases dealing with interpreting ordinary law in
light of international human rights law, the SCC has many times held that not simply ordinary
law but also the Charter must be interpreted on the presumption it offers no less protection than
Canada’s international human rights obligations.184
In review of the above-noted SCC cases, it seems reasonable to state that, while comity
may generally limit the reach of Canadian domestic law, it will not do so where blind adherence
to neighbourliness would risk undermining or breaching Canada’s commitments to human rights
norms or constitutional values.
Comity is variable by genre of application
It is not necessarily clear that the principle of comity applies equally to all conflict of
laws scenarios. Upon review of the SCC’s treatment of comity, it is clear that the Court itself
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often defines its interpretation of comity in relation to the actions, rather than inaction, of other
states. Indeed, in Pro Swing, the Court held the balancing exercise of comity requires “respectful
review of the relief offered by the foreign court.”185 Such focus on the acts of foreign states
suggests comity serves a more limited function, keeping Canadian courts from acting in a way
that may interfere with a foreign state’s sovereignty when the foreign state has demonstrated
some interest in adjudication and has done so in a manner that aligns with Canadian private
international law norms. This range of treatment is clear when comparing the three most utilized
mechanisms in private international law: anti-suit injunctions, recognition and enforcement, and
finally, forum non conveniens.
A first example lies in Amchem, the birth of the forum non conveniens test in Canada. In
that case the SCC was actually primarily asked to look at the principles that ought to apply to
anti-suit injunctions. In that case, the SCC was sitting on appeal of a BC Court of Appeal
decision to grant an anti-suit injunction to the defendants in a case launched in Texas to
determine damages related to asbestos exposure suffered by a large number of plaintiffs. In order
to define the test for injunctions, the SCC had to distinguish between the two remedies available
to a defendant: a stay of proceedings — upon which the court defined the new forum non
conveniens test — and an anti-suit injunction.
In its discussion of anti-suit injunctions, and in reference to the new test for a stay of
proceedings, the Court limited the new test for injunctions on the basis of comity; while both a
stay of proceedings and an anti-suit injunction had the purpose of identifying where a trial should
be held and legally applied in personam, the effect was that injunctions limited the actions of a
foreign court.186 In applying his reading of comity outlined by La Forest J in Morguard, Sopinka
J for the Court held that an anti-suit injunction would only be considered where a foreign
proceeding is pending; it would be unfair to pre-judge the actions of a foreign court. Only where
a foreign court has taken jurisdiction may a Canadian court look to that decision to determine
whether it did so in a manner inconsistent with the principles of forum non conveniens. If so,
then a Canadian court, confident the foreign jurisdiction had not observed the rules of comity in
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unjustly finding it was the appropriate forum, may issue an injunction against a private party that
has the effect of limiting that foreign court’s jurisdiction, thereby reaching the limits of its own
responsibility to comity. In other words, the Canadian court should not act so as to restrain the
actions of a foreign court unless it is confident the foreign court acted in such a way as to offend
Canadian norms.
In Amchem, the court found that there may be a real issue with comity in respect of
injunctions because of the effect it had on limiting the actions already taken by a foreign court.187
There are two important points to highlight. First, the conclusion that an injunction would offend
comity by interfering with a foreign court’s jurisdiction is not drawn with respect to a stay of
proceedings pursuant to application ofthe forum non conveniens test, i.e. a distinction is made
between the two mechanisms (the stay and the injunction). Indeed, this distinction followed that
made in the UK. The English case,188 from which the new Canadian test for injunctions was
borrowed for Amchem, SNI Aérospatiale v Lee Kui Jak,189 followed a decision in 1987 of the
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council to de-liberalize the test for anti-suit injunctions,190
which had then been adapted by the House of Lords to match the liberalization of the stay of
proceedings in Spiliada.191 This decision was made on the basis that such liberalization in the
case of injunctions was inconsistent with comity.
With respect to recognition and enforcement proceedings, comity becomes an issue for
the court precisely because of the impact it has on an action already taken by a foreign court.192
A clear example of the emphasis on foreign action is seen in the recent decision of the SCC in
Chevron. As noted above, the issue before the SCC in Chevron was whether the Ontario superior
court would have jurisdiction to provide the plaintiff with enforcement of an Ecuadorean court
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order. The Court held that international comity and the prevalence of cross-border transactions
and movement called for a modernization of private international law in Canada.193 In Chevron,
the Court distinguished between taking jurisdiction of a matter in the first instance and taking
jurisdiction in order to recognize or enforce an order already made. In the latter event, the SCC
noted that comity, which had consistently underlain recognition and enforcement law, militates
in favour of generous enforcement rules,194 such that the action of a state taken legitimately
within its territory ought to be afforded deference.195 Citing Tolofson — the case on choice of
law in tort — the Court held that the notion of comity will “in great measure recognize the
determination of legal issues in other states.”196 The need to acknowledge and show respect for
the legal acts of other states, the Court said, is a core foundation of comity, and that this respect
calls for “assistance, not barriers.”197 Citing Beals v Saldanha198 — another recognition and
enforcement case — the court concluded that, as cross-border transactions continue to multiply,
comity requires “an increasing willingness on the part of courts to recognize the acts of other
states.”199 In other words, to refuse enforcement would be to interfere and effectively neutralize
the act of another state.
In Chevron, the Court’s language continually returns to the idea of respect for the acts of
other states, albeit where those acts are done legitimately.200 Twenty-five years earlier,
Morguard itself — framing the modern approach to the real and substantial connection test —
was a recognition and enforcement case: the enforcement of a judgment already entered in
Alberta and sought enforced in BC. That Canadian courts should not, without good reason, delve
into the legal arenas and judicial acts of other states, was supportable. To do so would be to
suggest that Canada must “check the work” of its neighbours. However, the Court, even in the
wake of another’s state’s action and determination, may curtail its deference to comity where
there is evidence of fraud or violation of natural justice in a foreign court.
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Unlike an application for an anti-suit injunction where action by a Canadian court would
serve to restrain the court of another jurisdiction, a Canadian court asserting jurisdiction despite a
defendant’s suggestion there may be another appropriate forum does not prevent that foreign
court from acting. In other words, to keep an action in Canada does not have the same
consequences for international comity as an anti-suit injunction. This is clear in cases involving
disputes over the forum conveniens where the actions of another state will not be impacted by a
Canadian court’s determination on the matter. As a result, even where there hasn’t been evidence
of a violation of natural justice, and where there has already been action by another court, the
rest of the factors that make up the jurisdiction analysis can outweigh the impact of comity. In
Teck Cominco Metals v Lloyds Underwriters, the SCC rejected Teck’s argument that the action
of a foreign state in taking jurisdiction eliminated the need to engage in a forum non conveniens
analysis — in that case, under the CJPTA — and instead should consider a “comity-based”
analysis that respects the foreign court’s decision to take jurisdiction.201 The court held that
considerations of comity are already subsumed within the test for forum non conveniens and that
the action of a foreign court does not, and should not, act as a factor of “overwhelming
significance” to lead inevitably to a Canadian court declining to exercise its jurisdiction.202
It may be agreed that where foreign states (including their courts) have already acted, a
consideration of comity becomes relevant. But what appears to be more relevant is whether a
Canadian court’s actions related to comity will interfere with the foreign state’s exercise of its
own jurisdiction. When claims are initiated and where there may be overlapping claims to
jurisdiction between states, comity does not act as a trump card favouring the jurisdiction of firstto-file. The other factors considered in, specifically, the forum non conveniens analysis must also
be weighed. However, in cases where there has been no initiating foreign action, let alone any
action completed, consideration of comity must occupy a position of even lesser consideration.
Surely aggressive notions of comity do not extend to an insistence that Canada, by rote, “hold the
door” for other states that may or may not decide to engage.
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Comity should be flexible for all parties
Finally, far from being rigid and in keeping with its amorphous definition, comity and,
more generally, the interpretive practice of private international law have long been promoted for
their flexibility and ever evolving nature. For example, in relation to the globalization of business
and the invention of the internet, courts in Canada have consistently recognized the need of
private international law to keep up with the times.
In its search to identify the proper forum in Amchem, the Court sourced its struggle in the
fact that the business of litigation had become increasingly global and more difficult for courts to
identify the proper forum.203 Similarly, the Court in Pro Swing began its judgment by noting
modern-day commercial transactions require “prompt reactions and effective remedies.”204 The
globalization of commerce and the movement of people across borders, held the Court, make
territorial frontiers and national identity less relevant.205 The doctrine of comity, according to the
Court in Beals v Saldanha, “must be permitted to evolve concomitantly with international
business relations, cross-border transactions as well as mobility.”206 And, most recently in
Chevron, the Court, citing Beals, noted that as “cross border transactions continue to multiple,
comity requires an increasing willingness on the part of courts to recognize the acts of other
states.”207
Perhaps the most engaging discussion of the evolutionary dynamics of comity comes
from Justice La Forest’s discussion in Morguard. There, he held that principles of “order and
fairness, principles that ensure security of transactions with justice” underlie the modern system
of private international law.208 The state of interrelatedness and complexity of the modern system
calls for coordination and cooperation rather than a state’s unwavering focus on its own
parochial interests, lest injustice result.209 Modern means of travel, business, and communication
have made many of the 19th century concerns toward territoriality appear out of step. At the
international level, he explains, the rules of private international law and comity should be
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interpreted in accordance with the reality of the international business community and the
continuous decentralization of political and legal power.210
That states ought to focus on cooperation rather than adherence to territoriality is
reflected in significant shifts in what actions may be considered by the state to be “national” and
“territorial” for the purposes of Canada regulating its own citizens abroad. Examples include the
criminalization of child sex tourism when conducted by a Canadian — even if the act may not be
a crime in the state where it is committed — and section 46 of the Competition Act,211 making
corporate conspiracy a crime where it is committed by a Canadian national regardless of where it
is done.212 Through globalization, states are forced to reconceptualize the “national” and the
“territorial” in their creation and application of domestic legislation. With such reconfiguration
must come a complementary shift in the concept of comity.
But as private international law rushes to keep abreast of the practices of international
business, it cannot be allowed to do so only to the benefit of corporate interest. To do so would
create a type of “buffet development” of the common law in which corporate actors (and then
judges) pick and choose the elements of comity — for example, the recognition of foreign
judgments, recognition of patents and copyright, and recognition of contracts — that benefit the
corporation, while leaving behind those that do not, i.e. access to justice for affected peoples in
the corporation’s working state. International policy concepts such as comity are flexible enough
to be interpreted so as not to assume they operate in one direction or at least not to assume that
comity is the only policy at play.213 As private international law and comity are pulled forward
into the present, it is equally important that the recognition of “modern day commercial
transactions” recognize not only the global network and relationships of equal business partners,
but also the globalization of the corporation itself and its expanding influence in, for example,
the extraction of resources and exploitation of workers in areas of weak governance. As La
Forest J said in Libman, “we are all our brother’s keepers.”214
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While comity has, over time, transitioned from a public international law concept to one
informing — or as the SCC has recently expressed “inspiring”215 — the application of private
international law, its application to the practice of the latter is, in law, internally and judicially
limited. Not only is it not strictly enforceable, it is touted as constantly evolving to meet the
modern issues of transnational events. Furthermore, it would seem that comity is more
reasonably and effectively directed at solving apparent conflicts where the action of a Canadian
court would paralyze the action of another state, but even in those situations, care is due where
basic tenets of human rights would be violated by a blind deference in the name of sovereign
respect. Both the legal tests for forum non conveniens and forum of necessity, informed by the
principle of comity, are on their face, supportive of a liberal approach, in circumstances of
transnational corporate harm, to access to justice in Canadian courts.

C: The legal framework supports a reality-framed approach to conflicts
Some courts in Canada have shown themselves to understand the above-noted principles
and have engaged reasonably with the tests for forum of necessity and forum non conveniens in
contexts involving human rights and environmental abuses, although such well-reasoned
judgments are few and far between.
With respect to necessity, although few courts have had the opportunity to deal with it, as
was discussed above, the Ontario Superior Court in Bouzari took jurisdiction, where it otherwise
had none, on the basis of necessity where the plaintiff alleged he had been abducted,
incarcerated, and tortured in Iran. The court in that case held that Mr. Bouzari could not be
reasonably expected to return to Iran to make his claim in Iranian courts, the state in which the
torture took place.216 In doing so the court clearly rejected traditional territorial notions of comity
and state equality on the basis justice would not otherwise be served.
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Well-reasoned judgments related to forum non conveniens in cases involving human
rights abuses are similarly sparse. In contrast to such problematic judgments (which will be the
focus of Chapter 2), the BC Court of Appeal has proven itself up to the task in recent years when
it comes to an accurate reading of the current law on forum non conveniens.
In Tahoe, the plaintiffs claimed Tahoe’s private security personnel injured seven
protesters outside its Escobal mine in Guatemala when security opened the gates and began
firing live rounds at the protesters. Tahoe is a reporting BC company217 with majority
directorship residing in Canada (not in BC alone);218 Tahoe manages and controls all significant
aspects of the mine. The protesters claimed the attack was planned, ordered, and directed by the
head of the security force and that Tahoe expressly or implicitly authorized such use of force by
the security personnel or was negligent in failing to prevent it. All parties agreed the superior
courts of BC had jurisdiction simpliciter, however, Tahoe brought a motion for a stay of
proceedings on the basis Guatemala was the more appropriate forum pursuant to the CJPTA. The
motions judge allowed Tahoe’s motion and found Guatemala was clearly the more appropriate
forum for the action.219 That decision was appealed.
Madam Justice Garson, writing for the Court of Appeal, held that the motions judge had
misapplied the test for forum non conveniens. While the motions judge had correctly noted the
onus was on Tahoe to show why the Court should decline to exercise its jurisdiction, that judge
had not appropriately considered the evidence as it related to that burden. The Court of Appeal
held that neither a stand-alone suit, nor joining the ongoing criminal suit against the head of
security in Guatemala,220 were “clearly more appropriate” than conducting a trial in BC. Justice
Garson found the difficulties the plaintiffs would face in accessing Tahoe’s documents in
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Guatemala and the expiry of the Guatemalan limitation period — with no evidence adduced by
Tahoe that it would be waived — were not given sufficient weight by the motions judge. Further,
the motions judge had incorrectly isolated the discussion of the risk of unfairness of proceeding
with the claim in Guatemala.
The parties in Tahoe agreed the legal test – in making the determination of whether there
was a risk of legal unfairness before a foreign judiciary – was whether there was a “real risk of
an unfair process in the foreign court.221 This “real risk” test was borrowed from the English case
AK Investment CJSC v Kyrgyz Mobil Tel Ltd (2011).222 While the wording of the test was clear,
what was unclear was where the burden lay in proving there was a real risk of unfairness and at
what stage in the test such concerns were appropriately raised. Recall, in the UK the forum non
conveniens test is assessed in two stages. First, a defendant must establish there is a more
appropriate alternative forum. If the defendant is able to do so, a stay will be granted unless the
plaintiff can establish other circumstances which make the granting of a stay adverse to the
interests of justice.223 Whether there is a real risk of unfairness is considered at the second stage,
a burden borne by the plaintiff. Thus, in her decision, Madam Justice Garson examined whether
the “real risk of unfairness” test could operate in Canada where the approach to forum non
conveniens is unified, i.e. all factors are weighed together in one stage.
The BC Court of Appeal held that the “real risk” of unfairness test was an appropriate
standard and that it forms part of the overall forum non conveniens analysis, for which the
defendant bears the overall burden. The Court further held the weight of any provided evidence
of unfairness will be dictated by the quality of that evidence. The motions judge had given
insufficient weight to the evidence tendered by the plaintiffs related to systemic corruption in the
Guatemalan judiciary and the “context of the dispute,”224 i.e.: the evidence of weakness in the
Guatemalan justice system,225 the evidence of endemic corruption in the Guatemalan
judiciary,226 and the difficulties the appellants would face in bringing a suit against Tahoe given
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the limited discovery procedures available in Guatemala.227 The Court allowed the appeal and
dismissed Tahoe’s application for a stay of the BC proceeding.228 Tahoe sought leave to appeal
to the SCC and was denied.229
Later the same year, the same court was provided a second chance to comment on the
state of forum non conveniens in relation to Canadian mining abroad in Araya v Nevsun
Resources Ltd.230 In Nevsun, the plaintiffs are Eritrean refugees who allege they were forced,
through military conscription, to work at the Bisha gold mine in Eritrea owned, in part, indirectly
by the defendant. While constructing the mine, the plaintiffs allege they were forced to work in
inhuman conditions and under constant threat of physical punishment, torture, and imprisonment,
even after they had served their periods of conscription in the military. While all parties
acknowledged the BC superior courts had jurisdiction simpliciter over the matter, Nevsun
brought three applications. The first, like in Tahoe, was a motion for a stay of proceedings on the
basis that Eritrea was the more appropriate forum pursuant to the CJPTA. However, Nevsun is a
more complicated case than Tahoe as the notice of civil claim includes allegations of not only
domestic tort violations, but breaches of international law. This prompted the second application:
to strike the proceedings for no reasonable cause of action. Further, the plaintiff’s allegations
include the involvement of the state of Eritrea (through the army conscription process), thus
triggering the defendant’s third application: to strike the pleadings for no reasonable cause of
action on the basis of the act of state doctrine, claimed to follow from the same principles as
would, due to the State Immunity Act (SIA), protect Eritrea from being directly sued.231
Beginning her judgment by citing Justice Lloyd Jones of the English Court of Appeal in
Belhaj v Straw,232 Madam Justice Newbury, for the Court, accepted that “the traditional view of
public international law as a system of merely regulating the conduct of states among themselves
on the international plane has long been discarded…[C]hanges have been reflected in a growing
willingness on the part of courts in [the UK] to address and investigate the conduct of foreign
states and issues of public international law when appropriate.” She staked the case before her as
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one that may determine whether Canada was to remain on the traditional path of “judicial
abstention” even where foreign conduct consists of peremptory norms of international law.233
She concluded Canada ought to adapt.
For our purposes, it is unnecessary to delve deeply into whether international law can
ground a cause of action in Canada or whether an act of state doctrine exists and, if it exists, may
apply. That said, the Court’s discussion related to the appropriate forum is informative. Despite
the hundreds of witnesses located outside of Canada, their lack of ability to speak English, and
many similarly complex logistical issues, the Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge’s findings
that BC was the more appropriate forum. The Court found there was no real risk of multiplicity
of proceedings, nor any usurping of Eritrea’s internal labour tribunals. The Court found there
was sufficient cogent evidence that there was a real risk the plaintiff would not receive a fair trial
in Eritrea. The judicial system in that country was found — on the basis of significant expert
evidence — not to be set up to ensure judicial independence from the government.
Nevsun appealed the BC Court of Appeal’s decision to the SCC on the issues of
customary international law and act of state; that appeal was heard January 23, 2019. Perhaps in
recognition of the quality of reasoning in the BC Court of Appeal and of the current state of the
law on forum non conveniens, Nevsun did not seek leave to appeal Madam Justice Newbury’s
decision with respect to forum non conveniens.
Similarly, in Piedra v Copper Mesa Mining Corporation,234 and Choc v Hudbay Minerals
Inc,235 the defendants chose not to move forward with arguments related to jurisdiction
simpliciter or forum non conveniens, perhaps acknowledging the law is now clear that Canada
was the appropriate forum in which to face their accusers. In Copper Mesa, Ecuadorean plaintiffs
alleged they had been victims of repeated harassment, intimidation, and assaults at the hands of
the security forces hired by the owner of the proposed mine, a BC-incorporated mining
company’s subsidiary. They brought actions in various torts against not only the mining
company, but also the TSX (related to the TSX’s decision to list the mining corporations shares
on the Toronto Stock Exchange). The defendants moved forward only with a motion to strike on
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the basis of no cause of action. In Hudbay, the Canadian corporation doing business in
Guatemala initially raised a forum non conveniens argument in response to claims against it for
murder, gang rape, and assault of local indigenous people opposed to its Fenix mine. However,
again, the company eventually discontinued the forum non conveniens argument, moving
forward only with its motions to strike on the basis of no cause of action and limitations.
In Nevsun and Tahoe, the BC Court of Appeal approached the issue of forum non
conveniens with not only an eye to the correct burden and with whom it lies — the defendant —
but also a thoughtful and broad awareness of the “real risk” for unfairness of litigating in
alternative fora. In neither case did comity present any real barrier for the Court of Appeal’s
decision making. In an approach reflective of that taken in Bouzari, the BC Court of Appeal saw
the reality of uneven state-corporate power dynamics in lesser regulated states and the reality of
challenged justice systems, whether they be challenged for lack of resources or active political
interference. In other words, they used an approach that I refer to as a “reality frame” to evaluate
the otherwise highly discretionary tests.

Reality framing as a conceptual touchstone
“Reality framing” can be defined in terms both of what it is not and what it seeks to
accomplish. Reality framing is about not defining a problem by the black letter law, whether
common or legislated. It is about not blindly tying one’s hands to precedent. Reality framing
instead, seeks to understand a legal issue through its context. What is the true source of a legal
problem? Who or what is fundamentally responsible for that problem? What are the rationally
predicted results of applying the received, black letter law? Does that outcome adequately
consider the power dynamics impacting on the legal problem? And, is the legal response likely to
result in any real change in a situation about which it is generally accepted that the status quo is
seriously untenable?
To consider jurisdiction in a reality frame is to acknowledge the conditions in which
foreign (to Canada) plaintiffs find themselves when facing harms caused to them by CanCorps.
Indeed, former justice of the SCC, Ian Binnie, had this to say with respect to resistance to
regulating multinational enterprises (MNE) in developing states:
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The economic influence of transnational companies is often such that states,
competing amongst each other for investment opportunities, have little incentive to
regulate. Even where the incentive exists, the political influence of transnational
companies, particularly in conflict-ridden and economically underdeveloped countries,
may be such that a state has little real power to impose its will.236

Reality framing is already present in the way in which the legislature and the courts have
approached the legal tests for forum non conveniens and forum of necessity, as well as their
application of the test to the facts. As we have seen above, the test for forum non conveniens
places the burden on the defendant to prove another forum is clearly more appropriate, looking
to a number of factors including the real risk that justice will not be done in an alternative forum
— a seemingly high bar to meet. The existence of a necessity-based jurisdiction, to create
jurisdiction where there was none, acknowledges situations in which the reality of the involvedparty relationships (and those of third parties) and the nature of the allegations may create
situations where justice will not be done absent a Canadian forum’s intervention. The flexibility
of these concepts, and some courts’ resistance to strict rules of interpretation, reflect the
importance of considering the context of each case on its unique bases. Indeed, the SCC has
repeatedly held the assumption of jurisdiction must ultimately be guided by order and fairness,
not a “mechanical counting of contacts or connections.”237
Such framing was clearly at play in the decisions of Tahoe and Nevsun where the Court
of Appeal saw beyond the claims made by the corporate defendants and evaluated the
discretionary factors in a way suggesting the Court was alive to context; in doing so the court
never lost sight of the reality of the foreign state’s judiciary, the state’s involvement (or lack
thereof) in the fair operation of the judiciary, the nature of the allegations and how the same
would be treated by the foreign state’s judiciary, and the nature of the relationship between the
corporation, the foreign state, and the plaintiffs. In those cases, the Court properly understood its
role, the discretionary nature of the tests, and the need to safeguard against artificially limiting its
role — through, for example, relying on dated interpretations of comity — in ensuring justice is
done.
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Even where courts — seemingly uncomfortable with treading into the territorial
jurisdiction of another state — cite the concept of comity, we have seen that comity is itself
amorphous and context-specific. Particularly where no action has yet been taken by a foreign
state and where human rights are at issue, any dedication to strict territoriality is limited and
waning. It appears that, in law, neither tests of forum of necessity or forum non conveniens nor
the character of comity should bind the hands of Canadian judges in taking or retaining
jurisdiction in cases involving transnational human rights litigation. Even while overlapping
jurisdiction may in theory present comity issues, in practice where there are actual conflicts, they
can be fairly and effectively dealt with through the operation of the legal mechanisms and
doctrines described above in a manner that is sensitive to contextual reality. In fact, one might go
so far as to observe that true conflicts rarely appear, particularly with respect to causes of action
involving transnational human rights, as transnational corporate activity often occurs in zones of
weak governance zones characterized by a lack of effective national oversight.238 In such cases,
there is no conflict between a Canadian court exercising jurisdiction and non-action on the part
of the host country.
All that said, while in law there is no real barrier to a foreign plaintiff initiating a cause of
action for breaches of human rights or environmental torts in Canada against a CanCorp, what
we see in fact is that Canadian courts have not all had as broad a horizon as the BC Court of
Appeal in the Tahoe and Nevsun cases. Other courts have been more reticent in moving beyond
19th century frameworks of territoriality and strict, unsupportable interpretations of what comity
demands of them. In the next chapter I will examine some of the underlying reasons why too
many Canadian courts have maintained a 19th century territorialist bias in interpreting comity and
state non-interference and how that has played out through transnational human rights litigation.
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Chapter 2: Canadian courts are mired in a self-reinforcing territorialist
version of comity
Following the release of what Robert Wai terms the “tetralogy” — Morguard, Amchem,
Hunt, and Tolofson — between 1990 and 1994,239 there was some thought that the significant
changes to Canadian private international law represented a sign of judicial activism in the name
of recognizing international norms.240 However, in the following twenty years, it appears some
courts in Canada have ignored the spirit of those seminal judgments. An analysis of why courts
in Canada appear in many cases to be unable (or unwilling) to break free of territorialist notions
of comity could easily remain inwardly focused. Such an analysis could seek to smooth over the
apparent contradictions between the law on its face (the black-letter tests for jurisdiction) and the
way in which it is applied. However, it may be more useful to take a step back and apply what
Rahel Jaeggi refers to as an “immanent critique”241 in which we may ask whether the “form of
life”242 of private international law is equipped to deal with the “problem” of the
transnationalization of the corporation and the relative failure of the national juridical arena to
catch up such that Canada could ensure corporations may be actually held accountable for their
actions when acting abroad. One way to undertake such an analysis, is to consider the juridical
system through the lens of Pierre Bourdieu and his field theory. Doing so illuminates some of the
forces inherent in Canadian judicial decision making that lead to the conservative application of
comity, the effects of which are clearly visible upon review of some recent Canadian human
rights case law, and specifically, transnational tort litigation.
In the following section I will first review Bourdieu’s field theory and how his theory
applies to judicial decision making. Then, I will review the forces inherent in the Canadianspecific juridical field and some of the factors that inform the tendencies and inherent
preferences of Canadian judges. I will end with a review of recent human rights case law — first
with respect to a case demonstrating today’s judicial hyper-comity and then using several
239
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transnational tort claims — to demonstrate how judicial habitus (roughly translated, tendency)
has informed legal decision making and, in those cases, led to injustice.

A: Bourdieu, the field, and habitus
Introduction to Bourdieu and his field theory
Pierre Bourdieu was a 20th century French philosopher and sociologist who is best known
for his conception of “field theory.”243 Bourdieu’s approach rejected psychological structuralism
— the idea that human actions are born of the human mind — and ideas that behaviour is
entirely outwardly-influenced. Instead, Bourdieu conceived of behaviour and the operation of
“agents” as fundamentally relational. According to Bourdieu, a “field” is a social and political
context in which agents operate, compete, and in which they are hierarchically positioned. A
field, such as the juridical field he described in an article dedicated to law,244 is never completely
autonomous and is informed and defined by fields around it. Notably, fields are influenced by
the “meta-field” of power, which is made up of a combination of the economic and political
fields.
While the agents within the field are influenced by the nomos — the field-specific,
largely unspoken, norms that regulate the actions in the field — and the doxa — the underlying,
normative, and unquestioned beliefs commonly held in a field that are socially constructed as the
natural order245 — agents retain some, though still circumscribed, agency. This agency is
referred to by Bourdieu as habitus. An agent’s habitus is a collection of durable and ingrained
dispositions which function effectively as perception and assessment, tastes and distastes,
sympathies and aversions.246 Such dispositions are acquired throughout life: a “primary habitus”
developing through socialization by the family, and a “secondary habitus” built primarily on
forms of education and on an agent’s movement through (for example, occupational) fields in
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adulthood. The structures of conditions experienced early in development produce the structure
of the habitus, whose structure then acts as the basis of perceiving and appreciating all
subsequent experiences.247 In this way, the habitus is infinitely evolving — subject to
experiences and the nomos and doxa of the field — but always within the confines of limits set
by the historically and socially situated conditions of its initial production (the social, cultural,
and economic capital).248
While much of Bourdieu’s work focused on the political and economic fields — and
through analogy is easily applied to law — he and others did demonstrate specifically how field
theory might apply to the juridical field.249

The juridical field and the habitus of judges
In his analysis of the juridical field (the “Field”), Bourdieu resisted the formalist
approach — that which asserts the absolute autonomy of the juridical form — and the
instrumentalist approach — that which conceives of law as solely a reflection of, or a tool in the
service of, a dominant group.250 Bourdieu looked instead between such oppositional approaches
and concluded the Field is best understood by the social historical conditions that emerge from
the struggles within the field of power and the habitus of juridical agents; the existence of an
entire social universe that is otherwise ignored through focus on structure.
The Field is a production of, on the one hand, the power relations which give it structure
and which order the struggles between the agents within, and on the other hand, the internal
barriers which constrain the range of possible actions and outcomes.251 The outcome of such
confrontations leads to a social division between those on the “inside” and those on the
“outside,” which serves to buttress the juridical normative perspective that the field of law is
totally independent of the power relations it, in fact, sustains and legitimizes.252 In his review of
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the Field, Bourdieu observed and described a number of elements that are informative for this
review of the Canadian judiciary’s relationship with comity.
First, the agents occupying the Field are homogenous. While the membership of judges in
the dominant class is universally understood, class membership more generally in the Field is
also relatively uniform; the monopoly of the legal profession allows access only to those with a
common heritage and access to cultural, economic, and social “capital.”253 Having acquired the
“entry ticket” to the Field, the monopoly of legal education ensures a consistency in the legal
sources and materials available, modes of thinking, and expression and action.254 Consistency in
thought is further ensured by the agent’s implied acceptance — through choice and entry into the
Field — of the dominance of the Field and its ability to resolve conflicts according to the laws
and conventions of the Field itself.255 The predictability in the law is thus shaped by the
consistency of the Field habitus. The agreement — or nomos —among agents in the Field that
the law provides its own foundation for determining conflict reinforces ideas that there is some
fundamental or universal norm and, in turn, sustains the historical forms of legal reasoning that
created such norms in the first place.256 That said, it is important to note that, within the Field,
the struggle between agents is not equal;257 there is variation in the relative power and influence
certain agents will have over the creation and maintenance of their version of the law. This
version of the law, however, will continue to be strictly limited by the consistency of the legal
habitus.
Second, the study of a field cannot be done from an “objective” standpoint; observers are,
and become part of, the practices they observe in that their shared observations will influence the
field. This is true not only of the researcher studying a field, but of the agents who observe a
253
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field from within. A judge, in reviewing the history of the common law or in describing and
analyzing a statute, does not do so from a neutral or objective place; her observations — the
language used, the structure of analysis, the presence or absence of acknowledged doxa —
inform the approach taken by the next observer. As Bourdieu noted, despite judges preferring the
role of “lector, or interpreter, who takes refuge behind the appearance of a simple application of
the law,” judges, in fact, perform work of judicial creation.258 In granting judgment, judges
imbue the action with symbolic weight rendering it “legitimate.”259 The act of legitimizing is
intensified through the ritual of written judgment attesting that the decision expressed “not the
will or world-view of the judge but the will of the law or the legislature.”260
Third, and related, the Field uses ritual and language to express and re-exert the
legitimation of the rule of law and the work of agents within the Field. Agents use a common
language of defined terms in arguments and in judgments that further make the Field inaccessible
to the lay person. The “omnitemporality” of the rule of law and the use of constative verbs
emphasize the expression of the factual — i.e. making what is objectively unknown or
unknowable magically defined and known.261 The judgment of the court publicly proclaims
“objective truth” and creates a vision of the world through “naming.”262 In naming, the court
delineates and categorizes, providing actors and agents with identity; in this way, the court is
engaged in what Bourdieu termed “worldmaking” through defining social units.263 The court is
only able to do this where its proposed vision aligns with the pre-existing divisions of which the
agents of the Field (of which a judge is one) are the products; in this way a “correct” definition
of a social unit “ratifies and sanctifies” the doxic view of the already homogenous Field.264
Last, through naming and fact-creation, the court also informs the behaviours of all social
agents. By universalizing and authenticating its world view, it normalizes certain behaviours. By
normalizing the behaviour that aligns with its interpretation of the “rules” — which already
reflect the culture that creates and controls the rules — the court sanctions the effort of the

258

Ibid at 823, 826.
Ibid at 828.
260
Ibid at 828, 831.
261
Ibid at 820.
262
Ibid at 838.
263
Ibid.
264
Ibid.
259

61
dominant group to impose an official representation of its world views, which favours its
interests, thus sustaining the dominance of such views.265 Thus ideas are normalized, passing
from orthodoxy to doxa.266

B: The habitus of Canadian courts
Bourdieu’s framework, particularly that involving the idea of “field” was used as the
foundation in an early 1990s study conducted by Yves Dezalay and Bryant Garth to, for the first
time, analyze the mechanisms, the actors, the rules, and the role of international (as in,
transnational) commercial arbitration. In doing so, they applied what they described as a
framework immediately common and palatable to practitioners of law — while foreign and
uncomfortable to scholars — in order to examine anew this burgeoning field.267 While this thesis
is far more modest than that of Dezalay and Garth, I have looked to judicial commentary, state
action, and secondary sources to, hopefully, in similar fashion, introduce Bourdieu’s framework
to private international law in Canada as it considers questions of forum non conveniens and
forum of necessity, and to explore the impact of the habitus of the Canadian Field in considering
such questions.
A noted above, the habitus of a field is informed by the structures, nomos, and doxa of
the field. The habitus of the Canadian Field is informed by, among other things, (a) the structures
of federalism; (b) the doxa of the incremental movement of the common law, stare decisis, and
judicial independence; and (c) the nomos of the state sovereignty doctrine through historical
reference and norm signaling from the field of power. These “inputs” create a Field habitus that
tends towards and prefers a non-interventionist, territorialist, and hyper-comity approach. This
habitus is made visible in a number of tendencies — or “outputs” — of the Field. I will introduce
four such tendencies as examples: (a) the reference and deference to democracies, (b) the
reference and deference to judicial brethren, (c) the strict delineation and definition of conflicts
rules, and (d) the quiet and narrow co-option of transnational law — a law that is designed to
regulate the arena between sovereign states — for the benefit of only advancing comity where it
265
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serves the interests of the Field, including the meta-field of power. These two elements —the
input and output — are the subjects of the sections that follow.

1. Inputs: elements informing habitus
a. Federalist structures of habitus
The habitus of agents in the Field is initially defined, and continuously reshaped, by
Canada’s federalist foundation. Federalism has led to a varied understanding of state equality as
agents are taught to understand state equality not only as between nation states, but also as
between provinces. This structure naturally informs the content and further creation of conflicts
law in Canada and may, in some cases, blind judges to the unique requirements of comity at the
international, rather than inter-provincial, level.
As the western concept of state sovereignty moved from its western European origins to
the shores of America, the Hobbesian and Bodinian concepts of state and national sovereignty —
featuring one all-powerful secular ruler — were modified to fit the post-Indigenous American
context. With the signing of the new American constitution in the late 18th century, state
sovereignty — specifically the question of who held the right to make and enforce law — had to
be amended to accommodate federalism. James Madison, the American founding father and
fourth President, emphasized in The Federalist Papers the new national government was one of
limited and enumerated powers;268 the notion of limitation took shape not only as separation of
powers at a given level of government but also in terms of the nation-state’s power being shared
in a defined manner with the sovereign governments of the states through whose union the
nation-state was created. Although differing in detail in both form and substance, Canada’s
federalist constitution evinced a similar general conception of split sovereignty, but as between
the national and the provincial.
Unlike unitary states whose national governments control both the state’s public and
private international law approaches,269 Canada’s Constitution Act, 1867, provided most (though
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not all) powers of private law to the provinces, while the national government retained control
over Canada’s international relationships.270 Thus, as Joost Blom recently explained, it becomes
“logically impossible” to situate private international law in a non-constitutional space.271 As a
result, Canadian courts deal not only with questions of “private international law” at the level of
nation states, they also deal with “private inter-provincial law” as between the provinces; both
streams can be dealt with compendiously under the more general denomination, “conflict of
laws.” As will become clear, the majority of seminal cases that have set Canada’s approach to
conflict of laws were indeed determined not on the basis of international but on the basis of interprovincial legal conflicts.272
A number of these seminal decisions in the conflict of laws arena have made clear the
different approaches to be taken to actions resulting from international events and from those that
are inter-provincial. In 1990, Justice La Forest explained in Morguard that the underlying
principles of private international law and comity must be adapted to the situations in which they
were applied. There, he found that such application in the context of a federation implies a
“fuller and more generous acceptance of the judgments of the courts of other constituent units of
the federation.”273 The courts in one province, said Justice La Forest, should give “full faith and
credit” to the judgments given by a court in another province provided that that other court
exercised proper jurisdiction in the action.274 Fundamentally, he found, issues of fair process are
not an issue within the Canadian federation.275 In coming to his conclusion in Morguard — a
recognition and enforcement case — La Forest J cited Justice Dickson who had held for the SCC
in Zingre that comity is based on the common interest of both the jurisdiction giving judgment
and that enforcing it. Indeed, he stated, a recognition of comity is in the interest of the whole
country, “an interest recognized in the Constitution itself.”276
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As noted in Chapter 1, the Constitutional status of the real and substantial connection test
from Morguard was cemented in Hunt, in which the SCC found that “litigation engineered
against a corporate citizen located in one province by its trading and commercial activities in
another province should necessarily be subject to the same rules as those applicable to
international commerce.”277 In Hunt, the real and substantial connection test was deemed
appropriate to prevent provincial overreach and uphold Constitutional division of powers.
However, it was not clear that the test would be applicable beyond Canadian shores.
Indeed, in Spar Aerospace v American Mobile Satellite Corp, Justice LeBel for the SCC
suggested in obiter that it may be necessary to afford foreign judgments different treatment than
that given to inter-provincial judgments, wherein the latter would be subject only to a connection
test and not to wider fairness considerations. In Spar Aerospace he stated,
[h]owever, it is important to emphasize that Morguard and Hunt were decided in the
context of interprovincial jurisdiction disputes. In my opinion, the specific findings of these
decisions cannot easily be extended beyond this context. In particular, the two cases resulted
in the enhancing or even broadening of the principles of reciprocity and speak directly to the
context of interprovincial comity within the structure of the Canadian federation…278

Two years later, in Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v
Canadian Assn of Internet Providers, the SCC highlighted the lower status of comity in the
international realm as compared to the inter-provincial realm; comity in federalist Canada — as
opposed to internationally — enjoys “constitutional status.”279 Where the SCC finally did
comment in Beals on the test’s application to the international realm, the SCC held that the real
and substantial connection test could be applied in the international realm so long as any
unfairness that may arise be taken into account.280
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Such differentiation was not limited to the real and substantial connection test. In
Tolofson — the seminal case on choice of law — La Forest J preferred application of the lex loci
delicti rule because, among other things, the nature of Canada’s constitutional arrangements
support a rule that is certain and that ensures an act committed in one part of the country would
be given the same legal effect everywhere.281 Notably, in leaving open the door to a public policy
“exception” to the rule, La Forest J stated that he predicted limited application of such an
exception to actions that take place wholly within Canada and that any public policy problems,
particularly between provinces, tend to disappear over time.282 In other words, the public policy
exception was effectively limited to international actions.
By virtue of the interprovincial trade and movement of Canadian residents, Canadian
courts will naturally deal with far more volume of conflict of laws issues in the inter-provincial
realm than in the international realm. As a result, the application of the fundamental conflict of
laws principles from, for example, Morguard, Hunt, and Tolofson — three seminal cases in the
Field — whose findings and discussion centred largely on the relationships between provinces,
will be the norm. Through a continuous application of such principles, without thoughtful
reference to the context of their creation, courts may begin to lose sight of the differences in the
way in which comity and fairness apply as between inter-provincial and international cases.
As was noted by the SCC in Morguard and Hunt, comity, as between provinces,
recognizes the legitimacy and capability of sister provincial courts; generally speaking, the
courts of BC can be confident parties will see justice done as equally in Ontario as in BC. For
instance, Canadian provinces have similar, if not identical, rules of court, judges in every
province in Canada enjoy security of tenure, and by virtue of the proliferation of law schools in
Canada and government funding, it is generally possible for plaintiffs to find some legal
representation.283 These factors are not necessarily present in the courts of foreign state
jurisdictions. A judge in the Canadian Field, frequently engaging in conflict of laws issues
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between provinces, may not be turning his or her mind to whether justice can be done in another
provincial jurisdiction in a way that is required of international questions. Indeed, despite clearly
delineating between conflict of laws scenarios in the early 1990s, the SCC and other courts have
more recently readily applied the same provincially-situated tests to the international with little
account for the difference in context.284
For instance, in Van Breda, an international conflicts case heard in 2012, the SCC
reviewed the constitutional history of the real and substantial connection test and focused almost
entirely on the inter-provincial context. Indeed, even the presumptive connecting factors the SCC
created to support the real and substantial connection test are phrased in respect of connection to
a province.285 In the decision, there is no real discussion of how such factors may be modified in
the international context. Further, in its application of the law to the facts of the case, there is no
reference to the way in which the real and substantial connection test may be modified in the
international law context, nor any reference to the “fairness” issue highlighted in Beals when
considering an international action.286
While the constitutional treatment of comity in Canada — grounded in the equality of
provinces — is paralleled in the UN’s Charter regarding the equality of states, the reality is far
from the written aspiration. Canadian courts cannot realistically assume the courts of all other
states are equipped to see justice done. To assume as much, or, by virtue of habit, to fail to turn
attention to issues of fairness and justice, is to be wilfully blind to that fact. It is this reality —
the non-equality of states — that informed the decisions of the SCC in the early 1990s and
grounded the need to take account of the differences between inter-provincial and international
conflict of laws.
Through the frequent interaction of provincial courts with one another — notably,
through assessments of jurisdiction — and the continual rote naming of the appropriate tests, the
setting that grounded the original tests is lost and the tests designed for the federalist, interprovincial context is normalized for all areas of conflict of laws. Thus it is through the structure
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of federalism that the Field habitus is biased toward a more conservative, non-interventionist
approach to comity and private international law.
b. Field doxa
Three doxa of the Field — unquestioned and effectively non-derogable assumptions —
that are either implicitly or explicitly perpetuated by and for the Field contribute to the
traditionalist habitus of the Field. The first is the doxa that the common law is supposed to move
forward only incrementally lest it have unintended and radical impacts on the meta-field of
power.287 The incremental change in the law is a fact that is so well understood that it almost
need not be referenced. That said, the SCC has been quick to remind the Field of this doxic
“rule,” particularly in the arena of private international law.288 The result is that we see the Field,
unable by its doxa to effectively adapt, continuing to cite concepts of 16th century sovereignty
and equality of states. Such references perpetuate and continuously remake the norm of
territoriality and imbue even modern issues with dated justifications.
A second example, and related to the incremental development of the law, is the doxa of
stare decisis. The common law system requires that lower courts must follow and apply
decisions of higher courts in the same jurisdiction, to the extent that the higher court has decided
the same or a substantially similar issue. The “traditional view” is the doctrine applies only to the
ratio decidendi.289 However, while statements made outside the “ratio,” deemed “obiter dicta,”
are not strictly binding on lower courts, in some cases, where they are clearly meant as guidance,
they should be accepted as authoritative.290 The approach preferred in Canada when lower courts
are presented with differing facts on an issue already decided is to clearly provide commentary
and facts that may assist a higher court in reconsidering the law, but not to try to change the law
itself.291 As recently held by the SCC, “the doctrine that lower courts must follow the decisions
of higher courts is fundamental to our legal system. It provides certainty while permitting the
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orderly development of the law in incremental steps.”292 To overcome the barrier of stare decisis,
a lower court must be convinced a new legal issue is raised and there is a change in the
circumstances or evidence that “fundamentally shifts the parameters of the debate.”293 Stare
decisis favours a conservative and incremental approach to the change in the common law, and
arguably slows the adaptation of the Field to a changing world order.
A final example is the doxa of judicial impartiality and independence. While this example
may overlap with the “structure” of the Field, its existence is also socially constructed; judges
today are administered and appointed through instruments we consider to have independence at
their core – the Constitution Act, 1867,294 and the Judges Act295 — but this independence actually
developed gradually in the Field. In the UK, judicial power was initially concentrated in the
hands of the king and his immediate entourage (Curia Regis). Over several centuries, the UK
saw the emergence of specialized courts and a professional judiciary. By the end of the 15th
century, the king’s participation in judicial functions had greatly diminished, though he
continued to exert pressure on judges who could be dismissed when they refused to bend to royal
prerogative.296 Over time, judicial non-interference became expressed as a “constitutional”
principle though the term “constitutional” holds a very different meaning in Britain where, unlike
in Canada, there is, generally speaking, no written constitution.297 In Canada, the fundamental
components of judicial independence were inspired by the British principles, but actually
entrenched in sections 99 and 100 of the Constitution Act, 1867.298 The fact of judicial
independence in Canada is a shared attribute among Canadian judges, thus furthering ideas that
justice may be reasonably expected to be done in every province. This tenet, however true in
Canada, is not the case worldwide.
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c. Nomos of state sovereignty and norm signalling from the field of power
Finally, the nomos of the Field — the field-specific, largely unspoken norms — inform
the territorialist Field habitus. The nomos of state sovereignty is born of the significant history of
western legal thought and understanding of the role of the state. As canvassed in Chapter 1,
Bodin’s conception of the sovereign state, the Grotian addition of comity, and the subsequent
centuries of territorial sovereignty playing the cardinal role in both public and private
international law have remained steadfast. Such historical roots are perpetuated through the
homogeneity and monopoly of Canadian law schools, primary and secondary sources of
learning, and legal agents. Students of law are first exposed to a “traditional canon” — thus
cementing the structures through which they are able to understand and apply modern concepts
— before moving on to more complicated specializations.299 The canonical attachment to
territoriality requires the current school of private and public international law agents to perform
mental gymnastics to continually define and justify theoretical boundaries to match boundaries
drawn in the physical earth (state borders). The effect is that, while international corporations
seamlessly move around the globe, conveniently forum shopping to maximize profit, many
respected legal scholars and judges are sidetracked and distracted by whether a court may assert
private international law jurisdiction and upon what enumerated and normalized basis: extended
territorial or extraterritorial, the latter subdividing further to include national, universal,
objective, subjective jurisdiction etc. Through its focus on silos of interpretation, the Field selfreferences in a continuous action of “naming” and categorizing the world of “possible” answers,
thus repeatedly defining, identifying, and legitimizing a territorialist approach to conflict of laws.
A second source of territorialist nomos comes from the Field’s executive and legislative
sisters (field of power). As noted in Chapter 1, Canadian private international law rules err
towards asserting jurisdiction where one of many connecting factors is made out (under the real
and substantial connection tests).300 As a result, Canadian courts may arguably run the risk of
stretching further over the extraterritorial line than their civilian counterparts. Thus, a predictable
traditionalist reaction is to employ forum non conveniens liberally to demonstrate to the
international community that Canada is not one to overstep her bounds. Indeed, whenever a
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Canadian decision maker acts extraterritorially, it contributes to international norm setting,
making it increasingly more acceptable for other states to do the same, and perhaps to do the
same to the detriment of Canada’s own sovereignty.301 As a result, in some instances, we see the
Canadian legislative and executive branches norm signalling to the Field through demonstrations
of territorialist action.
It appears that Canada’s neighbour to the south is particularly concerning to the Canadian
political field. In the 20th century, the US has emerged as an outlier in taking aggressive steps to
assert its extraterritorial jurisdiction over, for example, certain forms of crime (including
economic conduct that is often regulated by categorizing it as crime) in a manner arguably
inconsistent with fundamental international law principles. This was only heightened after the
attacks of September 11, 2001, which led to, what Coughlan et al refer to as, “belligerent
exertions of extraterritorial executive jurisdiction that were driven by the rhetoric of the ‘global
war on terror.’”302
In response, the Canadian political field has resisted. A first example occurred in 1985,
when the Canadian legislative branch passed the Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act
(FEMA).303 FEMA responded to a number of United States measures passed to force disclosure
of documents from Canadian companies or to issue judgments against same in certain
circumstances including a company’s restrictive business practices, export controls, securities
measures, and bankruptcy and insolvency. The Minister of Justice at the time, the Honourable
John Crosbie, explained to Parliament in introducing the bill, that FEMA would give the
Canadian government (and presumably Canadian courts), the “muscle” to defend Canadian
sovereignty.304 FEMA was further amended in 1996 to respond to the US Helms-Burton Act,
which penalized non-US businesses for dealing in property that was expropriated from
Americans in Cuba.305 The Canadian government responded by adding sections 7.1 and 8.1 to
FEMA which, unlike the rest of FEMA, calls out the American government by stating that any
judgment made under, specifically, the Helms-Burton Act, would be unenforceable in Canada.
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Even where the US has taken steps that are arguably well within their own jurisdiction,
the Canadian political field’s response has been aggressively insular. For instance, in 2003
Canada tried to intervene on the part of a Canadian oil and gas company, Talisman Energy Inc,
which faced a civil suit in the United States for alleged wrongdoing in the Sudan. Talisman was
accused of cooperating with the government of the Sudan through the provision of oil revenue
that government relied on to fund its military effort in the Second Sudanese Civil War. More
specifically, the government of the Sudan was accused of a number of war crimes and crimes
against humanity, for which Talisman was accused of, effectively, aiding and abetting (for
example, by providing airfield access for the Sudan’s military). The Presbyterian Church of
Sudan sued Talisman in the US pursuant to the American Alien Tort Claims Act arguing the US
had jurisdiction by virtue of Talisman’s breach of international law.306 On a motion to dismiss on
the basis of forum non conveniens, among other motions brought by Talisman, the Canadian
government sent the US Court a letter alleging the Court was violating traditional restraints on its
exercise of territorial jurisdiction.307
Contrary to Canada’s insistence, Judge Schwartz of the District Court for the Southern
District of New York found Talisman, as a corporation, was capable of violating the law of
nations, the plaintiffs had adequately pled breaches of the law of nations on the part of the
government of the Sudan, and a substantial degree of cooperation between Talisman and the
Sudan made clear the Sudan was not an adequate alternative forum. While not deciding it — as
the plaintiffs had not questioned the adequacy of Canada as an alternative forum — the US Court
questioned whether Canada would be an adequate forum. First, Canada presumptively applies the
law of the place of injury (lex loci delicti) — which would not result in increased fairness
compared with the trial proceeding in the Sudan — and Canada does not allow a cause of action
for violations of the law of nations itself — as differentiated from common law torts of battery,
assault, false imprisonment, and so on — which failed to recognize the gravity of the plaintiffs’
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allegations. Whether or not Canada was an adequate forum, the judge found the US, namely that
Southern District of New York located in New York City, to be the forum conveniens.308
Canada’s sensitivity to the shadow of American legislative and judicial reach is clearly
evident in the actions of its legislative and executive bodies. As a result, it is likely this message
has seeped into the nomos of the Field as a resounding and perpetual chorus: “we do not give
them an opening.”
The federalist structure; the doxa of judicial independence, incremental advancement of
the common law, and stare decisis; and the nomos of state sovereignty through historical
reference and modern executive signalling — all of these elements combine to inform,
perpetuate, and ground the Field habitus of territorialism and non-intervention. This habitus and
its impact on transnational litigation can be spotted in the language of judicial decisions and the
tendencies of Canadian courts in such actions. What follows are some examples of such
indicators.

2. Output: evidence of the Field habitus
a. Comity towards democracies
As noted above, state sovereignty is supported by the public international law concept of
equality of states. This concept was born of Western Europe at a time when “legitimate” nation
states — and those to be afforded “equality” — were few and other “uncivilized” regions were
under colonized control of the former. At the time, it may have followed that equality of states
was a real and manageable concept. Today, with over 200 nation states “recognized” by the
United Nations — many of which are former colonies of those early select few — featuring
wildly variable geographies, government structures, economic power, and access to military
defence, it is charming to suggest the “equality” of states remains more than, at best, aspirational,
and more likely, a relic.309
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In what appears to be a very mild adaptation to this “reality,” we see the Field adapt
territorialist sovereignty concepts through reference to “democracies” or states with “similar
values” rather than simply nation states. This modification is clear in Van Breda; one of the
guiding principles the SCC introduced to use in adding any new presumptive connecting factor
for asserting jurisdiction on the basis of real and substantial connection is the treatment of that
factor in the private international law of other legal systems “with a shared commitment to order,
fairness, and comity.”310 Indeed, this approach echoes with what is “internationally recognized”
by the International Court of Justice as key sources of international law, namely: “general
principles of law recognized by civilized nations.”311 Unfortunately reference to democracies or
those states that share similar “commitments” appears to be a low bar — once a nation state is
“defined” as a democracy, the Canadian courts appear to revert to traditional notions of noninterference-based comity lest they offend Canada’s “democratic” sisters.
A clear example is provided by the 2008 determination of the Federal Court in the
Afghan Detainees case.312 The applicants in that case launched a judicial review of the decision
of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) to transfer Afghan detainees to Afghan government
prisons. The fundamental question in that case was whether the Charter applied to the actions of
the CAF when operating abroad. To solve this issue, the parties agreed to bring a motion to
determine that legal question alone. Evidence was presented that when CAF personnel
apprehended Afghan citizens, they could temporarily hold them before transferring them to
Afghan custody. Before transferring a detainee, the Commander Joint Task Force Afghanistan
had to be satisfied there were no substantial grounds for believing that there existed a real risk
that the detainee would be in danger of being tortured or suffering other forms of mistreatment at
the hands of the Afghan authorities.313 To follow up on detainee transfers, the CAF formed
agreements with the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission which agreed to monitor
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the condition of transferred detainees.314 In November 2007, the CAF decided to suspend the
transfer of detainees as a result of a credible allegation of mistreatment of detainees.315
In determining the Charter would not be available to the detainees, the Court reviewed
Justice LeBel’s decision in Hape, and several foreign judgments — although the Court’s
interpretation of Hape formed the foundation of the Court’s analysis and ruling. The motions
judge thus tried to apply the principles from Hape — collectively understood by all parties to be
the governing law — to a fact situation that significantly differed from that in Hape.
The first evidence of the judge’s territorialist approach to comity is evident in the judge’s
treatment of “consent.” Recall, in Hape, Justice LeBel noted that the Charter would not apply to
the actions of Canadian agents operating in a foreign territory absent (1) consent of the foreign
territory or (2) some other basis under international law.316 It was clear from the numerous bilateral and international agreements signed by the CAF and Afghan government that the Afghan
government had not provided clear written consent for the application of the Charter to its
territory. However, the applicants argued the consent test should not be applied strictly in the
case of Canada exercising military functions.317 In support of their argument, the applicants
relied on examples of previous CAF deployment to territories where it would have been unclear
whether the host government would be able to consent: namely, deployments to Somalia and
Yugoslavia. The argument a host government could not consent was deemed a legal exception
for “effective military control.” The motions judge first distinguished Somalia and Yugoslavia
on the basis the Afghan government was an “internationally recognized, democratically elected
government.”318 Second, the motions judge analyzed a series of UK and European Court of
Human Rights cases319 in which courts had determined jurisdiction in the context of military
operations. As admitted by the motions judge, the decisions were variable,320 some extending
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jurisdiction of a home nation into the territory of another, and in others taking a more
conservative approach. In this variable context, and in applying Hape to the fact pattern at bar,
the motions judge chose to apply the more conservative approach.
In these determinations, the Court took up a blind adherence to territorialist applications
of comity and equality of states. First, the Court, through “defining” the government of
Afghanistan as an “internationally recognized democracy” secured that nation state among those
deserving of “equal status” and thus whose sovereignty is unencroachable but for exceptional
circumstances. This was done despite clear evidence that the Afghan government was torturing
detainees — a clear breach of jus cogens and arguably not a characteristic, or, at least, not an
accepted characteristic321 – of “recognized democracies.” Second, the Court’s novel
interpretation of Hape’s “consent” standard errs towards a conservative approach, despite there
being room to manoeuvre, i.e. LeBel J’s open reference to exception on international bases.
This territorialist approach is starker given the Court’s conclusory comments. The
motions judge concluded by outlining some of the concerns that flow from “the Court’s
findings.”322 Such concerns included: (1) the fact that the content and scope of international
human rights are more limited and less likely enforceable than Charter rights; (2) the impact of
non-enforcement as a reflection of the “serious concerns” raised with respect to the treatment of
detainees; and (3) the fact that, while Canada can prosecute its CAF personnel after the fact if
they have engaged in mistreatment of detainees, a constitutional instrument (the Charter)
designed to prevent such abuse will not apply.323 Nevertheless, the Court concluded its hands
were tied by the narrow reach of Hape. In doing so, the Court clearly leaned heavily on its
obligation to stare decisis. The Court engaged in its own fact-finding that led to a determination
that neither the law nor the facts at bar differed enough from those of Hape to warrant a
departure from the earlier case – notwithstanding that, as noted above, such a finding would not
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even have been needed, given the “international bases” exception to the narrow test defined by
the Hape Court. On a positive note, the motions judge found it was not leaving the detainees in
“no-man’s land” because — seemingly unaware of the conclusion in Bouzari that a court cannot
expect a torture victim to seek redress in the state by which they were tortured — the detainees
may still exercise their Afghan constitutional rights and international human rights — those that
by this Court’s admission may not be effective — in Afghanistan.324
Similar deference to democracies by Canadian courts — as used to either reject
jurisdiction (forum of necessity) or to choose not to keep jurisdiction (forum non conveniens) –
are found across a spectrum running from Italy325 to Israel326 to Guyana.327 While not always
clear on its face (as with respect to the language used to describe Italy’s “long legal tradition”),
the deference to legitimate statehood is clear through the Field’s choice to dismiss clear evidence
suggesting otherwise. For instance, in the case of Israel, a Québec court, despite clear evidence
to the contrary, suggested not that the state clearly did allow elements of the Fourth Geneva
Convention to be applied in its courts in relation to harms on the West Bank but that, if it did not
Israeli courts would probably (if given the chance by the Canadian judge) acknowledge elements
of the Fourth Geneva Convention, thus creating no injustice for plaintiffs.328 In the case of
Guyana, the court ignored evidence that that state’s movement toward democracy and rule of law
had been slow and halting, and instead chose to contrast the current system with the fact there
had been a dictatorship — a contrast that makes even the feeblest of democracies look deserving
of full respect.329
It is important to note that in highlighting this democratic-deference some academics are
met with arguments that to suggest states are unequal and unequally able to provide justice to
victims of harm — particularly harm caused by multinational corporations — is to take an
324
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imperialist perspective.330 This corrupted “angel colonizer” argument is favoured among those
preferring the conservative approach to comity, resulting in shielding traditional notions of state
equality and non-interference from critique. While pretending to promote the “equal rights of
decolonized states” the defender of such arguments actually promotes conveyors of harm to be
under-penalized for such harms by ignoring the reality of state-state and state-corporate power
dynamics. As Sundhya Pahuja describes in Decolonizing International Law, the transition from
formerly colonized nations to players at the table of the international community was done under
the rubric of Western liberalism, human rights, and democracy;331 the emergence of newly
formed nations and radical decolonization at the formal level has outpaced the reality of power
and of traditional notions of comity.332 Indeed, while “equality of states” is a foundational
principle of public international law, the reality is that “third world” states have never
experienced sovereign equality among states, let alone environmental or human rights
sovereignty within their own borders.333 While I do not propose to engage in an extensive review
of legal legacies of colonization — many others have laudably and effectively taken on this
task334 — one example of the stark application of this “non-imperialist” approach is Judge
Keenan’s dismissal of the Bhopal action.335 While it is not a Canadian example, one can see very
similar values reflected in the Afghan Detainees judgment. In the Bhopal case, Judge Keenan
determined that to assert jurisdiction — even where the Indian state asked him to do so — would
constitute “another form of imperialism.” He even ended his judgment by claiming he was
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giving judges in this sister democracy a chance to “stand tall.”336 However, as Upendra Baxi
effectively argues, those that support such a determination remain wilfully blind to the reality
that were the Bhopal action to have gone ahead in India — rather than settle, as it did — Union
Carbide (the defendant in that case) would have been subject to strict multinational enterprise
liability rules — which Judge Keenan was aware of — thus resulting in a decision that likely
would not have ever been enforced in the United States against Union Carbide’s assets on the
basis that such strict liability law is “against US public policy.”337 In other words, in refusing to
assert jurisdiction — allegedly on the basis of avoiding modern imperialism — the court would
then very likely have rejected recognition and enforcement of an Indian judgment on the basis
such a judgment was “repugnant,”338 thus engaging in the very imperialism it sought to “avoid”
in the first place.
Modern reference to “democratic” states and the use of imperialist avoidance as a
shield339 promotes traditional notions of non-interference and comity through identifying de jure
or official norms to which the existence of states and their exercise of jurisdiction is compared at
a theoretical, rather than practical, level. In official recognition of the “democracy” of states,
through the ceremony of judgment writing, Canadian judges engage in fact-making that doesn’t
necessarily align with the reality on the ground. The act of doing so grounds their legal logic,
promotes the doxa that justice may equally be done in every democracy, and effectively serves to
advance/protect the interests of the Field and the interests of the field of power.
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b. Comity towards judicial brethren and their “legitimate judicial acts”
In her piece, “International Law in a World of Liberal States,” Anne-Marie Slaughter
reimagines international law as it would adapt to a world recognizing distinctions among
different states based on their domestic political structure and ideology.340 She imagines that in
such a construct, courts in liberal states would recognize each other as like units dedicated to the
same underpinning of rule of law, impartiality, and independence.341 I suggest that today, such
assumptions are already made by the Field and that this is clear in the judgments of the Canadian
judiciary in human rights conflicts law.
As noted, judges — by virtue of their shared economic, cultural, and social capital — are
largely “cut from the same cloth.” While, as described above, Canadian courts can be seen to
tailor the traditional notions of state equality to account primarily for states that are “like us” or
are “internationally recognized democracies” that are engaged in “legitimate judicial acts”342 —
despite what may be true in reality — written judgments make clear that above all else, judges
will protect their judicial brethren, generally with the result of deferring to such brethren.
Where counsel for plaintiffs have suggested that the judiciary of a foreign state is
wanting, either in training or independence, the response from the Field can be informative. A
first example is drawn from a judgment related to whether the courts of Guyana could provide
justice to plaintiffs alleging harm done by a catastrophic effluent spill caused by the Québecbased Cambior Inc. On the issue of interests of justice, the Court heard expert evidence from
William Schabas, a leading professor and expert in international human rights law who was then
a professor of law and head of the department of law at the Université du Québec à Montréal.343
Professor Schabas visited Guyana to conduct interviews and observe the court systems. He
provided the Québec Court with adverse conclusions related to the willingness and capacity of
the Guyanese judiciary to deliver justice for the plaintiffs. The Court, seemingly finding the
intrusion of an international human rights lawyer “presumptuous,”344 reduced and characterized
Professor Schabas’ testimony in flagrantly dismissive terms: “Professor Schabas…would have
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the court believe that Guyana is little more than a judicial backwater…”345 While the Court
recognized the professor’s expertise, it dismissed his evidence as being based on “secondary
sources” rather than his own experience.346
In contrast, the Court much preferred the testimony of three former Guyanese judges and
a former judge of the Québec Court of Appeal, all of whom testified to the independence and
integrity of the Guyanese judiciary. The Court wrote it was “particularly impressed with the
quality of [one of the Guyanese judge’s] evidence. To say the least, his legal credentials are
beyond dispute.”347 One of the former Guyanese judges even testified that the judiciary had
always been independent, even under dictatorial rule.348 It is certainly the prerogative of a trial
judge to admit and weigh evidence before her and determine which she prefers. However, in this
case, the weight provided to the Québec Court of Appeal justice witness — who had, like
Professor Schabas, only briefly visited Guyana and learned about the judiciary second hand —
and the weight provided to witness judges whose testimony regarding independence was
questionable on its face, suggests the Québec Superior Court justice could not fathom impugning
his brethren judges, particularly those of a “sister democracy.”349
Similar commentary can be found in the recent decision of the Ontario Superior Court in
Das v George Weston Ltd, to whose facts I will return below.350 In response to the plaintiffs’
suggestion that the judges of Bangladesh could not handle what would be an extremely
complicated and significant personal injury case against a multinational corporation, the Court
responded, “I need not dignify this argument and the one that follows, which insults the courts
and judges of Bangladesh, with an elaborate analysis...”351 The Court then engaged several
paragraphs vigorously responding to the plaintiff’s argument that the tort law of Bangladesh was
at a somewhat nascent stage of development, noting the plaintiffs’ argument was “patently
incorrect,” that the “bench and the bar in Bangladesh are well-educated,”352 and that the
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plaintiff’s argument was “somewhat insulting.”353
This charged response by the Court in Das is reflective of the judgment of Judge Keenan
in the Bhopal decision in the US. While, as noted above, India urged that Court to take
jurisdiction over the actions of an American corporate national — whose headquarters lay down
the street from the Court — Judge Keenan held he would “defer to the adequacy and ability of
the courts of India,” that the Indian government insulted its judiciary by taking such a position,
and that, as noted in the last section, this was an opportunity for the courts of India to “stand tall
before the world and to pass judgment on behalf of its own people.”354
In some cases, like in Tahoe and Nevsun discussed in Chapter 1, where we have seen a
Canadian court hold that there was a real likelihood justice would not be done, we see paired
commentary regarding the poor treatment judges in those countries have undergone, perhaps
suggesting in some cases the support of poorly-treated judicial brethren may be a factor for
consideration. For instance, in Nevsun, evidence was presented — and accepted as persuasive —
from a former judge of Eritrea who had been expelled from the judiciary after he was
imprisoned. He testified that the government had closed the only law school, the only lawyers
being issued a licence were conscripts from a new law department who are assigned by the
government to their work placements, and that many judges and lawyers had fled the country.355
In Tahoe, the BC Court of Appeal noted judges in Guatemala did not have security of tenure and
judges who make unpopular decisions may be subject to disciplinary proceedings and subsequent
sanctions.356 In both cases, evidence was presented that the foreign state was extremely
supportive of international industry for largely financial reasons. It may, thus, be fair to say that
one factor that appears to be persuasive to the Canadian Field is the importance of respect for a
foreign judiciary and the support a Canadian court may be able to show such foreign brethren,
whether that support is in favour of the foreign court exercising its power or, by punishing —
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through asserting jurisdiction and thereby potentially impacting the economic incentives
multinational companies have to stay in the foreign state — the foreign state actors.
Most commonly, through the use of language, Canadian justices are signalling — normmaking — to the rest of the Field that while they may readily leave plaintiffs without any real
remedy, they will be hesitant to entertain any suggestion their judicial brothers are lesser or
unable. In doing so, such judges create an awkwardness between their adherence to traditional
norms and judicial unity, and the language of the jurisdiction tests they created. For instance,
rather than focusing inwardly on whether Canada is an inappropriate jurisdiction for the purposes
of the forum non conveniens test, as Australia and the US do, the test in Canada is outward
looking; the test asks whether another jurisdiction is clearly more appropriate taking into account
issues such as justice and unfairness. It is structured as a presumption that Canadian courts
should keep jurisdiction. By its very nature, the test for forum non conveniens forces judges in
Canada to fairly evaluate the ability of their judicial brethren.357 The same is true in determining
whether a court should take jurisdiction under forum of necessity. It is thus, perhaps for this
reason, that in Canada we see a disconnect between what the tests for forum non conveniens and
forum of necessity actually require in law, and how they are being applied by a number of lowercourt judges (Bil’In (Village Council) v Green Park International Inc, Tahoe, Cambior, and Das)
and supported by courts of appeal in Québec and Ontario (Green Park, Das, Cambior) in
contrast to BC (Tahoe) with excessive comity to perceived equals.
c. Adherence to habitus through further delineation and traditional definition
The adherence to a territorialist and traditional approach to private international law — to
further the “logic” of the Field — in a world that no longer reflects that in which such notions
were born often requires internal inconsistency in naming/defining, wilful blindness to the global
reality of statehood and sovereignty, and strict practice of delineation (or isolating) of traditional
norms to re-trench traditional values. Such judicial tendencies are clear in the language of
Canadian jurisprudence.

357

Schultz and Mitchenson note that this very issue makes the “inward” focused test less of an issue with respect to
international comity as judges in Australia need not comment on a foreign court’s ability to ensure justice is done:
Schultz & Mitchenson 2016, supra note 109 at 368.

83
As a first example, we see internal inconsistency in defining thresholds for jurisdiction
and identifying the goals of assertion of jurisdiction. For instance, LeBel J inconsistently
interpreted the term “exceptional” in the contexts of forum of necessity and forum non
conveniens. Recall, with respect to the former, he described in Lamborghini the term
“exceptional” as requiring “near absolute legal or practical impossibility.”358 Meanwhile, when
defining the “exceptional circumstances” in which a claim will be stayed for forum non
conveniens, he describes exceptional as being akin to “clearly” — an obviously lower
standard.359 Only in an arena where non-intervention and comity are non-derogable does this
kind of distinction make sense; where the presumption is non-intervention (necessity) it is easy
for a judge to extend deference and refuse jurisdiction; and where the presumption is
intervention, reversing the presumption is made easier. A further inconsistency is evident in
Kazemi Estate v Islamic Republic of Iran360 (reviewed in detail below), in which the Court
repeatedly refers to the “purposes” of the subject legislation to support its interpretation, despite
there being no purpose section in that legislation and no official legislative purpose from any
other source cited by the Court.361
A second example of the promotion of traditional definitions demonstrates the arbitrary
adherence to comity based on equality and exceptional nature of states. Since the 1700s, the
concept of territorial sovereignty and of the state as the ultimate source of power has suffered
significant restriction through the rise of international organizations.
First, through membership in various organizations such as the World Trade Organization
(WTO), the European Union (EU), and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD), for example, states voluntarily give up bundles of state sovereignty
rights, allowing such institutions to prescribe and even enforce legal rules against member states.
The same is true with respect to treaties and agreements made between states including mutual
legal assistance treaties and trade agreements. While one could argue that in treaty organization
contexts the state has always maintained the power to opt in (or out), thus preserving its
sovereignty, the existence and enforcement of customary international law and jus cogens —
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norms whose violations by a state could impact its sovereignty — poses a direct challenge to the
Bodian concept of state sovereignty as a cardinal legal principle.
Second, further to the reality of “developed” state sovereignty being progressively
infringed, it is arguable that state sovereignty as it applies to the “third world” has never been a
reality – or at least not a comparable reality to that of more politically, historically, and
economically privileged states.362 As noted above, the aspirational equality of states as imagined
by the UN in its originating Constitution has never substantially reflected reality. In post-colonial
world governance, while formerly colonized states have a de jure “seat at the table,” the reality is
far from one of equality.
Finally, rigid adherence to traditional notions of the state as the only source of power
ignores the reality that the economic and political power of many multinational corporations far
exceeds that of a significant number of states. Equally important is the advancement, in public
international law, towards more and more robust recognition of individuals363 — not just states
— as legitimate players, particularly in the realm of human rights.364 Thus to reserve attention
only for the actions and the dynamic between states — arguably even if those states were equal,
which they are not — while not recognizing the lessening of the role of the state is to be wilfully
blind to the burgeoning group of non-state actors at play. This adherence to the domination of
states is clear not through the presence of judicial language, but in its absence. While the SCC
frequently remarks on the equality of states and state sovereignty, it does not do so in reference
to other international non-state players.
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A clear example of the mismatch between traditional sovereign equality and the factual
reality is clear in the discussion of state sovereignty in Hape. While recognizing there has been
some incursions into state sovereignty — notably through customary international law — Justice
LeBel concludes “the sovereignty principle remains one of the organizing principles of the
relationship between independent states.”365 That the Court then acknowledges that not all states
are in fact equal,366 this fact does not appear to moderate or dissuade the Court’s interest in
preserving sovereign equality as a “cornerstone of the international legal system.”367
A third example of defining and delineating traditional norms is evident from those
juridical decision makers who hesitantly accept a need for a reality frame of global statecorporate-individual dynamics, comity, and non-interference through the application of
international law in/by Canada. There, however, traditional notions are still preserved through
the apparent need to delineate between permissive and prohibitive/mandatory rules. While the
prohibitive/permissive debate has long been described,368 it may today be understood as two
dichotomies: first, with respect to the international application of Canadian domestic law,
permissive as non-binding and prohibitive as binding; and second, with respect to the application
of international law in Canada, permissive as requiring a state to act to provide some good or
service and prohibitive as a state preventing negative interference with a protected population. In
either case, the reliance on such formalistic delineations provides an “out” for Canadian judges
aware of modern international dynamics and the need for a transnational application of the law,
but still resistant to interference in or by foreign states.
In the first case — the application of Canadian norms outside of Canada — the traditional
understanding is that permissive — “may” — rules are favourable to prohibitive —
“must”/“will” — rules, which are odious and have extra-territorial effect only when clearly
stated or accepted by a foreign state.369 This dichotomy has appeared influential in cases
involving the extra-territorial application of the Canadian Charter. As we saw in Hape and in
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Afghan Detainees, the courts looked for clear acceptance of the application of not just Canadian
norms but specifically the Charter. In those cases, the courts, failing to find such crystal-clear
instruction (despite each case involving significant coordination and cooperation between states),
held back the application of the Charter to the detriment of the vulnerable plaintiffs.370
Where international norms are delineated on the permissive/prohibitive dichotomy
invoking the action required/action prevented interpretation, and where international rules are
customary, courts are significantly more likely to read prohibitive rules (do not commit
genocide) as binding or informative to Canadian courts (through adoption) than permissive rules
(provide victims of torture with remedies) which require transformation.371 With such
distinction, it thus becomes important for Canadian courts to properly delineate between which
international norms are prohibitive and which are permissive. As an example, Justice Lebel in
Kazemi held in obiter that should an exception to state immunity for acts of torture have become
customary international law, such a rule “could likely be permissive — and not mandatory —
thereby, requiring legislative action to become Canadian law.”372 Holding that permissive
principles may only be “informative” without transformation — read optional and ignorable373
— avoids any offence to state sovereignty and are thus preferable. Indeed, while international
human rights treaties and conventions saw an increase in “reference” at the turn of the 21st
century in Canada,374 such reference was restrained, described as informative or helpful for
interpretation, but not used to ground decision-making.375 In other words, international human
rights norms are more frequently defined as permissive rather than prohibitive; while they may
provide some “guidance” for the court – imbuing the court with a modernist veil – such norms
will not be defined as prohibitive such that they would form the basis for asserting jurisdiction in
a private international law tort claim, lest comity be offended.

370

Hape, supra note 105 at paras 115-118; Afghan Detainees FC, supra note 312 at paras 151-184.
Hape, supra note 105 at 314; Louis LeBel & Gloria Chao, “The Rise of International Law in Canadian
Constitutional Litigation: Fugue or Fusion? Recent Developments and Challenges in Internalizing International
Law” (2002), 16 Sup Ct L Rev: Osgoode’s Annul Const’l Cases Conf 23 [LeBel & Chao 2002] at 34; Kazemi, supra
note 360 at para 61; R v Finta, [1994] 1 SCR 701 [Finta] at 729.
372
Kazemi, supra note 360 at para 61.
373
Jutta Brunnée & Stephen J Toope, “A Hesitant Embrace: The Application of International Law by Canadian
Courts” (2002) 40 Can YB Int’l L 3 [Brunnée & Toope 2002] at 9.
374
See for instance LeBel & Chao 2002, supra note 371 in reference to Finta, supra note 371, Baker, supra note
177, Burns, supra note 164, and Suresh v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 SCC 1.
375
Brunnée & Toope 2002, supra note 373 at 4-5 (in response to and in partial critique of LeBel & Chao 2002).
371

87
In the foregoing examples, we see Canadian courts marching faithfully to the beat of the
traditional territoriality drum. They define silos or categories of sovereignty and territoriality
narrowly, and sometimes inconsistently. In finding it necessary to delineate between permissive
and prohibitive applications of domestic and international norms, Canadian courts ground
modern interpretations in traditional views of sovereignty: a state must be allowed to control —
to accept or reject — norms before they are applied. In other words, even where the Field can be
seen to dabble in international human rights norms, as they impact and interact with Canadian
law, the Field still finds a way to restrict such human rights norms. Where some courts have
demonstrated some limited flexibility they remaining restrained, the realm of possible options
being limited by the doxa of the Field.
d. Stunted application of lex mercatoria and jus gentium
Even if we are to accept that an approach to law that is incremental and — sometimes
blindly — self-re-enforcing is “desirable” or at the very least, not problematic, what we see is
that often only the structures and norms of private international law that support a siloed world
for human individuals — rather than corporations — are perpetuated. What is ignored, to the
detriment of individual human rights, is the significant history of “the law of nations” and “law
merchant” that have equally historic claims to legitimacy as does state sovereignty.376
In Blackstone’s Commentaries, published in 1769, Sir William Blackstone states:
[a]s it is impossible for the whole race of mankind to be united in one great society,
they must necessarily divide into many; and form separate states, commonwealths, and
nations; entirely independent of each other, and yet liable to a mutual intercourse. Hence
arises a third kind of law to regulate this mutual intercourse, called “the law of ‘nations;’”
which, as none of these states will acknowledge a superiority in the other, cannot be
dictated by either; but depends entirely upon the rules of natural law, or upon mutual
compacts, treaties, leagues, and agreements between these several communities: in the
construction also of which compacts we have no other rule to resort to, but the law of
nature; being the only one to which both communities are equally subject: and therefore
the civil law very justly observes, that quod naturalis ratio inter omnes hominess conftituit,
vocatur jus gentium [that which natural reason has established among all men is called the
law of nations].377
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A subset of the law of nations is the law merchant, lex mercatoria, a specialized set of
norms meant to ease the burdens of inter-state transactions and to benefit international trade.378
This systems of norms, like comity, was a reaction to the delineation of states and the impact
such structure had on inherently non-siloed activities. Importantly, lex mercatoria incorporated a
version of state comity to the extent that comity – here, a nation’s desire to enhance its economic
and legal sovereignty – is established and maintained through the promotion of a co-operative
legal system that supported the economic interests of participating nation states. In other words,
comity is realized not only through territorialist sovereignty, but also through cooperation.
Following World War II, commercial lawyers began a revival of a “borderless, universal
trade law of nations.”379 In the 1950s, Philip Jessup, the American jurist and scholar, famously
proposed a revisiting of the informal, unofficial lex mercatoria of medieval merchants — the law
that regulated actions that transcended national frontiers — which he proposed referring to as
part of or a core example of “transnational law.”380 Such law would challenge the delineations
of private and public international law, bringing to light the vulnerability of “official” and statestate-based law and regulatory governance.381 According to Jessup, the problem in applying
international law lay not in fact, but “in the minds of men,” a problem to be solved through
creating better understanding in law students, legal practitioners, and the judiciary.382
Today, transnational law has, as Peer Zumbansen suggests, “both a destructive and
constructive thrust. It is employed to destroy, erode and relativize the view that states alone are
relevant actors in border-crossing activity.”383 Many scholars, concerned with human rights and
environmental issues, and who have in their sights multinational corporations, have argued that
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the reemergence, use, and acceptance of transnational law may be the weapon with which
plaintiffs may seek and actually win justice.384
Lex mercatoria — whether understood as part of a wider transnationalism or as a unique
law merchant — is alive and active, its shadow visible in international arbitration law385 and the
“modernist” approach to comity. It is to be expected that, in trade, intellectual property, and
finance, such a liberal and modernist approach to transnational activity is applied. Indeed, where
the dominant political, economic, and moral norms promote the liberal internationalization of the
economic community, courts will justify a liberal interpretation of comity and inter-state
cooperation to further the goals of the Field. However, such historical notions of lex mercatoria,
a body of law that existed in the “in-between” and meant to reflect the needs of those whose
interests spanned national boundaries, today apply only to those whose policy goals are not too
controversial or political.386 Lex mercatoria has not been imagined to have folded into itself civil
liability of corporations for the harms they do in the course of business, but rather remained a
transactional, largely contractual sub-field. There is thus a “fragmentation” of transnational law
between the commercial and the human as there also is between transnational investment law
and transnational human rights law.387
As Scott notes, the further regulation moves away from criminal law and states seek to
regulate their nationals — specifically their corporate nationals — with respect to economic
interests, the more one sees resistance on the part of the state not to interfere or be seen to
interfere with another state’s sovereignty.388 Scott assigns this resistance to the possibility that
economic policy belongs in some “intrinsic way” to the very idea of sovereignty — that a state’s
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self-determination is thought to include the prerogative to make decisions pertaining to their own
economic interests.389
Another way to frame this resistance is that in a field where there are limited “possible”
answers, as Bourdieu noted, those that are “correct” are those that align with the habitus of
power. Thus, where territorialism and lex mercatoria are available as oppositional normative
avenues, the judiciary may choose an approach of transnationalism where it benefits the
economic or political fields — thus supporting the historical notion that lex mercatoria existed to
support the ease of commercial transactions or that much of admiralty law initially emerged as a
complex sub-field imagined as judicially-led transnational common law as a ‘necessary’ adjunct
to lex mercatoria — but choose a non-interventionist approach to benefit the same group when
“outsiders” seek accountability of that group, supporting such a decision by citing traditional
notions of comity and non-interference.390 This leads to a buffet-style development of the law
where the historical roots of legal structures are either championed or blindly ignored, almost
always to the benefit of those hierarchically advantaged in the Field.
What is thus interesting is how the potentially awkward existence of a form of law that
moves beyond states — lex mercatoria — is co-opted and reshaped to the benefit of the
economic field and, through arbitration and a modernist approach to comity, is touted as the
response to a changing world. In other words, it is not as though a basis in traditional law doesn’t
exist to ground transnational tort litigation — the hands of justice are not tied — that basis has
simply been shaped to serve a narrower, more economically-interested, purpose.
The Field is self-referential, consistently re-stating and re-legitimizing the habitus of state
equality and non-intervention through the application of comity.391 This mechanism is
concerning given the reality of internationalism and resulting violations of human rights, and
particularly in reference to the apparent conflict of this Field-wide territorialist habitus and the
formulation of jurisdiction-asserting thresholds designed by this same Field. In any event, the
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markers or indicators of Field habitus — deference to democracies, deference to judicial
brethren, commitment to narrow delineation, and the co-opting of lex mercatoria — demonstrate
a clear tendency — habitus — of the Field towards traditionalist territorial notions of state
sovereignty, state equality, and the preference for a non-interventionist form of comity. These
markers are on clear display in some private international law decisions involving human rights
violations allegedly carried out by transnational corporations or foreign states. In the next
section, I will explore how the impact of the Field habitus on decision making in some cases
(some of which have already been discussed in part) has arguably led to injustice.

C: The impact of Field habitus on private international law human rights and
environmental tort litigation
In this section, I discuss a number of cases decided in Canada through the written
judgments of which the judicial territorialist habitus can be observed in real time. I begin with a
discussion of Kazemi, a decision of the SCC related to state immunity. While this case deals with
whether a cause of action does or does not exist, and does not engage issues of jurisdiction (real
and substantial connection, forum non conveniens, forum of necessity), it serves as a useful
starting place for this section as it is one of the most territorialist, hyper-comity judgments of
recent years. As with the cases that follow — that engage the jurisdictional tests discussed above
— it is not the law in Kazemi that gets in the way of justice, but its application by a judiciary
trapped by its own habitus. As will become clear, the Field continuously struggles with its
territorialist origins and doxic traditions of slow development in the law and a favourable
defining of terms to the benefit of the field of power. In this struggle, agents remain seemingly
blind to clear escape hatches (exceptions to jurisdiction tests to advance justice), the reality of
state-inequality, and the changing face of sovereignty.

Hyper-comity and the SCC’s dated territoriality approach in Kazemi
One of the most stunning displays of reliance on a Westphalian, state-absolutist version
of comity in recent years is the SCC decision in Kazemi. Justice LeBel’s decision, and its
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acceptance by nearly the entire SCC,392 is reflective of the state-equality and non-interference
habitus inhabited by the judges at Canada’s highest court.
Zahra Kazemi, a Canadian citizen, travelled to Iran in 2003 as a freelance journalist and
photographer. In the midst of taking photographs of protesters outside a prison, she was arrested
and herself imprisoned in the building she had been photographing. While imprisoned, she was
beaten, sexually assaulted, and tortured. She was later brought to a government-controlled
hospital displaying massive head trauma; she was deemed “brain dead.” Upon arrival at the
hospital, the contusions on her body and internal damage revealed the extent of the violence she
had endured. Despite requests made by her family to be transferred to a Canadian hospital, staff
at the hospital in Tehran took Ms. Kazemi off life support. Ms. Kazemi was then buried in
Tehran, again, contrary to the wishes of her family.
Following a state investigation into Ms. Kazemi’s death, members of the judiciary and of
the office of the prosecutor were identified as perpetrators. Nevertheless, only one man was
prosecuted, and he was acquitted. Ms. Kazemi’s son — still living in Canada — brought an
action in the Québec Superior Court against the Islamic Republic of Iran, its head of state, the
chief public prosecutor of Iran, and the deputy chief of intelligence at the prison. The defendants
brought a motion to dismiss on the basis of state immunity pursuant to the SIA. The issue was
eventually appealed to the SCC.
The 2014 decision of the SCC espouses a dated and strict interpretation of international
law, comity, and state sovereignty, while employing an internally inconsistent analysis to arrive
at what was clearly the legal result that aligned with the inner “logic” of the Field. While there
are numerous examples of contradictory and confusing analysis, four themes emerge that
demonstrate the enduring influence of a non-interference form of comity.
The first theme is that the SIA may be interpreted in light of the purposes of state
sovereignty, but no other purpose. Throughout the decision, LeBel J refers to the “purposes” of
the SIA which he aligns with state sovereignty, and the principles of state equality and noninterference.393 It is important to note there are no enumerated purposes contained within the SIA
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and LeBel J offers no evidence of official legislative purpose from official statements or Hansard
debates.394 At no point does LeBel J suggest there may be any other overarching purposes to the
SIA or any overarching tenets of fundamental justice in reference to which the SIA may be
understood. In fact, at nearly every opportunity, LeBel J rejects any reference to overarching
norms of customary international law that include access to justice, particularly for breaches of
jus cogens norms.
The second theme is that international law can be used as a tool of interpretation, but only
when it leads to a conclusion of state non-interference. Justice LeBel begins his analysis by
finding that the SIA is a complete code into which no additional exceptions may be read,
regardless of whether those exceptions are drawn from customary international law or common
law. Justice LeBel asserts that because the SIA is clear in its language, no additional tools of
interpretation are needed to determine the extent of Parliamentary-intended exceptions to state
immunity.395 This approach — assuming he is correct396 — is an accepted approach with respect
to statutory interpretation.
However, in the analysis that follows, LeBel J offers several instances where he admits
provisions or wording in the SIA are ambiguous but then makes subjective (preferential)
decisions with respect to the kind of additional information or context he is willing to consider,
always to uphold a traditional notion of comity. For example, in determining whether the
exception outlined at section 6(a) of the SIA (bodily injury) may be interpreted to include the
psychological injury of Ms. Kazemi’s son, LeBel J prefers an interpretation that the act(s) that
cause the injury must occur in Canada, thereby limiting the reach of the exception. This
interpretation is particularly curious given LeBel J was personally familiar and supportive of
approaches in the determination of transnational — albeit, criminal — activity that a criminal act
394
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may be continuous, reasonably said to occur and to have connection to multiple jurisdictions at
once.397 Further, LeBel J prefers an interpretation of section 6(a) that requires any psychological
distress to be based in physical harm. In doing so, LeBel J rejects an interpretation offered by the
appellants and intervenors of where/how acts may occur and be felt using Canadian Charter
principles398 in favour of US judicial commentary and his own “common sense” — read, habitus.
Another example can be seen in LeBel J’s analysis of which actors Parliament intended
to capture in its inclusion of the word “government” in the definition of “foreign state.” Justice
LeBel again looks to the “purpose” of the SIA — which remains undefined — and to a UN
Convention that includes within the definition of “state,” representatives of the state acting in
that capacity.399 However, when the appellants argued that “government” must be construed with
reference to international norms, including the jus cogens norm against torture, such arguments
are dismissed. Indeed, the appellants argued a state official cannot be understood to act in their
official capacity when such an act constitute breaches of jus cogens, citing the American 4th
Circuit Court of Appeals case Yousuf v Samantar,400 that held as such. LeBel J implied the
American decision was unpersuasive, not least because it was under appeal; notably, that
decision was later upheld by the US Supreme Court.401 LeBel J concludes, in what appears to be
a misreading of the presumption to act in conformity with international obligations — which he
cites earlier in the decision — and perhaps forgetting that he sits as a law-maker on the highest
court in Canada, that the Canadian legislature had given no indication that the courts are to deem
torture an “unofficial act.”402 To be clear, Canadian legislation is presumed to be written in
accordance with Canada’s international commitments unless clearly written to indicate an
intention to violate such commitments;403 the lack of specific intent to derogate from
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international commitments does not serve to limit courts but instead provides courts the
flexibility to interpret legislation — to merge statutory interpretation with the common law
process — in a manner that supports Canada’s commitments.
A third theme is that a version of the facts may be chosen to the detriment of the plaintiff
and to further the interests of strict state boundaries. For instance, LeBel J, upon finding, and
accepting, the catch-22 that torture is by definition an act of state, and acts of state are immune
from civil liability — thereby leading to the conclusion that there will never be redress for torture
outside of the state in which it occurred — determined that there may be some rare exception in
which the wilful blindness by the state to the activities of private individuals or groups on behalf
of the state may meet the definition of torture and may not trigger state immunity. Despite this
finding, he dismissed that the case before him would fall into such an exception. He does so
despite the fact that the case was originally brought on a summary motion, through which the
facts as pled by the plaintiff are deemed accurate. Those facts, being presumptively accurate,
included evidence the Iranian government had itself initiated an investigation that identified
several members of government or those in official positions that were, as LeBel J puts it, linked
to the torture and death of Ms. Kazemi. While only one was put forward for prosecution, the fact
that that was done suggests the members were acting beyond their official capacities, thus prima
facie meeting this “exceptional” circumstance LeBel J identifies. Rather than engaging with this
possibility, or sending the case back with leave to amend the pleadings, LeBel J simply states
“that is not the case before us.”404
The final theme is that rules of Canadian Charter interpretation — most often referred to
as a living tree — should be limited to favour a restrictive view of state norms. While
acknowledging that Canada actively barring Ms. Kazemi’s son from redress could result in a
breach of his right to security of the person per section 7 of the Charter (psychological harm),
LeBel J finds that to do so is not in breach of any principle of fundamental justice. To do so, he
first rejects any suggestion that Art 14 of the Convention Against Torture — the requirement on
the state to provide redress to victims of torture405 — is a principle of fundamental justice. In
404
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doing so, he employed a traditionalist state sovereignty-based analysis406 and by rejecting any
reliance on the interpretation of that article by the UN Committee Against Torture,407 and found
instead the nature of international law is diverse and every changing408 — though apparently not
changing to favour victims of torture.
Second, LeBel J addressed the suggestion made by an intervenor that the court could
accept as a new principle of fundamental justice the legal maxim that “where there is a right
there must be a remedy for its violation.”409 It is at this stage we see an unfortunate side-stepping
of the clear need to find redress for Ms. Kazemi’s family. Justice LeBel held that while some
rights exist, it is not correct to say that there must be a remedy for their violation as remedies are
frequently limited by procedural measures. As examples, he cited mechanisms for determining
real and substantial connection in international libel cases and limitation periods in others.410
First, unlike the procedural barrier presented by the SIA which effectively completely eliminates
any redress, the examples LeBel J cited merely limit remedies that otherwise exist. Further, it is
not an exaggeration to suggest that the comparison of seeking a remedy for libel hardly offers an
equivalent or meaningful comparison to that of torture, its use as comparator further confirming
the lack of any real acknowledgment on the part of the Court of the heinous quality of violence
suffered by Ms. Kazemi. But, rather than engage meaningfully with whether an “access to
remedy” principle of fundamental justice may achieve justice, it is summarily dismissed on the
grounds it is “not a manageable standard.” This dismissal failed to take into account the inherent
flexibility and necessarily opaque quality of existing principles of fundamental justice.411
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Despite these themes, LeBel J consistently assured Ms. Kazemi’s family that the violence
Ms. Kazemi faced was “nothing short of a tragedy,”412 that Canada does not condone torture,413
and that the SIA — actually, his subjective interpretation of the SIA — is:
…not a comment on the evils of torture, but rather an indication of what principles
Parliament has chosen to promote given Canada’s role and that of its government in the
international community. The SIA cannot be read as suggesting that Canada has abandoned
its commitment to the universal prohibition of torture.414

It is difficult to understand how the aggressively black-letter, state-territorialist
interpretation of state immunity that followed does not belie and render such pronouncements
hollow. The judges of the SCC are fundamentally law-makers, and they are not bound by stare
decisis. Nor are they bound by unacceptable interpretations of statute or unconstitutional
legislation. To suggest LeBel J and the majority of the SCC’s interpretation of the SIA was
anything but subjective and thus steeped in the habitus of the participating members and their
institution is to ignore the role and responsibilities of Canada’s highest court, and to be blind to
the fact that when a majority of that Court wishes to harness law to its vision of justice, it does
not hesitate. At every turn the Court made subjective and normative interpretations to the benefit
of the field of power (nation state comity for the benefit of Canada-Iran state-relations —
whether they be economic or political) while dismissing any interpretation of comity that would
serve to uphold any international obligation to protect the global citizenry.
Unfortunately, this hyper-sensitivity to traditional notions of comity is not an exception.
In the realm of transnational tort and environmental civil actions, such inclinations have similarly
served to undermine justice, leaving particularly those who suffer the negative byproducts of
extraction activities without any real recourse.

Hyper-comity informs transnational tort cases
Few cases of project-specific human rights and environmental tort claims have been
initiated in Canada and fewer have dealt primarily with the jurisdictional questions of forum non
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conveniens and forum of necessity. However, those that have present a mixed bag regarding what
can be expected when Canadian courts are faced with jurisdictional issues involving human
rights. We have already seen that in some instances — Tahoe, Nevsun, Hudbay, Bouzari — some
Canadian courts have engaged thoughtfully with the tests for forum non conveniens and forum of
necessity while, in other instances, we see the courts struggling and ultimately failing to break
free of their traditionalist habitus.
To begin, three cases out of Québec have demonstrated the way in which the tests for
forum non conveniens and forum of necessity are being misinterpreted or conservatively applied,
thereby denying plaintiffs justice against CanCorps. By way of preliminary comment, the
outcomes in all three cases — favouring a strict interpretation of jurisdiction to the detriment of
human rights victims — represent a profound irony given that Québec’s law is the only one that
stipulates that forum non conveniens stays must be “exceptional” and was the first forum in
Canada to recognize a forum of necessity doctrine.
Recherches internationales Québec v Cambior inc.
In 1998, the Québec Superior Court heard a preliminary motion from Cambior Inc, the
defendant in a potential class action lawsuit relating to the breach of an effluent treatment plant
at a mine in Guyana that sent 2.3 billion litres of liquid containing cyanide, heavy metals and
other pollutants flooding into two rivers, including Guyana’s main waterway.415 The hearings
judge found the Court had jurisdiction simpliciter over the claim pursuant to Arts 3134 and 3148
of the Civil Code; notably, Cambior was a Québec-domiciled company and the claim was
advanced against Cambior as a personal action of a patrimonial nature. Further, Cambior was the
majority shareholder of, and was involved in decision making related to, the Guyana-based
corporation operating the mine: Omai. In other words, the corporation operating Omai was
Cambior’s controlled subsidiary. However, after finding it had jurisdiction, the Court then turned
to the determination on forum non conveniens.
The Court began by laying out the test and noting its exceptional nature. It went on to cite
at length Sopinka J’s judgment in Amchem and the development of the common law test of forum
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non conveniens in Canada. Through this discussion, the judge did not appear to recognize that
the Supreme Court of Canada in Amchem (1) had not adopted the two-step United Kingdom test
and (2) that the Canadian test placed the burden entirely on the defendant. With respect to the
residence of the parties, while the Court appeared to engage with the plaintiff’s arguments
suggesting Québec is the more appropriate forum, it fervently declined any suggestion that the
domicile of the defendant is a more important factor than others. Instead it held that Guyana was
the preferred forum based on the domicile of the parties; the Court clearly placed increased
weight on the domicile of the plaintiffs, having immediately before suggested there was no one
determinative factor. In doing so, the judge accepted the fiction of Omai as a truly separate entity
from Cambior – otherwise, it made no sense to speak of Guyana as the defendant’s domicile, not
just the domicile of the plaintiffs.
Next, despite accepting that, of the witnesses listed by the plaintiff, the preferred forum
was Québec due to the reduced cost of hearing witnesses in Québec, the Court then explained
that, in effect, it didn’t believe the plaintiff had listed all witnesses. The Court then created its
own list of appropriate witnesses — a process of fact-creation — and then found, based on that
list, that Guyana was the preferred forum.416 This action, described by Sara Seck as a
“paternalistic twist” revealed the Court purporting to understand the best interests of the plaintiff
better than the plaintiff itself.417
The Court accepted the defendant’s argument that the necessary documentary evidence
was in Guyana, the fault occurred in Guyana, and the governing law would be that of Guyana,418
making Guyana the more appropriate forum. Despite applying a relatively low bar to the
preceding factors (often finding Guyana the preferred place on its own initiative), the Court
stressed the plaintiff had not presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate it would lose juridicial
advantage in the availability of class action in Québec – a complete error of law in that such a
second-stage burden is not the law in Canada.419 While the Court found, contrary to Cambior’s
suggestion, the Québec class action process was significantly different and more advantageous to
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the plaintiffs, it found this factor should be given limited weight.
In engaging in this fact-finding, as discussed earlier, the Court in Cambior preferred the
testimony of three Guyanese judges and a former judge of the Québec Court of Appeal, over a
Canadian professor and international law expert, despite the fact that at least one of the Guyanese
judges stated the courts of Guyana had always been fair and impartial, even under dictatorial
rule. In a circumstance weighing progressive human rights values against loyalty to judicial
brethren, easily supported through a traditional comity-based territorialist analysis, it is not
surprising the court found Guyana to be the “natural forum” for the litigation.420
In so finding, the Court concluded by doing two things that created a chilling effect for
such future cases. First, the Court ordered normal (rather than decreased or no) costs against the
plaintiff, Recherches internationales, despite the plaintiff representing poor foreign victims of
corporate misbehaver. Second, despite finding Guyana to be the forum conveniens the Court did
not even follow Judge Keenan’s lead in Bhopal by requiring Cambior to attorn to the courts of
Guyana; the Court simply required Cambior not to raise arguments in Guyana related to forum
non conveniens. The plaintiffs did attempt to carry on with the action in Guyana but their
attempts were vigorously defended by Cambior and twice struck by the High Court of the
Supreme Court of Judicature of Guyana, first in 2002, then in 2006.421
In dismissing the plaintiffs in Québec, the Court repeatedly subjectively interpreted
elements of the test for forum non conveniens to the benefit of only the corporate defendant: it
side-stepped the “exceptional” bar required (effectively reading it down); it weighed the
plaintiff’s residence more heavily than that of the defendant; it favoured facts — even those that
are prima facie incredible — when delivered by judicial brethren; and it remained blind to the
reality and likelihood of Guyanese justice. Throughout the judgment, the Court stressed no one
factor is determinative, but appeared to favour certain factors over others, often suggesting it was
the plaintiff that had not presented enough evidence – contrary to the burden laying with the
defendant – in coming to its conclusion. Finally, in accepting the facts as presented by Cambior’s
experts, the Court engaged in a form of fact-creation and world-making in which Guyana’s
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justice system was and was always entirely up to the task of holding foreign corporate
wrongdoers responsible for their actions. While at the time the Québec Court would not yet have
notice that Guyana’s courts would not favour the plaintiffs, the Québec Court’s finding certainly
assisted in reinforcing Canada’s status both as an industry-friendly nation, one that is keen to
support its corporations, and as a nation resistant to exercising jurisdiction over a foreign state. In
doing so, the Court’s decision-making process remains framed by its habitus, rather than the
evidence.
Bil’In (Village Council) v Green Park International Inc.
Similar to Cambior, in 2010 the Québec Court of Appeal heard an appeal from a decision
to reject jurisdiction on the basis of Art 3135 of the Civil Code: forum non conveniens. In Green
Park,422 a group of individuals representing Bil’in, a village on the West Bank of the River
Jordan in the territories that have been occupied by Israel since 1967, sued two corporations in
Québec for civil liability for alleged war crimes. Green Park International Ltd and Green Mount
International Ltd were Québec-registered corporations with head offices in Montreal. Under
contract with the State of Israel, Green Park and Green Mount began constructing residential and
other buildings on lands in Bil’in allegedly contrary to Art 49(6) of the Convention (IV) relative
to the Protection of Civilian Persons in the Time of War (“Fourth Geneva Convention”) dated
August 12, 1949.
Despite dismissing many of the defendant’s initial motions, one of the main issues before
the motions judge was whether Québec was the appropriate forum. In this analysis, the motions
judge dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims that the matter would not be heard in Israel because Israeli
courts had found issues regarding the Fourth Geneva Convention to be non-justiciable; indeed,
the Court heard evidence from Israeli scholars that suggested the Israeli High Court of Justice
refused to hear matters relating to the Fourth Geneva Convention for that reason. In what appears
to be another misapplication of the test for forum non conveniens, the judge accepted the
interpretation of the defendant’s expert over that of the plaintiffs to suggest the plaintiffs had not
proven the courts of Israel would not find the claim justiciable, thus overlooking that the burden

422

Though not discussed in the Appeal, the Court had jurisdiction simpliciter over the defendant Green Park as the
defendant was incorporated in Québec.

102
fell to the defendant, not the plaintiff, and at the same time making the burden one of proving a
negative.
Furthermore, as James Yap — who observed the trial — suggested, it is questionable
whether Israel could even have been considered an available forum at all.423 While the forum non
conveniens test is grounded in the comparison of the plaintiff’s chosen forum to another,
preferred by the defendant, there must in fact actually exist an alternative forum,424 the proof of
which a court may conclude on the evidence before it. Where the putative alternative forum does
not recognize the cause of action as it is brought — here, a claim framed in terms of civil liability
for war crimes425 — or arguably has no jurisdiction simpliciter over the matter,426 then it is a
stretch to suggest that forum does in fact exist for the purposes of even initiating a forum non
conveniens analysis. In any event, the Court clearly preferred to see the courts of the state that
allegedly inflicted war crimes on the plaintiffs hear the case rather than keep jurisdiction, and so
found the juridical advantage of the Québec courts — as Canada has incorporated the Fourth
Geneva Convention through domestic legislation which the Québec Civil Code’s liability
provisions piggyback onto — did not weigh heavily enough in the forum non conveniens
analysis to lead to Québec retaining jurisdiction over the matter.
The plaintiffs appealed to the Québec Court of Appeal and were met with a similarly
disconnected panel showing a “complete lack of human rights consciousness.”427 The Court of
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Appeal acknowledged that it could not decline to keep jurisdiction except in an exceptional case
and noted the motions judge could certainly not have declined jurisdiction on the basis of
jurisdiction simpliciter. And yet, the Court of Appeal erroneously found it was open to the
motions judge to look to the plaintiff to prove the foreign jurisdiction was not appropriate. The
Court found the appellants had not proved the motions judge had erred in such finding using
what appeared to be the appellate standard of review on findings of fact “palpable and overriding
error” rather than the less deferential standard of “correctness” to apply to misstatements of the
law. Similarly, in applying the factors related to forum non conveniens outlined with respect to
the Civil Code by the SCC in Spar Aerospace, the Court held, despite the burden being on the
defendant which had not, on the facts, proven it to be so, that it was “in the interest of the
parties” to have the case heard before a court in Israel.428 Like Cambior, the Court in Green Park
appeared to look to the plaintiff to defend why the claim should not be heard in Israel, rather than
holding the defendant to task on why it shouldn’t be heard in Canada.
The test for forum non conveniens is highly fact-specific and engages the heart of judicial
decision making: the weighing of facts in a manner aligned with the purpose of the common law
mechanism or legislative framework. Courts, especially ones of first instance, are engaged in
fact-determination which in turn creates a legitimized factual story. In Green Park, the motions
judge defined and made fact the present and imagined future of the Israeli High Court of Justice;
in finding that justice would be done in Israel, the Canadian Court created a fact that, while
legitimized in the ceremony of judgment writing, did not translate to the reality on the ground in
Israel. If anything, such world-making and subjective interpretation acts only to justify the
dismissal of responsibility in favour of an arbitrarily imagined alternative. The approach taken by
the Québec courts in Cambior and in Green Park — fuelled by a habitus of non-intervention —
served to later inspire the stunning concluding comments of the Québec Court of Appeal in Anvil
Mining Ltd c Association canadienne contre l’impunité.429
Anvil Mining Ltd c Association canadienne contre l’impunité
While the conclusion in Anvil Mining was determined on jurisdiction simpliciter and
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forum of necessity, the Court’s failure to situate the case in a reality of international business —
corporate-state power dynamics and the real (and likely) potential of corporate wrongdoers
skirting justice through legal gaps/cracks — is consistent with the forum non conveniens
analyses in Green Park and Cambior.
In Anvil Mining, a Canadian-incorporated mining company operating in the Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC) allegedly assisted the DRC government in subduing a small group of
armed individuals who had entered the DRC town of Kilwa and declared liberation of Katanga.
In pushing back the small group, the DRC government forces (FARDC) allegedly engaged “in a
slaughter by summarily executing people and plundering the property of the inhabitants…about
70 or 80 civilians were killed.”430 After a series of in-country military Courts Martial, in which
seven members of the military and three Anvil executives were tried for war crimes, five military
members and all accused Anvil executives were cleared of charges.431 The Courts Martial
concluded the deaths were the accidental result of fighting.432 Of the two members of the military
who were convicted, both saw their sentences reduced and were reintegrated into the army.433
The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights observed: “[T]he judicial decisions
made during the Kilwa case are an illustration of the lack of impartiality and independence
within the military justice system…[T]hroughout this case, political interference, a lack of cooperation on the part of the military authorities and many irregularities were observed.”434
The Québec Superior Court judge held it had jurisdiction simpliciter over the action and
that Anvil had not proved that a foreign jurisdiction was clearly more appropriate than
Québec.435 Anvil appealed. The Québec Court of Appeal found the hearings judge had
misinterpreted jurisdiction under Art 3148(2) of the Civil Code, finding Québec had no
jurisdiction simpliciter — despite Anvil having incorporated in Canada (Northwest Territories)
and maintaining a small office in Montreal.436 The motions judge had found Anvil’s employee
was sufficiently connected to the activities of Anvil in the DRC; indeed, the Anvil mine in the
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DRC was Anvil’s only project. However, rather than apply the appellate test for findings of fact
— again, palpable and overriding error — the Court of Appeal simply found, on its own accord,
Anvil’s activities in Québec had “absolutely nothing to do with ‘complicity’ to commit ‘war
crimes’ or ‘crimes against humanity’ while operating a mine.”437 This finding was made despite
the Court immediately thereafter acknowledging that the Montreal employee was engaged in
events that could be described as “crisis management.”438 Further, in order to overturn the
motions judge who had found Anvil had a connection to Québec, the Court of Appeal held that
rather than having to find an error of fact (a high bar), it need only find the motions judge made
an error in law by not connecting the actions of the Montreal office to the events.439 In other
words, if the motions judge had applied the wrong test (by not finding the Montreal employee
was connected to the actions in the DRC) the Court of Appeal figured it could step in, and apply
the facts presented to the motions judge to their properly enumerated test. While this approach
may have been open to the Court of Appeal, either way there was clear connection between
Montreal and the DRC and such an approach should not have led to their ultimate finding.
Earlier in the same judgment, the Court of Appeal cites a translation from the motions judge’s
ruling wherein that judge stated: “[I]t appears that the role of [Montreal employee] was
necessarily connected to the Dikulshi mining operation in Congo…[Montreal employee]’s
activities were necessarily connected to the Congolese mining operation in October of 2004
when local employees, whether voluntarily or involuntarily, allegedly provided logistical support
to the army to counter the insurrection in Kilwa.”440 Such statements clearly demonstrate the
motions judge had indeed turned his mind to the connection between the Montreal office and the
actions in the DRC, thus clearly engaging in the “sufficient connection” analysis. The Court of
Appeal’s decision to ignore the motion judge’s written findings demonstrates the mental
gymnastics and wilful blindness some courts are willing to entertain in order to maintain a strict
interpretation of territoriality; there was clearly no context in which the Court of Appeal was
finding it had jurisdiction.
In finding the it did not have jurisdiction simpliciter the Court did not have to determine
the forum non conveniens application. However, notably, the Court did go on to apply Art 3136
437
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of the Civil Code: forum of necessity. Despite having been presented with evidence of the
international community’s findings regarding the corruption in the DRC judicial system,441 and
despite having had explained how the victims were prevented from moving ahead in Australia,442
the court determined it would not be “impossible” to gain access to a foreign court. After
purporting to apply the highly discretionary and fact-based tests for jurisdiction (simpliciter and
necessity), and after claiming sympathy for the plaintiffs, the Court stated: “the law prevents us
from recognizing that Québec has jurisdiction to hear this class action.”443 While the Court’s
chosen interpretation of the facts may have led it to that conclusion, it certainly was not the black
letter law that prevented it from assisting the plaintiffs. Leave to appeal to the SCC was
denied,444 thus suggesting the highest court’s agreement with the decision.
While the Québec courts have been found wanting, it would be a mistake – however
tempting – to chalk these decisions up to either incompetence, to a series of unusually poorly
reasoned judgments, or to a combination of the two. Rather, a fixation on comity and nonintervention is pervasive — the nomos informing the Field’s habitus. In these cases, we see the
above-noted hallmarks of the Field’s non-intervention habitus through discomfort in being seen
to undermine judicial brethren (Cambior), through heightened respect given to democratic allies
(Cambior, Green Park, Anvil Mining), and through rigid adherence to traditional definitions of
the state and its powers (Green Park and Anvil Mining). This habitus is strong even where the
court ultimately takes jurisdiction. For instance, in Tahoe, discussed above, while the BC Court
of Appeal held there is some measurable risk that the appellants would encounter difficulty in
receiving a fair trial “against a powerful international company whose mining interests in
Guatemala align with the political interests of the Guatemalan state,”445 the Court chose not
conclude whether there actually was widespread corruption in the Guatemalan legal system,
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presumably keen to avoid being seen to comment on its international brethren.446
In the Québec cases, the traditional field doxa of hesitancy in legal development and
reliance on judicial independence (thus informing judicial belief that foreign judges share the
same independence) informed judicial logic along with decades of province-centred precedent
and state-centred traditions of comity and territoriality.
Perhaps particularly influential in the Québec cases was the nomos of field normsignalling from the field of power. Notably, in none of these cases was a Canadian entity or
individual harmed; in fact the Canadian “citizens” involved (CanCorps) — i.e. those that vote (or
that employ people who vote) and participate in the Canadian political process — were
protected, arguably in a way that supports the Canadian state’s (meta-field of power) interests.
While it is certainly not obvious on the face of such cases, nor is it likely to be, it is likely not
irrelevant that, for example, Canadian judges chose not to assert jurisdiction and in turn (1)
potentially create discomfort in Canada’s relationship with its close political ally, Israel; (2)
suggest CanCorps should be made responsible for environmental harms abroad (if at all) thus
making them less profitable or less able to compete internationally;447 or (3) make findings of
fact related to the actions of the FARDC contrary to the position/non-position taken by the then
federal government.448
This traditionalist approach is mirrored in other ways the Field has handled human rights
more broadly. Specifically, in the context of transnational state and corporate action, the Field
generally prefers the rights of the corporation and its activities (economic field) to that of those
of the individual. This is done on a buffet-approach, the court preferring the bricks and mortar of
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either comity or of “globalization,” whichever assists the field of power on the particular facts.
Two examples are instructive.
State Immunity Act
The first example is the way in which courts in Canada have interpreted exceptions to
state immunity as prescribed in the SIA. We have already seen the approach taken by the SCC in
Kazemi, discussed above, but it is in these additional examples that the hyper-traditionalist
approach in Kazemi can be understood as reflective, rather than exceptional to its context. I will
begin with section 5 of the SIA, the commercial exception.
While foreign states are generally immune from suit in Canadian courts due to the
principles of state sovereignty, injured plaintiffs may take advantage of the misleadingly broad
commercial exception that allows suits for financial injury resulting from commercial
relationships between a private party and a foreign state. In reality, Canadian courts have taken a
parochial approach to such suits, defining “commercial” narrowly to the benefit of Canadian
corporations rather than private individuals. Indeed, such provisions, as described by Robert
Wai, are designed to benefit the home state — Canada — by ensuring its corporations may seek
damages when operating abroad and have as their primary beneficiaries private parties from the
West who are contracting with sovereign authorities of other states, particularly those of the
developing world.449 While, as Wai argues, there is no significant or coherent justification to
make an exception for commercial enterprise and not tort — other than the lack of obvious
commercial or state pecuniary interests at stake450 — courts have facilitated the expansion of this
once purely common law theory of restrictive, rather than absolute, sovereignty, but only to the
benefit of commercial interests.
There appears to be no movement toward recognition of harms felt by private individuals
by foreign state actors, even where there are clear commercial elements at stake. Compare, for
example, representative cases from the Supreme Court of Canada: the decisions in Re Canada
Labour Code451 and Kuwait Airways Corp v Iraq.452 In the first, the affected party included
449

Wai 2001a, supra note 13 at 243.
Ibid at 244.
451
Re Canada Labour Code, [1992] 2 SCR 50.
452
Kuwait Airways Corp v Iraq, 2010 SCC 40.
450

109
private Canadian workers while in the second, the affected party was a domestic airline
corporation. In the first, the Court held labour relations related to the protection of Canadian
workers at a US Navy base in Newfoundland were not “commercial,” a decision that favoured a
significant Canadian state ally (US), while dismissing the interests of Canadian citizens.
However, in relation to Kuwait Airlines, the Court found the appropriation of the Kuwait
Airways fleet by the national Iraq airline was indeed “commercial” in nature, the finding thus
benefiting a Canadian corporation.453 The operation of the commercial exception in Canada has
created preferentialism in the way it facilitates litigation by commercial plaintiffs when
compared to individuals; plaintiffs, more likely to suffer tort losses at the hands of another state
rather than losses associated with contract, are defeated by sovereign immunity.454 Wai argues
that national courts ought to consider carefully why they should refuse to take jurisdiction over
individual claims based on “problematic ethics of parochialism and bounded responsibilities.”455
In Wai’s construction of restricted immunity, there is a need for a reality frame in which courts
look beyond antiquated and stiff constructions of “commercial” and observe the way in which
the commercial exception — a significant and constructed tear in the classical state sovereignty
formulation — has evolved only to the benefit of, realistically, western-allied corporations
exerting their unequal might and bargaining power on states unable to contract free of duress.456
The commercial exception, however broadly it is read for the benefit of the corporation,
is not some easily ignored anomaly. The same subordination of the rights of the individual is
seen in the Field’s interpretation of section 6 of the SIA. Section 6 exempts foreign states from
immunity where the action relates to death, personal injury or damage to property that occurred
in Canada.457 In interpreting this section, the Ontario Court of Appeal in Bouzari v Iran458 ruled
that Mr. Bouzari had not suffered personal injury in Canada despite continuing to suffer from his
injuries of having been tortured and abused in Iran after returning to Canada, thereby arguably
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unduly restricting the otherwise broad provision. The same narrowing is seen, as discussed
above, in the SCC’s conclusions related to the harm suffered by Mr. Kazemi’s son in Kazemi.
As Coughlan et al note, section 6 could be arguably read to include a “continuing” injury
where the effects of an initial course of abuse abroad are further experienced in Canada. While
such an interpretation is arguable, and while there is no guidance made explicit within the SIA,
the international human rights law binding on Canada — specifically Canada’s commitment to
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)459 — provides “strong
contextual support...that would favour the [latter] conclusion and would sustain the court’s
jurisdiction over the suit.”460 Given Canadian courts and lawmakers are presumed to act in
accordance with Canada’s international obligations unless clearly legislating in conflict with
those obligations, where two interpretations exist, as they do here, one could reasonably assume
the court would choose that which upholds individual human rights (thus acting in accordance
with international obligations) rather than that which leans on a restrictive and clearly statist
comity-based approach. In interpreting the SIA, particularly those provisions of the Act that are
ambiguous and require interpretation — namely what constitutes “commercial activity” and
“harm in Canada” — we see the territorialist habitus of the Field restraining purposive, modern,
and reality-framed interpretations to benefit the advancement and changing face only of, what
Bourdieu calls, the field of power (generally corporate and state interest).
Das v George Weston Limited
The second example of the court’s wilful blindness to the reality of international
corporate action and economic dynamic is the recent analysis of the legal concept of proximity
with respect to the harms suffered by the victims of the Rana Plaza disaster in Bangladesh.
In 2013 Rana Plaza, a poorly constructed commercial building, housing thousands of
garment workers, collapsed killing 1130 people and injuring 2520 others. Alongside other legal
avenues, a number of individuals launched a proposed class action in Ontario against the group
459
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of companies responsible for Joe Fresh apparel (Loblaws) and the group of companies that made
up Bureau Veritas Consulting services (Veritas). Loblaws had contracted with a subsidiary,
which then further contracted with another company, to make garments for its “Joe Fresh” label.
Veritas had been hired by Loblaws to conduct social safety audits on the factories used to
manufacture Joe Fresh apparel. The plaintiffs pleaded Loblaws had caused their injuries through
negligence, vicarious liability, and breach of fiduciary duty. The plaintiffs pleaded Veritas had
caused their injuries through negligence. Loblaws and Veritas filed a motion to strike on the
basis that (1) the time limitation under Bangladeshi law had run out and that (2) there was no
cause of action.
The motions judge at the Ontario Superior Court of Justice found he had jurisdiction
simpliciter, but allowed the motions brought by Loblaws and Veritas.461 His judgment was
recently upheld on appeal.462 Fundamental to both the judgments of the Superior Court and the
Court of Appeal was a limited and traditional interpretation of control. While the courts both
arguably applied the black letter law on control within a range of reasonable possible outcomes,
where that law called for subjective or context-based interpretation or the analysis of global and
national policy considerations, the courts leaned into their conservative habitus.
The first example of such preference comes from the discussion of whether the law of
Canada or the law of Bangladesh would apply. This finding was particularly important as the
general limitation period in Bangladesh is one year (excluding minors), thus potentially
eliminating most plaintiffs. The Superior Court walked through the analysis laid down in
Tolofson, which led to a determination that the law of the forum where the injury was felt would
be appropriate. However, in doing so, the Court dismissed any argument suggesting where the
injury was done was more nuanced and appropriate. Loblaws had contracted with its subsidiary
in Canada and the relationship between Loblaws and Veritas — i.e. the decision making with
respect to inspections and whether to follow up on breaches in its (Loblaws) corporate social
responsibility (CSR) policy — was similarly done in Canada. Thus, the plaintiffs argued, there
was a reasonable argument to be made that the Tolofson test may be read to accommodate a
broadened understanding of where an action is “done.”

461
462

Das SC, supra note 284.
Das CA, supra note 287.

112
Further, when it came to assessing whether any of the exceptions to lex loci delicti would
apply, the motions judge took a restrictive approach — perhaps reflective of the inter-provincial
approach taken in Tolofson (rather than an international approach arguably more suited to the
case at hand) — and came to the defence of his brethren making clear he would not accept any
suggestion that applying the tort law of Bangladesh would be unjust due to its nascent stage of
development and lack of experience with class actions. He noted he need “not dignify the
argument” as it “insults the courts and judges of Bangladesh”463 and is an “insulting
proposition.”464 The fact that Sharia law would distinguish between men and women in any
resulting damage awards was apparently not incompatible with Canadian values because not that
many women would be affected. The trial court could simply, the judge held, sever the parts of
the law that so discriminated.465 This finding was upheld by the Court of Appeal. Where the
courts had an opportunity to meaningfully assess the locus of harm and the impact to the
plaintiffs in relying on discriminatory law, the Court chose instead to honour concepts of state
equality — specifically judicial equality — and non-intervention.
The second example concerns the Court’s discussion of whether the plaintiffs had a cause
of action. At both levels of court this discussion is lengthy and engages the laws of Bangladesh,
the UK, and Canada. However, two points are notable. First, in determining whether Loblaws
had sufficient control over its subsidiaries to create the necessary proximity to found a new duty
of care, at no point does the Court recognize the reality of the international power dynamics at
play between major global brands engaging in one of the most abusive and environmentally
destructive industries in the world, and their often-poor host states. The Court instead suggests
Loblaws (a retail giant) didn’t have control over its subsidiaries (local companies in Bangladesh)
because contractually it could not impact the actions of such companies. There is no
acknowledgment (reality-frame) that Loblaws has enormous, though perhaps unwritten, power
over such manufacturers.
The second point is that where convenient, the Court of Appeal imagines — and
effectively dictates — a future in which the Bangladeshi court would not entertain any new duty
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of care as defined by the plaintiffs. It does so on the basis that it determined the court in
Bangladesh would follow the authorities in the UK rather than the authorities in India despite
evidence the Bangladesh court relies equally on both.466 This is particularly problematic given
recent authority from the Indian Supreme Court which had held India would take a liberal
approach to tort law and would not be held back where the UK had not yet moved forward. In
particular, in the case cited, the Indian court had held the social costs of conducting hazardous
activities should be borne by the profit-maker and not by the community.467
Despite engaging in speculation itself — indeed, speculation that whispers of modern
imperialism even as the same judge castigates the Bangladeshi plaintiffs’ lawyers for themselves
being so imperialist as to cast doubt on the Bangladeshi tort law’s preparedness — the Court held
that to argue Bangladesh would follow the lead of the Supreme Court of India rather than that of
the UK was “pure speculation,” and rejected the argument.468 To be clear, the Ontario courts
hearing this case (1) first, through a strict construction of Tolofson, denied Ontario law would
apply in favour of Bangladeshi law, then (2) denied any suggestion — despite evidence to the
contrary — that Bangladeshi law would reflect Indian law, (3) instead found novel Bangladeshi
law would reflect British law, (4) found British law would not allow recovery and (5) granted the
defendants’ motion. This string of logic was accomplished while remaining shrouded by the
Courts’ insistence it was rejecting the plaintiffs’ imperialist logic.
In Das, the Court determined Loblaws — a giant multinational company — would not
(and should not) be held responsible for the CSR standards it itself had promoted despite:
knowing such standards were being breached;469 knowing Bangladesh has “an abysmal record of
enforcing safety standards,”470 and choosing to do business there in any event. The judgment,
where it benefits Loblaws (a CanCorp), upholds traditional concepts of state and judicial equality
either by rejecting any suggestion the foreign state is unable to deliver justice, or by assuming
the foreign state’s judiciary will apply traditional and corporation-favouring, western, black letter
conceptions of the law.
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In being forced to engage with the modern experience of transnational corporate activity,
such as modern ideas of control and the impact of CSR standards, the Courts chose to apply
traditional and dated territorialist notions of comity, tailored deference, and subjective factfinding, all to the benefit of the corporate interest. In this case, like many of the others noted
above, in the act of naming and defining what is meant by “control” and the impact of CSR
standards, the Courts engaged not only in self-referenced fact-finding but also in norm creation
for the Field itself. It defined for the agents in the Field and those in interacting fields (economic,
political) what will be expected of them. In this case, the Courts legitimized a corporate-powerbenefiting interpretation of obligations and control, rather than looking to international human
rights obligations (or comparative tort law such as the Indian Supreme Court, for that matter) for
normative inspiration, and legitimized the continued use of CSR standards and complicated
corporate structures with no resulting responsibility. At the same time, the judge aggressively
layers a deference-to-foreign-states rationale onto the reasoning, for good measure.

Territorialist application of comity leads to injustice
Using Bourdieu’s field framework as an interpretive lens, we may understand some of the
sociological reasons why Canadian justices are continuously, despite the actual black letter
wording of private international law jurisdiction tests, pulled towards state non-intervention in
cases of alleged human rights abuses. They include: the comfort and familiarity of the federalist
context; frequent judicial reference to historical notions of comity paired with the influence of
the field of power over the juridical field; and the doxa of incremental development, stare
decisis, and independence of the judiciary. These “inputs,” or drivers, feed and enhance a hypercomity, state non-intervention Field habitus that colours resulting judicial decisions. This Field
habitus tends toward the traditional and away from change. Such change would be in the real
acceptance by the Field of the modern power disparities existing between states, between
corporations and states, and between corporations and individuals. This acceptance would create
a reality frame that would further recognize that such power disparities must be “read in” or used
to inform the tests for jurisdiction.
In point of fact, the tests available for and created by Canadian courts to determine
whether to assert jurisdiction over parties to an action in cases involving human rights or
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environmental abuses — particularly where the defendant is a Canadian national — already
favour the assertion of jurisdiction through reference to a sort of reality frame (through, for
example, analysis of juridical advantage). Additionally, a modern reading of the already-flexible
concept of comity assumes some abandonment of non-intervention principles in contexts
involving human rights abuses. However, what we have seen is that a territorialist approach to
comity and to private international law, informed by the habitus of judges, continues to lead to
some results which frequently do not align with fundamental concepts of justice. Even in a
black-letter interpretation of the law, this ought not be the case. In other words, it is not the law
that binds the hands of Canadian justices; rather, it is – or may well be – the habitus of their
Field.
The reality is that some CanCorps operating in developing states are responsible for
subjecting locals to human rights and environmental abuses. In 2009 the Canadian Centre for the
Study of Resource Conflict completed a report for the Prospectors and Developers Association of
Canada, which found Canadian mining companies were the worst offenders of environmental
and human rights abuses around the world.471 CanCorps, detailed the report, were more likely to
be engaged in community conflict, environmental abuses, and unlawful or unethical behaviour.
Seven years later, in 2016 (as noted above in the introduction) JCAP released a report entitled
“The ‘Canada Brand’: Violence and Canadian Mining Companies in Latin America” in which the
organization documented 100 incidences of violence associated with Canadian extractive
companies operating in Latin-America.472 Such incidents involved 28 Canadian companies and
involved injury — disappearance, battery, sexual violence, and death — to 403 people. At the
time, over 40% of the mining companies present in Latin America were Canadian.473 While
mining is certainly not the only sector in which CanCorps have behaved badly, such figures offer
some insight into the realities of those subjected to the presence of CanCorps abroad. Were the
victims of the above-mentioned abuses domiciled in Canada, they would have the option of
claiming against the CanCorp for damages in Canadian courts. However, being nationals of
developing nations, often such victims have no redress as the courts of their states can often be
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corrupt, ineffective, or unable to enforce against a CanCorp (for various reasons, including
politics and economic incentive created by the CanCorp’s presence). It is for this reason
Canadian courts become so important an avenue for justice and why it is important for Canadian
judges to begin to critically observe their own conditioned assumptions and the way in which
their habitus as Field agents is standing in the way of justice for vulnerable people. As it stands,
however, there appears to be a lack of redress not only in host states but in Canada, which is
made clear in cases such as Anvil Mining, Cambior, Das, and Green Park.
Even if the disparity between what the law intends for or requires of Canadian justices
and the influence of the field habitus — thus calling into question the effective independence of
the Canadian judiciary — is unpersuasive on its own as a call for change, another line of analysis
(taken up in the next section) may help make the cumulative case. A careful, even if only
preliminary, analysis of the benefits CanCorps receive by virtue of being Canadian nationals may
spark greater understanding as to why, as one dimension of fairness, such corporations should be
held responsible for their actions in Canada rather than being able to hide at home from their
poor or callous decisions. Where the preceding two sections introduced the effective conflict
between the law and the way in which it is applied with respect to private international law, the
following section introduces a fairness argument as to why self-critical Field agents should —
despite their habitus — favour a modern and reality-framed interpretation of the law to ensure
CanCorps face justice in Canada. As we shall see, one — not even powerful multinational
corporations — cannot eat their cake and have it too.
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Chapter 3: Fairness dictates Canadian courts take jurisdiction
A: Fairness as a set-off against sovereignty
Framing
As we have seen, in Canadian private international law foreign plaintiffs face barriers at
the stage of jurisdiction. As a preliminary stage in civil procedure, jurisdiction has become a
gatekeeper in access to meaningful justice.474 A cursory read of the cases already decided (and
discussed in Chapters 1 and 2) could lead a reviewer to conclude the law in Canada simply is not
positioned to handle or adapt to the globalized world. However, when searching for the reasons
that the courts in Canada have stumbled, we see a more complicated issue than perhaps initially
assumed.
The law itself — the “black letter” that was created both judicially and legislatively —
actually favours the taking of jurisdiction in transnational human rights tort cases. Even the
current understanding of comity — as explained by the SCC — reveals a shape-shifting,
adaptable concept primed for reality-framing. As noted above, in some cases, courts appear to be
applying a law of jurisdiction that aligns both with the purposes of private international law —
namely the ordered and fair resolution of cross-border disputes — and with Canada’s
commitments internationally with respect in particular to human rights. Nevertheless, we still see
other courts failing to account for modern principles of interpretation by analyzing jurisdictional
questions in a way that reveals a bias towards strict comity and a preoccupation with Canada’s
primary role as a state among a community of states in what amounts to a throwback to a late
19th century high-positivist construction of statehood and territoriality.
A way of understanding this bias is to draw on Bourdieu and his field theory to examine
why judges continue to be mired in this traditional idea of territoriality. If we understand the
problem through this lens, we are left with the following dilemma: while the law is primed for
adaptive and modern use, the habitus of the Field — shaped by the experience of its agents, by
the history and doxa of the Field, and by the overarching input of the field of power — prevents
474

Trevor C W Farrow, “Globalization, International Human Rights, and Civil Procedure” (2003) 41 Alta L Rev 671
at 673 [Farrow 2003].

118
some agents (judges) from seeing beyond territorialism and statehood. Provided we accept this
understanding of the problem, we must also accept that the habitus of the Field is not easily
shaken, the doxa, nomos, and structures of the Field being relatively stable. To ignore the habitus
of the Field, I argue, is to ignore the elephant in the room; no real change can happen without
addressing it.
Thus, rather than ignoring the reality of traditionalist notions, we may approach the
problem by leaning into them. A practitioner, in presenting her private international law case to a
Canadian court, may “reality-frame” or “ground”475 an underlying conflict by catering to
additional (or, alternative) Field doxa whose tradition and longevity are undeniable and even
longer lasting than statehood, most notably among them, fairness. Through bringing fairness to
the fore, we may shift the Field’s attention to the reality of Canadian civil procedure itself and
the reality of international corporate accountability. Such ideas can, I will argue, be used to “set
off” (to balance or even outweigh) preferences for territoriality within the current Field habitus.

Fairness as equality
That the concept of fairness is foundational to justice is generally accepted. However, the
makeup or content of fairness is forever at issue. A veteran philosophy of justice sees fairness in
like-actors being treated equally – where one understands “equally” in the sense of formal
equality only (likes being treated the same). Indeed, from Glaucon’s speeches in Plato’s
Republic476 and the Melian dialogue,477 through Hobbes’ Leviathan, justice — a pact between
“rational egoists” — as equality leads to fairness because of an underlying balance of power.478
Justice, in other words, required only that parties with similar power be treated equally, read
fairly. John Rawls extended this concept of equality by arguing that actors deprived of
knowledge about their current social position (i.e., for our purpose, their place in power
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constellations) would choose fairly equal distribution of goods and power as the basis of state
institutions and decision making as they could not be sure where in society they would fall.479 By
shielding a decision maker behind what Rawls referred to as a “veil of ignorance” the decision
maker is imagined as disembodied; she is no one, and everyone.480 This veiled decision-maker,
not knowing whether she would benefit from any given set of rules, will act in accordance with a
contemporary version of a golden rule (or, Kantian categorical imperative) so as to select rules
that reflect certain overarching disinterested principles of justice. In Rawls’ rendering of justice
as fairness, political morality was de-coupled from an actor’s corporeal relationships and
imagined as a universalist enterprise in which even unequally situated actors could strive to
engage.481 In other words, the Rawlsian approach treats all veiled decision makers as effectively
the same, rather than accounting for how the differences in their social contexts may impact their
versions of “true impartiality.” Thus, a Rawlsian approach to fairness in private international law
would see the equal application and development of the law by the Field and would have as a
necessary starting point the optimal benefit of the law to all “users” of such law.482 For instance,
it is difficult to imagine a veiled decision-maker not requiring the integration of the reality of
globalism and transnational movement of goods and peoples within private international law in
such a way as to benefit of victims of tortious conduct rather than only to the benefit of the
corporate tortfeasors.
In the context of private international law, this approach may engender some resistance.
For instance, critics of Rawls’ theories may question the provenance of equal treatment or even
the act of conceiving the content of equal treatment as such exercises fundamentally ignore a
contextualized understanding of Field actors or circumstances.483 In other words, equal treatment
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ignores the inherent differences between actors before they engage in the veiled choice exercise.
This divergence in political theory is certainly important. For instance, in the context of private
international law, this divergence leads to arguments grounded in the fundamental power
imbalance between CanCorps and plaintiffs (including developing states) as a basis for equity in
treatment (equality through different treatment) before the courts. This argument — that courts
ought to base their decision making (their application of the tests for jurisdiction) with an eye to
the reality of the power of the CanCorp over the plaintiff— is frequently made and is, to some,
ethically powerful.484 Rather than suggesting these positions are without merit — an argument
that I would oppose — for the purpose of this analysis, I propose to, instead, evaluate equality
(rather than equity) of treatment not between parties, but as between the Canadian treatment of
the CanCorp itself, comparing the benefits and liabilities experienced by the CanCorp that are
embedded in the Field. By doing so, we may conceive of the problem — whether courts ought to
take jurisdiction over their own nationals — without reference to agent-relational equality, and
may focus solely on equality in the corporation’s relationship with the Field itself. Such a singleagent approach is part of Rawls’ own understanding of one dimension of how justice as fairness
works. As Rawls explained in his 1958 paper “Justice as Fairness,” in relation to “fair play,” a
societal agent acts unfairly where they take advantage of a system without being responsible to
it:
Usually acting unfairly is not so much the breaking of any particular rule, even if the
infraction is difficult to detect (cheating), but taking advantage of loopholes or ambiguities
in rules, availing oneself of unexpected or special circumstances which make it impossible
to enforce them, insisting that rules be enforced to one’s advantage when they should be
suspended, and more generally, acting contrary to the intention of a practice. It is for this
reason that one speaks of the sense of fair play: acting fairly requires more than simply being
able to follow rules; what is fair must often be felt or perceived, one wants to say. It is not,
however, an unnatural extension of the duty of fair play to have it include the obligation
which participants who have knowingly accepted the benefits of their common practice owe
to each other to act in accordance with it when their performance falls due; for it is usually
considered unfair if someone accepts the benefits of a practice but refuses to do his part in
maintaining it.485
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Just as some judges in Canada have used the elements of the test for jurisdiction to
support a reality frame — one that takes into account the power differential and economic
dynamics of transnational corporate activity — one may use a parallel reality frame to focus
judicial attention on fairness in the equality of treatment provided to the CanCorp in and by the
Canadian state. This analysis is contextual — or grounded, as Laverne Jacobs terms it — to the
Canadian Field while avoiding the many challenges of arguing whether fairness within the Field
must consider those who are subject to, but not immediate or repeat participants in the Field,
namely foreign plaintiffs.
Thus, ideas of fairness as it relates to the conduct of CanCorps within the Field could be
grounded in the idea that a corporation should be held responsible for the burdens of
accountability wherever it derives benefit, i.e. equal treatment in both gain and responsibility.
Traditionally the question of benefit is framed to bind the victims of tortious (or criminal)
corporate behaviour to the benefits that corporations get through operating in developing
nations;486 an ethical (if not legal) duty arises to ensure benefit for the victims of such abuse.487
This way of framing fairness, like the approach used by those critical of John Rawls, calls for
embodied decision-makers who take into account the inherent social/economic/political power
dynamic between plaintiffs and corporations. However, for our purposes, one can flip this
concept to focus instead on benefits corporations derive by virtue of operating from Canada as a
home state. Such benefits fairly lead to taking responsibility in the same home state for civil
actions initiated against the CanCorp.
By contrasting the benefits CanCorps receive by virtue of being Canadian nationals, we
are able to encourage the Field to ground and justify purposive interpretations of the tests for
jurisdiction in the doxic concept of fairness rather than in the contending doxic concept of
territoriality without using principles of globalized moral equity (i.e. Canada owing as much by
way of equal treatment to foreigners as to Canadians) or straying far beyond the current Field
habitus (i.e. of Canadian law’s treatment of corporations, including Canadian private
international law). In such a frame, the first step is to analyze what benefits the CanCorp enjoys;
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the next section provides core examples of the financial, regulatory, and reputational benefits a
CanCorp receives through their Canadian nationality.

B: Corporations as Canadian nationals: the benefits
CanCorps receive a number of advantages by virtue of being “Canadian,” whether
incorporated nationally or provincially. As an example, this section will explore some of the
benefits enjoyed, as a representative example, by Canadian mining companies operating abroad
accrued through their status as Canadian “nationals.” Such benefits include financial benefits —
tax benefits, increased access to capital, increased access to intellectual capital, access to credit
insurance, subjection to less aggressive securities regimes, access to Canada’s international trade
agreements — and non-financial benefits488 — weaker criminal law, lessened regulatory
oversight, and finally, the benefit of the “Canada brand” to a CanCorp’s reputation.

1. Financial benefits
Tax perks
Taxation of Canadian companies (as with individuals) begins with a taxable event
occurring in a corporation’s taxation year. Determination of how much a corporation actually
“owes” is based on a determination of that corporation’s “taxable income.”489 Thus, it is only
once “taxable income” is calculated that the corporate income tax rate, both federal and
provincial, is attached. For reference, the federal corporate tax rate is 15%. This rate is added to
the variable provincial tax rates that range from 11.5% (Ontario, Northwest Territories) to 16%
(Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island). While Canada’s corporate tax rate is relatively moderate
among developed nations,490 Canada’s corporate tax rate has dropped significantly from (using
Ontario as an example) 36.6% to 26.5% since 2003. Corporations based in Canada but operating
488
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abroad are provided many of the same tax benefits given to Canadian corporations, and indeed
some benefits that are not. What follows does not purport to be an extensive review of the
benefits CanCorps get through the Income Tax Act (ITA), but an overview of some of those
benefits provided by some of the most basic corporate structures.
Taxable income of, for example, Canadian mining companies operating abroad depends
mostly on whether the CanCorp is conducting mining directly, or whether it is doing so through
subsidiaries.491 Either way, the CanCorp benefits by being in Canada.
Where the CanCorp is doing business directly in the foreign jurisdiction, expenditures for
the mining operation will be deducted from the CanCorp’s income as “foreign exploration and
development expenses” (FEDEs).492 FEDEs include prospecting, surveys, drilling, trenching, the
cost of (non-depreciable) property, or any annual payment to preserve the foreign resource.493 In
this way, FEDEs operate like Canadian exploration (CEE) and development expenses (CDE) per
section 66(1) of the ITA. However, unlike CEEs and CDEs, FEDEs are calculated on a countryby-country basis494 and can be between 10% to 30% of gross income. By deducting FEDEs, a
CanCorp can reduce its taxable income thus resulting in less tax owing.
Additionally, the CanCorp may claim capital cost allowances (CCA) for any depreciable
property. Most capital assets acquired by mining and oil and gas companies qualify for a
depreciation rate of 25% of a declining balance. Currently, some companies qualify for
accelerated capital cost allowances which can provide up to 100% depreciation of the asset
cost.495 These CCAs, like FEDEs, allows CanCorps to further reduce their taxable income. That
a CanCorp may deduct expenses such as FEDEs and CCAs is not unusual; indeed, Canadian
corporations operating in Canada are eligible for similar deductions. The interesting part, though,
is that deductions for operating costs and land devaluation, for example, for a Canadianoperating corporation involve Canadian land and an interaction with the Canadian economy
through local workers, local suppliers etc. While the corporation is saved some money in the
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calculation of its taxable income, it has otherwise directly contributed to the Canadian economy.
The same cannot generally be said of a CanCorp operating abroad.
Where the CanCorp must eventually pay tax in Canada on its foreign-sourced income
(income minus the FEDEs and CCAs), it may be further granted a “foreign tax credit”496 which
reduces the amount of tax otherwise payable by the CanCorp to Canada so that the total of tax
paid to the foreign state and to Canada does not exceed the tax the CanCorp would pay if only
paying in Canada. Where the foreign taxation rate in the operating country is higher or the same
as in Canada, this may mean reducing the tax payable to the Canadian government by the
CanCorp to zero. For example, if the CanCorp’s tax bill in the foreign state is $1 million and the
calculated taxes due in Canada are $1.5 million (after having taken into account FEDEs and
CCAs), the CanCorp will get “credit” for the $1 million paid in the foreign state and only be
responsible to pay $500,000 to the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA). If, as in the last example,
the tax bill in the foreign state is $1 million and it is the same in Canada, the CanCorp will owe
no taxes in Canada. The key here in this example is that a CanCorp is granted tax deductions and
credits (on non-Canadian property and trade), thus decreasing its contribution to Canadian
coffers, but having contributed far less to the Canadian economy than a Canadian-operating
corporation. While this allowance seems of little consequence, the impact of a CanCorp offering
little to the Canadian economy will be revealed in the review (below) of the extensive public
loans, grants, and insurance provided to CanCorps operating abroad.
Many CanCorps choose to do business abroad through either shell companies or
subsidiaries — the CanCorp being the majority or only shareholder of the foreign company’s
shares. These foreign companies are referred to in the ITA as “foreign affiliates.”497 Where a
CanCorp carries on mining through a foreign affiliate, the CanCorp is subject to the “foreign
affiliate” rules under the ITA.498 Under the ITA, income generated for the CanCorp shareholder
of a foreign affiliate is taxed on two general bases: the foreign accrual property income (FAPI)
system and the surplus system. The FAPI system generally attaches to income derived from
passive investing sources (investment property, capital gains, non-active business, rents,
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royalties, interest etc.) while the surplus system attaches to income generated from active
earnings. This distinction is important because, while the FAPI system is taxation without credits
or deferrals, the surplus system allows for significant if not complete deduction based on where
the affiliate is located and on how the CanCorp categorizes its foreign affiliate’s earnings.
Under the FAPI system, a CanCorp may deduct losses on property, certain allowable
capital losses and foreign taxes paid (or deemed paid) on the income.499 Tax is paid on a current
basis, i.e. taxed in the year it is earned. The surplus system, however, is more lucrative. For
policy reasons, the Canadian government has structured international tax instruments so that if a
CanCorp is conducting active business in a treaty country — say, Ecuador — Canada wants to
ensure the CanCorp competes with companies headquartered in other states on a level playing
field. So, for instance, the CanCorp subsidiary would pay its corporate taxes in Ecuador. Then,
the CanCorp subsidiary, out of its “exempt surplus” — which includes net earnings in a
designated treaty country and certain business activity — would pay dividends to the CanCorp.
While dividends are generally taxable income in Canada,500 under the surplus system, the
CanCorp can repatriate its dividends without paying any Canadian tax. Thus, even though the tax
rate in Ecuador is lower than the total corporate income tax payable in some Canadian provinces,
the CanCorp’s subsidiary will pay the Ecuadorean rate, and the Canadian tax rate will never be
applied. In other words, where the subsidiary is operating in a tax treaty state, and where
dividends are paid to the CanCorp out of the foreign affiliates’ exempt surplus, the CanCorp pays
no tax in Canada on those foreign earnings.501
As for any corporate concerns about the risk of future amendments to the ITA to increase
taxation, CanCorps are assured that the Canadian government has their best interests in mind.
Natural Resources Canada states Canada’s mining taxation regimes are “flexible enough to keep
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pace with industry trends” and that “changes are implemented transparently and are based on
industry consultation” so companies can make informed decisions about investment.502
On its face, assuming corporations act within the spirit of the law, the Canadian tax
framework — including a beneficial tax rate, operating deductions, and the exempt surplus rule
— is highly attractive to extraction companies. CanCorps are provided with tax incentives and
credits without having to contribute directly to the Canadian economy.503 The scenarios I have
reviewed above assume all deductions made by the CanCorp are legitimate (that they happened
and they were valued accurately), and that the CanCorp actually paid taxes in the foreign state.
However, these scenarios do not yet account for more creative tax-minimization schemes. One
such example is strategic base erosion and profit sharing (BEPS),504 a process by which
companies shift profits from higher-tax jurisdictions to lower-tax jurisdictions (tax havens such
as the Cayman Islands or Barbados) to avoid paying taxes either in the operating state or in
Canada, a CanCorp’s home state.
BEPS is a major issue in Canada,505 both with respect to CanCorps operating in Canada
and those operating abroad. With the release of the “Panama Papers”506 and the subsequent
“Paradise Papers,”507 Canadians have been made significantly more aware of Canada’s lax
taxation framework and the so-called “snow washing”508 of billions of dollars in potential tax
revenue. Canadians for Tax Fairness, a Canadian non-profit organization, estimates the annual
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tax income lost to the Canadian government per year as a result of BEPS is between $10-$15
billion.509 While not all corporate tax-minimizing structures are illegal (i.e. they involve lawful
avoidance of tax versus unlawful evasion of tax), legality is not the essential point; such tax
minimization, made possible by the ITA, creates a highly advantageous situation for Canadian
corporations. As Peter Dent, a forensic accountant and past chair of the a non-governmental,
anti-corruption organization, Transparency International Canada, observes: “Canada is one of the
most opaque jurisdictions, globally, in terms of identifying corporate ownership…Canada is
increasingly becoming an attractive jurisdiction for individuals who want to hide their money or
their assets.”510 Following the release of the Panama and Paradise Papers, the CRA has initiated
audits into many of the corporations and individuals therein named. However, this action may be
for naught. In the recent decision of Cameco Corp v the Queen,511 the Tax Court of Canada
upheld as legal Cameco’s transfer pricing scheme to move profits from a uranium mine out of
Canada thereby denying Canada $8.4 billion between 2003 and 2017. Without a major overhaul
of Canada’s ITA, moral incentive alone will not be enough to rein in technical readings of ITA
requirements, which continue to be possible under the flexibility of the current law (as
interpreted by our current courts). This flexibility is not lost on CanCorps.
Each ITA provision allowing for tax advantage to a CanCorp creates benefit. However,
the real benefit comes from the combination of such provisions along with organizational and
operating structures designed to take advantage of the differences and interaction of tax rules
amongst different state jurisdictions. Such tax planning allows an overall diminution of tax paid
not just to Canada but across the board – even as that corporation may still be receiving a wide
range of financial benefits from the Canadian legal system, whether through tax law deductions
and credits or through other forms of financial support.
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Access to capital
Beyond taxation, one of the most important reasons to headquarter a mining company in
Canada is the access to investment and to institutional knowledge available in the Canadian
market.
Export Development Canada (EDC), Canada’s export credit agency, is the most
significant source of funding for a CanCorp.512 EDC is a crown corporation that reports to
Parliament through the Minister of International Trade.513 Despite being generally self-funded,
since 1944, EDC has been advanced over $1 billion in taxpayer dollars to assist in the expansion
of its insurance and lending operations. Through various funding programs, in 2017 alone, EDC
facilitated nearly $14 billion in mining business worldwide.514 EDC, in assets at $69.4 billion is
more than twice the size of the Export-Import Bank of the United States. In January 2018, EDC
opened a wholly owned subsidiary, called “Development Finance Institute Canada” (FinDev).
FinDev is guided by a development-focused mandate — as compared to EDC’s export-focused
mandate — and seeks to support CanCorps doing business in developing countries (Latin
America, the Caribbean, Sub-Saharan Africa) specifically in “green growth” (renewable energy,
energy infrastructure, energy efficiency, water supply, water management, waste management,
waste water management, bio-refinery products, green industrial production), agribusiness, or
financial services.515 FinDev was capitalized in 2017 with $300 million.
EDC works with several other crown corporations and crown departments to support
CanCorps doing business abroad. Such examples include: The Trade Commissioner Service
(TCS),516 Canadian Commercial Corporation (CCC),517 Sustainable Development Technology
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Canada (SDTC),518 and the Business Development Bank of Canada (BDC).519 As with the EDC,
each partner organization is similarly endowed and keen to provide significant funding and
assistance opportunities to CanCorps. For instance, as of 2018, the Export Diversification
Strategy will invest $1.1 billion over six years to help CanCorps access new markets, and in
doing so triple the Canadian TCS CanExport program.520 If a CanCorp is able to market its mine
as one focused on research and development, then a number of additional funding sources
become available, such as the Strategic Innovation Fund,521 or the $155 million Clean Growth
Program.522 Similarly, in 2017, the EDC launched two “green bonds,” one CAD$500 million and
one for US$500 million, and provided $1.5 billion in support for clean tech companies.523 The
EDC does not define what is meant by “clean tech,” making it difficult to discern whether clean
tech will include more controversial “sustainability” options like “clean coal.”
Canadian embassies in host states may provide additional assistance to CanCorps in
facilitating negotiations and contracts. For instance, according to MiningWatch Canada, which
obtained documents through access to information requests, the Canadian Embassy in Mexico
assisted Toronto-based Excellon Resources in their efforts to avoid addressing violations of its
land-use contract with the local agricultural community on whose land it operates its La Platosa
mine by lobbying Mexican officials, failing to encourage peaceful dialogue with the local
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protesters, and sharing information gathered from locals with the company without the consent
of such locals.524
Many of the above-noted programs have instituted requirements that CanCorps seeking
funding demonstrate they have identified and planned for any social and environmental impacts
that may be caused by a proposed project. Despite these goals, the de facto impact of such
policies is less certain. The EDC provides a prominent example.
For a CanCorp to be provided with general corporate support from EDC — such as
insurance and financing for day-today operations — the CanCorp must submit declarations that
it is “not aware of any significant environmental consequences of their transactions and/or
business.” Upon receipt of an application for such funding, an EDC financial officer conducts an
initial screening to look for activities that might be high risk to the local peoples or the
environment. If activities are flagged as high risk, the CanCorp is forwarded to the
environmental advisory services team (EAS) for further assessment. As an example, the EDC
stated that in 2017, 170 projects underwent “human rights screening” which reflects “human
rights flags from business pre-screening that were assessed, not only those completed.”525 It is
not made clear how many funding requests were granted despite having been flagged for human
rights risks.
CanCorps seeking EDC funding for large infrastructure projects must follow further
requirements outlined in the EDC Environmental and Social Review Directive and provide
quarterly status reports to the EDC board of directors. For a project to be considered for support,
it must meet international standards which include International Finance Corporation’s
Performance Standards on Environmental and Social Sustainability and the OECD’s Common
Approaches and the Equator Principles. Projects must also be subject to an environmental and
social impact assessment; such assessments are conducted by the CanCorp. For the largest
projects, the EAS team visits project sites and works with independent reviewers.
The EDC publishes a list of projects that have received financing approval, divided
among projects that have potential significant adverse environmental or social effects (Category
524
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A), those with less impact (Category B), and those with no impact (Category C). EDC provides
some information regarding the basis of expected compliance such as “host country standards”
or “IFC Performance Standards” and, in recent cases, provides a short project review
summary.526 Pursuant to the EDC’s policy, the EDC states that it monitors projects over the
long-term and will suspend disbursements or funds or stop them entirely if it is unsatisfied the
terms of the agreement are being met.527 However, managing environmental and social risk,
according to the EDC, is the responsibility of the EDC client. While the EDC monitors funded
projects, it outlines no clear process for non-compliance; the EDC does not publish decisions
related to non-compliance with environmental or social standards and when/how the EDC has
suspended such funds and upon what basis. Indeed, the EDC’s disclosure policy does not require
EDC to disclose such information. Disclosure with respect to CSR standards is limited to
approval stage, and even then, is limited in its depth.528
The latest EDC report available at the time of writing, the 2017 Report, was prepared
with reference to the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) standards529 and promoted “great
progress in both environmental and social realms.” The Report features a “3-Year Scorecard” in
which the EDC provided the values associated with total export and investment ($29.9 billion) as
well as projects assessed under the Equator Principles and “other guidelines” (nine and nine,
respectively). The EDC heard 42 “CSR-related public inquiries.” Five project sites were visited
by the EAS team to meet with EDC customers, civil society organizations, government
organization and other lenders. With respect to none of the assessments it conducted — on the
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Equator Principles, the CSR inquiries, or the site visits — does the EDC release its findings or
any corrective action it may have taken. While the trappings of environmental and social
sustainability have been adopted, follow-through and effective monitoring is less certain by
virtue of a near-total lack of real transparency.530
This lack of transparency was recently highlighted in a 2018-2019 investigation done by
the Globe and Mail which, after studying the practices of the EDC over a one-year period, found
the EDC continues to do business with and provide significant financial loans to CanCorps and
foreign corporations that are embroiled in human rights and financial scandals.531 For instance,
EDC approved a loan guarantee to the Royal Bank of Canada to finance the sale of a CanCorp’s
(Netsweeper Inc) technology to the Bahraini government, which has been accused of using the
technology to censor political opposition movements, human rights groups, gay and lesbian
advocacy groups and news organizations such as Al Jazeera.532 On numerous occasions, EDC
has continued to support its clients despite banks and international organizations such as the
World Bank halting any such support. For instance, while the World Bank stopped any further
loans to Canada’s SNC-Lavalin (SNC) following widespread allegations of bribery, EDC
continued its support of the company to the tune of between $50-$100 million. EDC eventually
distanced itself from SNC in 2014 only to re-partner with the company in 2017, providing the
company with three more loans with a maximum possible value of $1.25 billion. This, despite
criminal charges laid in Canada against the company for bribing Libyan dictator Muammar
Gaddafi (discussed in further detail below). Today, following allegations CanCorp Bombardier
engaged in significant bribery involving South Africa’s notorious Gupta brothers, EDC is facing
scrutiny for having helped Bombarbier win a $1.2 billion portion of a locomotive contract and
thereafter maintaining its relationship with the company, which is also its biggest client.533
While Canadians are investors in EDC and are the beneficiaries of EDC’s profits
(whether those profits are “clean” or not), neither ordinary citizens nor most government officials
have access to EDC’s files. According to the Globe and Mail, EDC treats its investigations and
loan conclusions “as confidential information belonging to its customers.” In 2014, following
530
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orders from the Minister of International Trade, EDC hired a consultant to review its risk
management practices. The consultant provided a 58-page final report, though EDC refused to
make this report public, thereby shielding its shortcomings and any further response from public
scrutiny. Further, in June 2019, a federal review was conducted of EDC which found serious
shortcomings related to disclosure practices and a lack of legal obligation to consider social or
environmental impacts of proposed projects.534 Notably, EDC’s disclosure practices were found
to be inferior to those of other credit export agencies, such as in the US or at the World Bank.
The report was tabled in Parliament on June 20, 2019, and will be submitted to a parliamentary
committee. The report was met with immediate backlash from the Canadian Chamber of
Commerce and the Business Council of Canada, among others, who stressed in open letters to
the federal Trade Minister that no changes resulting in the scaling back of export support –
particularly to developing countries – should be considered.535
Despite the depth of crown/crown-corp funding, funding from government sources is not
the only way CanCorps access capital. While domiciled in Canada, CanCorps have access to
preferential commercial loans from one of Canada’s big five banks, all of which are ranked
among the world’s largest 100 banks and remain, even after the 2008 financial crash, some of the
most highly rated banks in the world.
Additionally, investment is not limited to banking or project-specific loans. It extends to
the personal savings of taxpayers. It is not legally necessary that Canadian public pension plans
break down the companies in which funds are held. Thus, unless that information is made public,
it can be difficult to determine how much CanCorp stock is held by Canadian pensioners.
However, two examples are illuminating. In 2018, the Canada Pension Plan Investment Board,
one of the largest pension plans in Canada investing the funds of over 20 million Canadians —
managing $356.1 billion in public funds536 — held $100 million invested with Teck Resources,
$77 million with Goldcorp Inc, and $94 million with Barrick Gold.537 As of March 31, 2018,
BC’s Investment Management Corporation, which invests $145.6 billion of BC’s public sector
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pensions, had the following invested: $56.5 million with Barrick Gold, $68.5 million with
Goldcorp Inc, $5.5 million with Tahoe Resources (recently acquired by Pan-American Silver,
also a BC-based extraction company), and $2.7 million with Nevsun Resources.538 Recall, two of
these companies are currently resisting the jurisdiction of BC courts.
Beyond access to financial capital, a CanCorp headquartered in Canada also has access to
knowledge capital: significant expertise in mining in, for instance, Toronto or Vancouver. First,
the CanCorp can be locally listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX), along with 57% of the
world’s public mining companies,539 which can provide certain benefits. For instance, listing on
the TSX means the issues are “eligible to be included in the S&P/TSX Composite Index as well
as assignment to S&P/TSX sector indices.”540 Such inclusion provides listed companies with
increased access to investment funds through large-scale institutional investment (from, for
example, pension funds) in such index funds.541 In 2018, the TSX and TSV venture exchange
were responsible for 49% of mining investment in the world.542 Further, CanCorps in Toronto or
Vancouver will have access to accountants, lawyers, and myriad corporate entities who, by virtue
of Canada’s significant global presence in mining,543 have the necessary expertise to assist the
CanCorp in its corporate structuring, politicking, and expansion.544
Last, locating the CanCorp in Canada provides access to various private associations that
support a mining corporation. Examples include the Prospectors & Developers Association of
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Canada, the Mining Association of Canada, various provincial mining associations, and the
Canadian Institute of Mining, Metallurgy and Petroleum. Such associations employ registered
lobbyists to lobby every level of government on behalf of mining CanCorps. As but one example
of the scale of lobbying activity, the nine in-house lobbyists for the Mining Association of
Canada (there are five external firms that also lobby on behalf of the Mining Association) were
involved in 319 communications with federal government employees on the subject of mining in
the 12 months between April 17, 2018 and April 17, 2019. These lobbying efforts do not include
the efforts of other lobbyists on behalf of the Mining association, nor lobbyists hired by the other
entities and those hired by individual companies. For instance, Goldcorp Inc itself has five active
lobbyists registered with the Federal government; Barrick Gold pays three.545
Insurance
Beyond capital, the EDC also offers CanCorps credit insurance at up to 90% of losses.
Coverage under EDC Portfolio Credit Insurance includes the risks of customers (foreign states or
corporations) failing to pay due to bankruptcy, termination of contract, or hostilities in a
particular market that prevent the customer from paying. The EDC also offers “Political Risk
Insurance” and “Performance Security Insurance” that protect CanCorps from losses resulting
from expropriation, political violence, war and related disturbance, conversion, transfer
repossession, non-payment by government, and acts of God. In other words, where a CanCorp’s
mining project is at risk because of, say, local indigenous opposition, EDC insurance will protect
the CanCorp’s investment. While the EDC is “self-funded,” its insurance policies are
underwritten by the Government of Canada (tax payers), who, through the Export Development
Act — the legislation that created the EDC — allows EDC to take on liability up to $45 billion.546
For clarity, the EDC provides a mining CanCorp with funding to do business abroad —
and under FinDev, specifically to do so in developing nations — and then insures the CanCorp at
up to 90% of losses — underwritten by taxpayers — should that CanCorp face “hostilities” from
locals who jeopardize their profit margins, thereby shielding the CanCorp from most risk.
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Securities
Publicly traded companies in Canada are subject to the provincial securities regimes,
which require regular reporting in the form of (1) annual reports, (2) management discussion and
analysis statements, and (3) annual information forms.547 Mining companies are also required to
report information pertaining to their mining projects that may result in a change to the market
value of their shares. As of 2015, the previous 15 years had seen 23 countries enact legislation to
require public companies to issue reports including social/environmental information.548 In
parallel, seven stock exchanges have required social/environmental reporting. Neither Canada
nor the TSX are included in these groups.549
While provincial securities requirements arguably require reporting of environmental,
social, and political issues that may materially impact a company’s financial position, some
studies have found disclosure such information wanting. In 2008, the Ontario Securities
Commission assessed the financial statements of 35 reporting issuers and found that many had
simply used boilerplate description of environmental liabilities;550 the same deficiencies were
found in Alberta one year earlier.551 Such issues remained nearly 10 years later.
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In a 2016 report conducted by JCAP, a review of disclosure made by CanCorps in a fiveyear period on the SEDAR filing system of the Canadian Securities Administrators found
Canadian company disclosure rates of incidents that meet legislated definitions to be only
24%.552 Additionally, the quality of disclosure was poor and, often, misleading.553 For instance,
some companies reported the number of incidents rather than the number of victims, or reported
an event such as a protest while failing to note the violence associated with the protest.554 Such
findings suggest Canada’s securities systems lack robust requirements and enforcement
mechanisms beyond those associated with pure financial data. Further, by tying disclosure to
events that may impact market share, the burden to do so is felt unequally between companies;
bigger companies with many operation sites are less likely to see a dip in market share resulting
from an event at one site, even one involving violence, whereas the same is not necessarily true
with respect to companies that operate one mine.555
While the rate of compliance in continual reporting with respect to environmental and
social issues remains questionable, it further appears CanCorps may also benefit from cost
discrepancies between Canada and, for example, the United States — a fact some companies
discuss openly. In Tahoe Resources’s Short Form Prospectus in 2015, it stated: “The regulatory
and compliance costs to us under U.S. securities laws as a U.S. domestic issuer will be
significantly more than the costs incurred as a Canadian foreign private issuer.”556
The self-reporting requirement of Canada’s provincial securities regimes appear to favour
self-bias and underreporting to the benefit of CanCorps. While securities standards could
arguably be said to require disclosure of environmental, social, and political issues lest a
securities reporter face commission sanctions — an obvious deterrent to Canadian incorporation
— relaxed monitoring of such requirements allows public corporations to gain benefits as listed
above without facing real risk of punishment for downplaying their actions abroad. It is
important to remember, however, that such oversight — effective or not — applies only to
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publicly listed corporations; there is no need for a private CanCorp to report on its non-monetary
business dealings, thus leaving the public generally veiled from its operations.557
International agreements
Canada’s various international agreements provide CanCorps with attractive tax benefits,
trade options, and investment security. Further to the tax benefits that flow from tax treaty states
(explained above regarding the foreign surplus rule), Canada boasts free trade agreements with
more than 40 countries, providing CanCorps with preferential market access around the world.
The Canadian Mining Association lists specifically the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement with the European Union
(CETA), and the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) as enabling strong economic growth for mining
companies by eliminating tariffs, specifically those related to aluminum, nickel, non-ferrous
metal, and iron and steel.558 Furthermore, Canada maintains dozens of bilateral trade accords
with foreign states for the protection and promotion of Canadian investments. Such accords often
require host states to encourage favourable investment conditions for Canadian corporate
investors, to withhold from expropriation, and to compensate for losses suffered as a result of
civil strife, armed conflict, or natural disasters.559
***
Tax benefits, loans, grants, insurance, favourable securities regimes, and international
connection provide a confluence of financial benefit for CanCorps. Interestingly, that the
economic benefits CanCorps receive are numerous is a sensitive fact for mining companies. In
2010, Vancouver-based Talonbooks published Imperial Canada Inc: Legal Haven of Choice for
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the World’s Mining Industries written by Québec academic researchers Alain Denault and
William Sacher. The book examines the economic and political factors that contribute to why
Canada was then home to 70% of the world’s mining companies. Before publication, Barrick
Gold demanded copies of the manuscript and proceeded to launch a multi-million dollar
defamation action against the publishers, postponing the translation of the book into English.560
The action postponed the publishing of the book for two years, though it was eventually released.
Though important, financial benefits are not the only benefits provided a CanCorp;
limited regulatory oversight also makes for a welcome home base.

2. Beneficial regulatory oversight
Weakened criminal sanctions
On June 21, 2018, the federal government budget omnibus Bill C-74 entitled “An Act to
implement certain provisions of the budget tabled in Parliament on February 27, 2018 and other
measures,”561 received royal assent. At Division 20 of that Bill, the government amended the
Criminal Code to include provision for “remediation agreements” (at new sections 715.3-715.43)
for certain offences.562 Remediation agreements, also known as deferred prosecution agreements
(DPAs), provide prosecutors the power to suspend charges and negotiate sanctions against an
organization allowing an organization to avoid a public criminal prosecution. The purpose of the
provisions is allegedly to “hold an organization accountable” and “denounce wrongdoing” while,
among other things, reducing negative consequences of the wrongdoing for “persons —
employees, customers, pensioners and others — who did not engage in the wrongdoing.”563
560
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While DPAs may arguably lead to greater enforcement of and compliance with anti-corruption
laws, without meaningful consequences for the corporations involved, a good case can be made
that DPAs simply transform criminal sanctions into the “cost of doing business.”564
Though there is arguably a trend towards DPA schemes among some developed states,565
few schemes are operational. The notes provided by the federal government explaining the DPA
amendments cited the existence of the American DPA provisions introduced in the 1990s,566 and
the UK provisions introduced in 2013.567 Unfortunately, some examples from the American and
UK experience have been less than promising.
In the UK, the 2017 DPA negotiated for Rolls-Royce, and judicially approved by the
Right Honourable Sir Brian Leveson,568 was received with mixed opinion. Following a four-year
investigation by the UK’s Serious Fraud Office (SFO) into systemic corruption at Rolls-Royce
that spanned a quarter-century, seven countries, and 30 million documents, Rolls-Royce’s size
and economic clout appear to have played a significant part in its DPA;569 indeed the collateral
damage of serious threats to the viability of the company that would result from prosecution
would have been too far-reaching. The Rolls-Royce DPA included disgorgement and penalties of

wrongdoing; (e) to provide reparations for harm done to victims or to the community; and (f) to reduce the negative
consequences of the wrongdoing for persons — employees, customers, pensioners and others — who did not engage
in the wrongdoing, while holding responsible those individuals who did engage in that wrongdoing. It is important
to note that the purpose of avoiding negative consequences for “innocent” people is expressly not considered at s
715.32(2), the factors to consider in entering into a negotiation for a DPA. It is only in the “umbrella” subsection of s
715.32(2)(i) — any other factor the prosecutor considers relevant — that the “innocent persons” purpose may be
considered.
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more than £670 million and independent monitoring of an ongoing compliance program.570
Transparency International responded to the DPA by noting that Rolls-Royce got off lightly and
that the fine was relatively painless for such a powerful company, particularly given no
individual actors were prosecuted. There is yet no evidence with respect to the effectiveness of
the negotiated compliance program in terms of reducing corruption within Rolls-Royce.
In the US, scholars note that American judicial scrutiny over the terms of DPAs has been
non-existent.571 In the recent decision of United States v Fokker Services BV,572 the DC Circuit
curtailed recent efforts of reviewing judges who had tried to declare that an “Article III judge” is
not a “potted plant”573 or “rubber stamp”574 when reviewing DPAs. The appellate court held that
a court is not authorized to reject a DPA based on finding the charging decisions and the
conditions agreed to are inadequate; to do so would be to interfere with the “Executive’s longsettled primacy over charging.”575 In 2010, Fokker — a Dutch company that sells products to the
aerospace industry — approached the US government to self-report that it may have violated US
sanctions and export laws by selling product in Iran, Sudan, and Burma. Following a four-year
investigation, American authorities discovered Fokker had unlawfully earned $21 million from
1147 transactions. The DPA arranged with Fokker required it to pay fines and penalties totalling
$21 million — effectively to pay back the income it had unlawfully generated and no more —
and to implement new compliance policies.576 Indeed, the District Court judge found the DPA
was too lenient and criticized the Department of Justice for prosecuting “so anemically” a
company that had assisted some of the nation’s “worst enemies.”577 Specifically, like in RollsRoyce, the DPA failed to require prosecution of individual actors. The “unnecessary broad
conclusion” of the appellate court that the “Judiciary's lack of competence to review the
prosecution's initiation and dismissal of charges equally applies to review of … the choices
reflected in the [DPA]'s terms” has worried some American criminal justice scholars.578
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Despite such examples, the Canadian government incorporated a significantly similar
system in Canada. Of particular import are the provisions related to publication of information.
For instance, the new Canadian model, following that of the UK requires judicial oversight for
acceptance of an agreement. However, like the UK, further monitoring is not circumscribed.
Critics have argued independent monitoring should be required of DPA schemes and that
monitor reports should be made public. In the United States, monitor reports are not publicized
and the Department of Justice has repeatedly objected to public review of such reports, which
has resulted in little public oversight of the effectiveness of DPA agreements on the subsequent
operation of affected corporations.579 Similarly, while the public release of monitor reports is not
addressed in the UK’s Schedule 17, the UK’s DPA Code of Practice notes that monitor reports
are deemed confidential.580 Not only has the new Canadian scheme not addressed the disclosure
of monitor reports, like the UK scheme, the assignment of independent monitors is not required.
Additionally, publication of an approved DPA is not always mandatory. In the UK, while
there is requirement to publish a positive decision,581 a judge may order postponement of
publication, where it is “necessary to avoid substantial risk of prejudice to the administration of
justice in any legal proceedings.”582 The Canadian model similarly provides the court with the
discretion not to publish the DPA, but on a less rigorous standard: “if it is satisfied that the nonpublication is necessary for the proper administration of justice.”583 Notably, the Canadian
Senate’s Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs expressed concern, noting a
court’s decision not to publish a remediation agreement may mean victims and other members of
the public may never be informed of outcomes. The Standing Committee recommended
remediation agreements “always be published at the earliest opportunity;”584 this change was not
made to Bill C-74.
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As the content of the Canadian scheme has received criticism, the timing of its
implementation has been similarly questioned given that it was brought about amid a significant
looming criminal prosecution against one of Canada’s biggest developers, SNC-Lavalin. Further
criticism has addressed SNC’s involvement in the drafting of the scheme.585
The SNC affair has already cast the future effectiveness of the DPA scheme in doubt.
Before the scheme’s implementation, Transparency International Canada recommended
that a DPA be a discretionary tool with only the prosecutor permitted to invite the defendant to
enter into negotiations; the accused should have no right to demand that DPA negotiations
commence.586 Notably, nothing in the language of the new DPA scheme suggests otherwise.
However, following the Director of Public Prosecution’s decision not to engaged in DPA
negotiations with SNC, SNC — being advised by former justice of the SCC, Frank Iaccobuci —
applied for a judicial review of the prosecutor’s discretionary decision.587 In doing so, it appears
it had the support of at least some members of the governing party. Liberal MP Steven
MacKinnon went so far as to explain to the CBC that SNC was “entitled to a deferred
prosecution agreement.”588 Such legal challenge was not surprising given the extended media
campaign SNC launched in Québec to raise support in its push for a DPA. In one advertisement
it stated, “The Government of Canada passed legislation in 2018 to allow companies to settle
charges via a remediation agreement, and yet the new law is not being made available to SNCLavalin for unknown reasons.”589 SNC’s sense of entitlement is particularly noteworthy given
that it is questionable whether its alleged criminal wrongdoing could ever be subject to a DPA.
In Canada, as in the USA and the UK, DPAs are available for monetary crimes, but not those
that involve bodily harm or death. SNC is charged with bribing Libyan dictator Muammar
Gaddafi with more than $50 million in exchange for billions of dollars in contracts — including
provisions of the budget tabled in Parliament on February 27, 2018 and other measures, 42nd Parl, 1st Sess (27
February 2018); note, the Senate Standing Committee also expressed their concern regarding a lack of information
provided by the Minister of Justice, the fact that the changes were introduced through a budget omnibus bill, and an
apparent lack of consultation by government with victims of corporate harm in designing the new scheme (the last
observation was proposed by a minority of Senators).
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infrastructure contracts to build prisons — over the course of 16 years. SNC did so while almost
certainly aware of the reality of Gaddafi’s direction of and role in widespread human rights
abuses including torture, murder, abductions, and rape.590 For instance, SNC helped finance
Gaddafi’s son’s soccer team after his bodyguards opened fire on fans — resulting in the killing
of between 20-50 people — for booing a referee seen to favour the son.591
The timing of the DPA amendments and support of SNC’s position by Canada’s
governing party592 suggests the new DPA scheme was indeed meant to save precisely this kind
of company from prosecution, despite any link between the company’s actions and subsequent
human rights abuses. Such support potentially foreshadows the way in which such agreements
may be interpreted in the future, possibly by a more corporate-friendly public prosecutor. Even at
their best, DPAs represent a collective “giving up” in the serious investigation and prosecution of
corporations; they are the admission on the part of government that some companies are simply
too big, too powerful, too complicated, and too involved in politics and the community to be
treated like everyone else. This, despite the government’s own role in allowing such companies
to self-complicate, to grow unwieldy, and to amass such power. The recent boom in DPA
schemes, including that in Canada, will provide an “option C” for CanCorps that engage in
illegal practices: pay the price to do business, and move on.
The advent of DPAs as a corporate-friendly oversight tool is unsurprising given the
general lack of legislated corporate oversight in Canada.
Legislated corporate oversight
No legislation has been implemented in Canada — either federally or in any province or
territory — to ensure victims of extractive harms abroad have access to damages in Canada, nor
to prosecute CanCorps for poor behaviour abroad. This reality is not for lack of opportunity.
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In 2005, following hearings on the abusive activities of the mining company TVI Pacific
Inc in the Philippines, the House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and
International Trade (SCFAIT) presented Parliament with the Fourteenth Report of the 38th
Parliament: “Mining in Developing Countries - Corporate Social Responsibility.”593 The
SCFAIT had established a subcommittee tasked with the responsibility of inquiring “into matters
relating to the promotion of respect for international human rights and the achievement of
sustainable human development.” The Report made eight general recommendations including
“establish[ing] clear legal norms in Canada to ensure that Canadian companies and residents are
held accountable when there is evidence of environmental and/or human rights violations
associated with the activities of Canadian mining companies.” The government committed to
further examining some issues, but ultimately rejected any recommendations that would require
binding commitments by government or corporations.594
In an attempt to revive the concerns raised by the SCFAIT, in 2007 NDP MP Peter Julian
introduced a private members bill that would allow foreign plaintiffs to sue in Canada for claims
based on violations of international law or treaties to which Canada is a party.595 The Bill
proposed adding a provision to the Federal Courts Act596 providing the Federal Courts with
original jurisdiction in civil cases in which “the claim for relief or remedy arises from a violation
of international law or a treaty to which Canada is a party and commenced by a person who is
not a Canadian citizen…” Among acts over which the Federal Court would have jurisdiction
were breaches of customary and treaty-based international law such as genocide, slavery, torture,
and war crimes. The Bill further proposed to limit the flexibility of the common law test for
forum non conveniens in such cases by requiring the court not stay a proceeding unless the
defendant could establish, not only that another forum was available and appropriate but, that
that other forum would “fairly and effectively provide a final and binding decision,” that the
other forum would do so “in a timely and efficient manner,” that the interests of justice
593
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“adamantly” require that a stay be granted and — notably adding the Australian and American
inwardly-focused approach — “that Canada is not a suitable forum in which to decide the case.”
The Bill has not progressed past its first reading in any of its iterations from Parliament to
Parliament.
In 2009 the Liberal MP, John McKay, introduced Bill C-300, “An Act respecting
Corporate Accountability for the Activities of Mining, Oil or Gas in Developing Countries.”597
The purpose of the proposed act was “to ensure that corporations engaged in mining, oil or gas
activities and receiving support from the Government of Canada act in a manner consistent with
international environmental best practices and with Canada’s commitments to international
human rights standards.”598 The Bill would create reporting requirements for Ministers and the
ability to receive complaints and then, through amendments to the Canada Pension Plan
Investment Board Act,599 the Special Economic Measures Act,600 the Export Development Act,601
and the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Act,602 would create Ministerial
power to limit federal support of CanCorps. The Bill passed a first and second reading and was
referred to SCFAIT. In June 2010, SCFAIT returned the Bill without amendment. However,
following a significant lobbying effort by CanCorps and mining associations,603 the Bill was
defeated at the reporting stage by six votes.604 The failure of this bill — the clear opposition to
the Minister’s proposed ability to cut funding to a corporation — further calls into question the
effectiveness of, for instance, EDC’s environmental and social responsibility mechanisms.
Notably, the EDC joined opponents of the bill in lobbying against it.605
Today, two federal government bodies are responsible for “monitoring” corporate social
responsibility in Canada: (1) the office of the Extractive Corporate Social Responsibility
Counsellor (CSR Counsellor) and (2) the National Contact Point (NCP) under the OECD
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Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises.606 Neither office has the power to conduct
investigations, sanction companies directly, or compensate victims.
The office of the CSR Counsellor was established in 2009 following the release of the
federal policy called “Building the Canadian Advantage: A CSR Strategy for the International
Extractive Sector,” with the power to receive complaints and invite CanCorps to participate in a
mediation with complainants, though the corporations may refuse or withdraw at any stage of the
process for any reason. The CSR Counsellor cannot act unless there has been a complaint, cannot
investigate complaints, and cannot issue binding decisions to the corporations.607 Since its
inception, the CSR Counsellor has not developed a process for withdrawing support or
withholding funding from companies engaged in nefarious practices and as of the end of 2017,
the office of the CSR Counsellor had not indicated it had acted with the Canadian Government or
Canadian embassies to withhold funding or assistance from any company.608 In its 10 years of
operation, the office has reported only six requests for review. One of the more recent examples,
a complaint against Silver Standard (a CanCorp) operating in Argentina, concluded when Silver
Standard withdrew from the voluntary process. Similarly, Excellon Resources, operating in
Mexico, withdrew from the mediation process prior to commencement, noting: “it did not
consider the dialogue process facilitated by the office to provide value to the company or the
company’s shareholders.”609

606

OECD, OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, 2000 [OECD Guidelines].
Shin Imai et al, “Access to Justice and Corporate Accountability: A Legal Case Study of HudBay in Guatemala”
(2014) 35:2 Can J of Dev Stud 286 [Imai et al 2014].
608
On its website the CSR Counsellor references Canada’s CSR strategy for the extractive sector, “Doing Business
the Canadian Way: A Strategy to Advance Corporate Social Responsibility in Canada’s Extractive Sector Abroad,”
as establishing “consequences” for companies that do not embody CSR best practices or refuse to engage in good
faith with the CSR Counsellor’s dialogue facilitation process: Global Affairs Canada, “Reviewing Corporate Social
Responsibility Practices,” online: <https://www.international.gc.ca/csr_counsellorconseiller_rse/Reviewing_CSR_Practices-Examen_Pratiques_RSE.aspx?lang=eng>. The CSR Strategy states
“Companies are expected to align with widely recognized CSR-related guidance and will be recognized by the CSR
Counsellor`s Office as eligible for enhanced Government of Canada economic diplomacy. Companies will also face
withdrawal of TCS and other Government of Canada advocacy support abroad for non-participation in the dialogue
facilitation processes of Canada’s NCP and Office of the Extractive Sector CSR Counsellor…Canadian companies
found not to be embodying CSR best practices and who refuse to participate in dispute resolution processes
contained in the CSR Strategy, will no longer benefit from economic diplomacy of this nature:” Global Affairs
Canada, “Doing Business the Canadian Way: A Strategy to Advance Corporate Social Responsibility in Canada’s
Extractive Sector Abroad” online: <https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accordscommerciaux/assets/pdfs/Enhanced_CS_Strategy_ENG.pdf> at 12.
609
Simons & Macklin 2014, supra note 238 at 261.
607

148
In 2018, the federal government created the new position of “Canadian Ombudsperson
for Responsible Enterprise” (CORE) to replace the CSR Counsellor; in May 2019, the CSR
Counsellor’s position will be folded into the ombudsperson’s role. The CORE’s mandate will
include addressing complaints related to allegations of human rights abuses arising from a
CanCorps activity abroad, making recommendations, monitoring implementation of those
recommendations, and reporting publicly.610 The CORE is not yet operational and is set to be in
place “as soon as possible.”611 The government indicated this position will differ from that of the
CSR Counsellor in that it will have the ability to investigate independently and that it will
monitor more sectors of Canadian business, beyond extractive companies. It remains unclear
whether the CORE will have any real ability to sanction or limit the activities of CanCorps
abroad, beyond making recommendations to government.612
The OECD NCP is similarly limited. In 1976, the OECD released its Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises (OECD Guidelines),613 voluntary principles and standards for
responsible business conduct. The OECD Guidelines encourage enterprises to follow a number
of positive steps, including for our purposes, to: respect the human rights of those affected by
their activities;614 develop systems that foster relationships of confidence and mutual trust
between enterprises and the societies in which they operate;615 respect trade unions;616 contribute
to the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labour;617 and maintain plans to prevent
serious environmental and health damage from their operations.618 The OECD Guidelines are the
only international guidelines that recommend risk-based due diligence619 and provide tailored
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sector-specific guidance for multinational enterprises.620 As recently as May 30, 2018, Canada
and other OECD countries agreed to step up responsibility and commitment to the OECD
Guidelines through their support and monitoring of the implementation of the new OECD Due
Diligence Guidance for responsible business conduct at the OECD’s annual meeting.621 While
the OECD Guidelines are voluntary, Canada promotes its support of the OECD Guidelines
through its NCP.622
However, similar to the CSR Counsellor, the NCP is limited in its jurisdiction;623 any
resolution between parties is non-enforceable and the NCP has no power to award
compensation.624 Since 2001 (17 years), only 19 “specific instances” (read, complaints) were
forwarded to the NCP. In June 2017, the UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights
noted in its end-of-visit statement that the Canadian NCP was ill-equipped to deal with human
rights concerns and that it ought to be made more independent, vested with adequate resources,
and be made more transparent in its process.625 In January 2018, MiningWatch, in partnership
with OECD Watch, filed a statement outlining specific concerns with the way in which the NCP
had handled complaints raised against the Sakto Group (a CanCorp) alleging the NCP failed to
follow enumerated OECD processes and provided no clear basis for failing to do so.626
Specifically, although finding allegations made regarding Sakto’s alleged involvement in
laundering the proceeds of corruption from Malaysia were “material” and “substantiated,” five
620
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months later, the NCP dismissed the case without providing clarification for its reversal in
position. MiningWatch highlighted that, later that year, the NCP issued an eight-page final
statement627 in which it revealed it had experienced significant pressure from a member of
parliament and from Sakto’s legal counsel challenging the NCP’s legal jurisdiction and findings.
This “final statement” was later retracted and replaced with a new final statement, removing all
mention of concerns regarding Sakto’s conduct and instead suggesting Bruno Manser Fonds (the
not-for-profit representing the complainants) was at fault and would have to demonstrate its
commitment to “good faith” should it request any further review in the future.628
I am aware of no official change to the NCP’s role or powers since the UN Working
Group or MiningWatch’s complaints were made public. Indeed, over the last 15 years, rather
than legislating power to monitor and punish CanCorps in Canada, the federal government has
preferred the creation of non-binding policy and monitoring schemes. The federal government
published guidelines available to CanCorps entitled “Voices at Risk: Canada’s Guidelines on
Supporting Human Rights Defenders” in which the government explains that CanCorps are
“encouraged to operate lawfully, transparently and in consultation with host governments and
local communities and to conduct their activities in a socially and environmentally responsible
manner.”629
Similarly, in 2009, Global Affairs Canada launched Canada’s official policy on corporate
social responsibility called “Doing Business the Canadian Way: A Strategy to Advance
Corporate Social Responsibility in Canada’s Extractive Sector Abroad.”630 The policy relies on
education and promotion of “effective” (not binding) CSR, and specifically notes the policy
builds on Canada’s “steadfast engagement” with Canada’s commitments under the UN Guiding
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Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGP)631 and the OECD Guidelines (read, reliance
on the NCP).
CanCorps derive not only significant financial benefit from incorporation or doing
business in Canada, they are also able to do so in an environment where official monitoring of
their behaviour is limited and there are no effective means by which the government can or will
choose to limit their profitability or access to such financial benefit. By choice, the federal
government has not provided itself with the tools with which it could control or aggressively
guide the behaviour of CanCorps operating abroad. This limitation results in a safe and
financially comfortable home base for CanCorps. From this home base, CanCorps can further
their profitability through the promotion of its reputation, borrowed from its national host.

3. Canada’s reputation as a shroud of human rights support
It is increasingly common for a corporation to adopt CSR policies to assist with the
promotion of its corporate reputation,632 and respond to “issues beyond the...economic, technical,
and legal requirements of the firm to accomplish social benefits along with the traditional
economic gains which the firm seeks.”633 In developing CSR policies, MNEs often cite
adherence to voluntary international instruments. For instance, Barrick Gold promotes its
commitment to “working constructively” with governments and other partners to meet the UN
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reporting is done by KPMG in the Netherlands. In 1993 ESG reporting of the top 100 companies in OECD countries
was 12%, in 2013 that percentage rose to 76%. Of the largest 250 companies worldwide, the percentage that engage
in ESG reporting is 93%: Williams 2018, supra note 529.
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Keith Davis, “The Case For and Against Business Assumption of Social Responsibilities,” (1973) 16 Am Mngmt
J 312 at 312. While reporting may be one of the most preferred CSR approaches, the Business and Human Rights
Centre, an NGO supported by the UK and German governments, found reporting does not necessarily lead to
changes in the field. For instance, despite Barrick Gold’s 100% reporting rate on the UN Compact, Barrick’s
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Sustainable Development Goals by 2030,634 while Goldcorp promotes its implementation of the
UN Declaration of Human Rights and the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human
Rights.635 Some MNEs further promote their CSR initiatives through engagement in NGO
partnerships, borrowing the goodwill associated with, for instance, the World Wildlife Fund, to
sell the company’s commitment to CSR.636 However, an MNE’s opportunity to engage with or
merely cite international CSR standards or partner with NGOs can be done from anywhere. In
contrast, the ability for MNEs to borrow a home country’s reputation is tied to nationality and
cannot be underestimated. Indeed, a CanCorp is marked by Canada’s reputation when operating
abroad.
And, while the reality of its actual commitment is hotly debated, Canada certainly
promotes itself as a guardian and promoter of human rights, at home and abroad. Since its
participation and promotion of the UDHR in 1948,637 Canada has since committed to and voiced
support for a large number of human rights instruments —the provisions of which have direct
reference to the activities of CanCorps — such as: the codification in 1966 of the UDHR rights
in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights638 and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights;639 the 1976 OECD Guidelines;640 the 1977 International
Labour Organization’s Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises
and Social Policy;641 the 1999 UN Declaration on Human Rights Defenders;642 the UN Guiding
Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGP);643 and the more recent 2015 UN Sustainable
634
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Development Goals644 and its follow-up, the UN Global Compact.645 Notably, after years of
resistance,646 in May 2016 the Canadian federal government declared its “full support”647 for the
2007 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP).648
Despite Canada’s relatively small population size, Canada has consistently participated in
the governance of world affairs. For instance, since 1976 it has been a member of the Group of
Seven (G7) Industrialized Nations — described as the “steering group for the West”649 — and
has served as a non-permanent member on the United Nations Security Council for six terms,
thus ranking in the top 10 of non-permanent members. Further, despite ranking as 38th in
population size, Canada’s GDP as measured by the World Bank ranks 10th in the world.650 The
Reputation Institute — an American corporate consulting agency which has listed the most
reputable countries since 2005 — has ranked Canada (as measured by the reputation of Canadian
corporate responsibility, to focus on human rights impact assessments and comprise best practices of states and
corporations, and provide concrete guidance regarding the obligations and responsibilities of states and businesses,
among other things. In 2008, Ruggie presented the “Protect, Respect and Remedy Framework.” After further study,
in 2011 Ruggie concluded his work by issuing the Guiding Principles, a set of 31 recommendations containing
operational principles to support the initial Framework. The principles call on states to protect human rights and
ensure remedies are provided for victims of human rights abuses. Additionally, the framework calls on multinational
enterprises to respect human rights by resisting interference with such rights. Notably, Ruggie concluded the state’s
duty to protect human rights extraterritorially, while encouraged, is not mandated: see Radu Mares, “Business and
Human Rights After Ruggie: Foundations, the Art of Simplification and the Imperative of Cumulative Progress,” in
Radu Mares, ed, The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,
2012) at 3. John Knox, “The Ruggie Rules: Applying Human Rights Law to Corporations,” in Radu Mares, ed, The
UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2012) at 79.
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companies) in the top seven countries since at least 2011.651 By such measures, Canada appears
to be punching above its weight as an influential leader, one that promotes and supports human
rights globally.
Not surprisingly, the federal government and associated crown corporations have
promoted this reputation. In selling Canada as a place to headquarter business, the EDC boasts
that “Canadian companies are increasingly commanding respect on the global stage, for reasons
ranging from our Canadian values to our capabilities and expertise in various industry
sectors…The Canada brand is incredibly hip — and right now, it’s the envy of the world.”652 In
concert, the TCS advertises that Canada ranks among the top countries in 2017 for business, as
being one of the easiest places to start a business, and first in the G7 for overall living conditions,
quality of life, democracy, economic freedom, social progress and, importantly, overall
reputation.653
It is clear global mining companies agree Canada is a favourable state in which to
headquarter their businesses. Mining CanCorps represent nearly half of publicly held global
mining businesses, and while they control $88.3 billion in assets at home in Canada, this only
accounts for one third of the value of assets held abroad by mining CanCorps: $170.8 billion.654
A significant location of these foreign assets are in South America ($53.4 billion) and Africa
($31.3 billion), while Asia experienced the greatest gain in Canadian investment (up 18.2%,
$11.1 billion in 2015); in other words, much of the business of mining is done in Canada and the
majority of mining is done abroad from the comfort of “home.” Canada’s reputation abroad
provides CanCorps with the means to effectively and unfairly “bait and switch;” such
corporations presenting themselves cloaked in the social and environmental “values” of the
Canadian state only to flee liability – and, in turn, the critical ethical values-driven juridical gaze
– in that same state.
Canada is a stable democracy in which a CanCorp may have access to significant
financial and expert capital, insurance, international access, and tax breaks, much of which
651
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comes at the expense of the Canadian taxpayer. The financial and human capital benefits of
headquartering a corporation in Canada lead to significant advantages for a CanCorp. Such
advantages are supported by a strong national reputation with which a CanCorp can promote
itself abroad while being subject to a consistently non-interventionist regulatory system.
However, the necessary consequence of being domiciled in a stable developed state with
an (arguably) strong democracy is the existence of a strong judiciary. Fairness — in its operation
as between the Field and the CanCorp — dictates that the multitude of benefits reaped by a
CanCorp ought to be met by real responsibility before the same country’s judiciary. As John
Dewey explained, the corporation is a right-and-duty-bearing unit;655 it is now a matter of
determining whether society will impose fairness, or an equality as between rights (benefits) and
duties, to its corporate nationals. This basic duty of democratic fairness — that all Canadians are
subject to the law and to Canada’s courts — begs for a reality frame in the judicial examination
of a CanCorp’s impacts abroad. As Trevor Farrow noted, Canada’s acceptance of a capitaliststyle economic and trade development means it should also incorporate responsibilities that
attend to those policy decisions; to the extent the “fruit” of our domestic policy choices — such
as financial and regulatory support for CanCorps — leads to serious human rights violations, our
courts need to be made available as a resource for remedies.656
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Conclusion
At the front end of transnational tort litigation, it is jurisdiction that must be overcome by
putative foreign plaintiffs. However, over the last 30 years, the development of conflict of laws
legislation, common law, and Civil Code provisions has created a legal framework that, in theory
(and sometimes in practice), supports the assertion of jurisdiction, specifically in cases involving
breaches of human rights by Canadian persons. Even the traditional international norm of state
comity, in its flexibility and modern adaptation, supports such an assertive approach to
jurisdiction.
In other words, it is not the tests for forum non conveniens and forum of necessity that
require change to see transnational cases heard in Canada. The tests already allow for plaintiffs
to choose their preferred forum, are imbued with a plaintiff-friendly burden (even an
“exceptional” burden in Québec), and require Canadian courts to consider justice in their
balancing of factors. In fact, even imagining further liberalization of the test for jurisdiction may
not make any difference to the tendency of the judiciary to avoid assertion of jurisdiction in the
first place. This is so as it is not the test itself but the habitus of judges as agents of the judicial
Field that impresses a state-centred traditionalist approach and leads to Canadian judges shunting
foreign plaintiffs away from Canadian jurisdictions and back to foreign jurisdictions that are
unlikely to provide justice.
While some in the Field appear to be able to shake their traditionalist habitus — at least
in some cases — the ongoing tendency of the Field (from the superior courts to the SCC) to rely
on traditional norms of sovereignty and territorialist comity leads to the conclusion that a shift in
framing is required. To force the Field to see the forest for the trees, or to frame transnational
actions in a reality of global corporate power dynamics, may be impossible (or at least very
challenging) in the light of the current Field habitus. Thus, I have argued that one approach to
ignite a shift towards a global justice reality frame is for practitioners to lean into traditional
Field doxa – or tenets – whose reference may help to steer the Field habitus towards a more
liberal — arguably, accurate — interpretation of the tests for jurisdiction. The doxa that I argue
may be most effective is that of fairness.
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In the transnational tort arena, many commentators rely on fairness to argue that, for
instance, corporations must not be able to profit while taking no responsibility for their having
taken advantage of vulnerable populations. In other words, it is unfair for giants to take
advantage of the little guy. This conception of fairness pits two or more different parties against
each other and argues that fairness must be understood in a grounded manner, aware of the
potential inequality of treating differently positioned parties equally (read, the same). While this
argument is attractive and can be morally effective in some contexts, it requires Canadian Field
agents (judges) to accept they have a duty to foreign parties, an already challenging task to those
grounded in territoriality. Thus, in order to steer even the most traditional Field agents towards a
liberal interpretation of jurisdiction, I argue that a traditional, equality-based conception of
fairness may be effective when used in relation to treatment of a single actor. Rather than
comparing a corporate party to a vulnerable group of foreign plaintiffs, it is more effective to
apply a Rawls-based fairness approach to that Canadian corporate party alone. In this way, we
may avoid having to rely on globalized (liberal and uncomfortable) interpretations of justice in
the construction of our doxic fairness lens.
In providing Canadian courts with this lens, one that asks whether the corporate party is
being treated equally by the Canadian state in benefit and burden, the question of whether
fairness dictates an assertion of jurisdiction is answered by the extent to which Canadian
corporations take benefit from Canada while avoiding responsibility. As demonstrated in Chapter
3, in Canada it is clear that CanCorps doing business abroad, particularly those in mining,
receive considerable benefit while avoiding burdens. CanCorps receive significant financial
benefits through government funding, public investment, tax avoidance, and insurance. They do
so while under no obligation to provide business opportunity, jobs, or benefit back to the state. In
exchange, the Canadian government has repeatedly avoided instituting any effective corporate
oversight mechanism and has instead preferred the creation of a scheme to assist large
corporations avoid prosecution. In further benefit, CanCorps borrow the reputation and goodwill
of the Canadian state while operating abroad. In doing so CanCorps revel in the benefits of
Canadian “citizenship” while avoiding any accountability burdens associated with such
citizenship; in other words when CanCorps actively avoid being held liable in a Canadian
jurisdiction for their wrongdoing, knowing that many Field agents will allow them to do so, they
are taking advantage of the Canadian state.
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In bringing to light this version of unfairness, it may be possible to lead — by an
alternative route — traditionalist Field agents to the primary goal: a modern and justice-based
interpretation (or reality frame) and approach to the tests for jurisdiction. Not only does this
approach address La Forest’s push for “fairness” in Tolofson, but also his desire for “order” in
private international law. Indeed, “order” in the common law is created, in part, through
predictability. As has been explained, a source of the confusion around private international law
in Canada is the disconnect between the wording of the jurisdiction tests and the way in which
they are applied. To actively and predictably hold CanCorp’s to account for human rights and
environmental torts committed abroad – i.e. by acknowledging and promoting the actual
wording/burdens of the jurisdictional tests – creates no more disorder in Canadian law than to
hold CanCorps accountable for domestic torts committed in Canada; I don’t believe anyone
suggests there is unacceptable uncertainty in domestic civil litigation. Order, in this case, is
created through certainty of being held to account.
For further support, Field agents may be comforted to know that a more aggressive
approach to asserting jurisdiction aligns with the approaches increasingly taken by Canada’s
international brethren (including the US and the UK),657 and with retaliatory legislation enacted
by developing states designed to force developed common law states to assert jurisdiction.658
Further, such an approach aligns with the commitments Canada has long made on the
international stage through, for instance, Canada’s endorsement of an injured party’s right to an
effective legal remedy as outlined in the “international bill of rights.”659
Without addressing barriers to jurisdiction, along with other procedural barriers, foreign
plaintiffs will continue to struggle to achieve justice in cases involving human rights and
environmental abuse. Further, beyond such project-specific cases, a failure to shift the Field’s
approach to jurisdiction within Canada will more than likely mean that larger climate changerelated litigation brought from the international sphere will see no success in this country,
657
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forever susceptible to being dismissed on preliminary grounds. The Canadian judiciary (Field)
and litigation practitioners are on the front lines of this issue and may have a dramatic effect on
the development of Canadian law to the potential benefit of international plaintiffs. Through a
simple yet fundamental shift in framing, potentially achieved by practitioners introducing
evidence of the benefits enjoyed by a particular defendant corporation, such practitioners may be
able to create the right environment within the courtroom to encourage logical, modern, realitybased, appropriately weighted, and thoughtful decisions on jurisdiction, thus reserving hope for
the next step in climate change action. Indeed, where the tests for jurisdiction attain greater
predictability through a more globalized application – consistent with their current frameworks –
actions in liability launched by non-Canadian parties against CanCorps may have the opportunity
to be considered on their merits, rather than dismissed on procedural grounds. And hopefully, the
ever-increasing risk that CanCorps (particularly in oil and gas) that share in the responsibility of
climate change may actually be held responsible by a strong judiciary will lead to a sharp change
in business direction and practice, to a global benefit.
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